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ABSTRACT

The research problem was— to study the relationship between
Maritain's concept of the habitus and the fine art of musical perform
ance.
The purpose of the study was (1) to identify philosophical
truths concerning the role of the habitus in musical performance; and
(2) to apply these truths to the performance program in music education.
The research procedure was a philosophical analysis of Maritain’s
treatises on the fine arts and on education.

Source material also

included additional related writings by Maritain and pertinent studies
on Maritain's philosophy, as prepared by other researchers.
The main body of the study was designed in terms of four broad
components.

The habitus was related to (1) the fine arts in general;

(2) the aim of performance;

(3) the action of performance; and (4) the

use of performance.
As the study design evolved (through development), each component
focused upon a particular selection of Maritain concepts for study and
analysis.

The habitus of fine art was discussed in terms of the intel

lect, the practical order of art, and the rules of art.

The aim of

performance was examined by relating "the disinterested work" to beauty,
technique, and communication.

The action of performance was considered

in terms of artistic judgment, imitation, and the creative idea.

The

use of performance was studied by relating morality to performance.
viii

From the foregoing analysis, the relationship of the habitus to the three
broad components of performance was discussed and summarized.
The conclusions were as follows:
1.

The habitus of performance is an intuitive and operative dis

position which empowers a performer to aurally produce music without a
logical, conceptual understanding of his productive action.
2.

The performer is only vaguely (preconsciously) aware of his

habitus until its operative power is freed by intellectual connaturality
with an object, the sound of a musical work.
3.

The habitus relates to musical performance in the spiritual

or internal sense; therefore, the material or external aspect of per
formance is subordinated to the spiritual aspect.
4.

The operation of the habitus flows through the sound of a

work, as the sound pleases or displeases the intellect.
5.

The performer's connaturality with the sound of his music is

defined as the placing of his self into the work.
6.

The habitus operates through its object comprehensively,

thereby causing the artistic components (aim and action) of performance
to be

interrelated and overlapped in their contribution to the final

product.
7.

The aim, action, and use of performance can occur concur

rently; however, the use (of the product) must be subordinated to the
art (from which it was conceived).
8.

It is apparent that the most intense operative practice of

the habitus will occur during the performance rehearsal, while the final
performance is, to a greater extent, the use of the aural product and,
ix

to a lesser extent, a continuation of the aural art.
9.

A reciprocal relationship exists (within the intellect)

between the operation and development of the habitus.
10.

The relationship of the habitus to musical performance

explains why musicians, possessing a habitus of great depth, are able
to perform musical works without the assistance of a written score and
without dependence upon conceptual terminology.
Applications to the performance program in music education were
made by (1) comparing the aim of performance to Maritain's definition of
the aim of education; and (2) relating the habitus to learner intuition.
The results of these comparisons had the following implications for the
performance program:
1.

The performance program must direct its attention toward the

natural intelligence of the student; therefore, its aim should be to teach
for the meaning of music rather than toward
2.

the habitus of performance.

The teaching of musical skills and concepts should not define

the performance program.

These material aims are contributory aims, neces

sary but secondary to the classroom art.
3.

Since the meaning of music prepares the intellect for the

development of the habitus, an immeasurable degree of the habitus is
developed as a natural result of the student performer's connaturality
with his aural object.
A.

The habitus, because of its internal depth, is the least

accessible result of the performance program but one which has farreaching implications for the student in possession of such virtue.

x

5.

The material means of performance, because of their external

nature, are the most accessible results of the performance program, but
these are measurable only in the immediate sense.
6.

The instructor encourages student intellectual adherence to

an aural object by adapting his educative approach to the spontaneous
curiosity of the student.
7.

Intellectual adhesion to an object of sound relates to con-

naturality; and the freeing of intuition, through connaturality, encour
ages the student to place his self into his aural object.

Consequently,

the enjoyment of music is given a renewed priority in the performance
program.
Pursuant to the applications discussed, the following recommenda
tions were made:
1.

The student performer should be designated as the primary

agent in the classroom (in place of instructional and institutional
primacy).
2.

Classroom performance should focus its attention upon works

rather than students because, as previously determined, such an emphasis
(on artistic endeavors) best serves the primary agent.
3.

The use of classroom works should be subordinated to the pro

ductive action of classroom art; accordingly, the pursuit of nonmusical
and

extramusical objectives should be subordinated to the classroom

production of musical works.

xi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem
Broadly defined, the habitus refers to

. . qualities which are

essentially stable dispositions perfecting in the line of its own nature
the subject in which they exist."-*-

The intellectual virtues are special

energies which grow in intelligence through exercise in a given object as
added perfections of native capacity or natural intelligence.^

The intel

lectual virtues are an operative habitus because these faculties or powers
tend to action by their very nature.

The operative habitus is an acquired

habitus, acquired through exercise and use and a dependence upon human
effort.

This kind of habitus is a natural habitus of the soul because

the intellect resides in the soul of man.^

^Jacques Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," in Art and
Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry, trans. Joseph W. Evans (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962; also in paperback edition by Uni
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1974), p. 10; also see Edward H. Flannery,
trans., Glossary to An Essay on Christian Philosophy, by Jacques Maritain
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 110.
O
Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," in The Education of Man,
ed. Donald and Idella Gallagher (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1962; paperback edition, 1967), pp. 48-49.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10. The acquired
habitus is antonymous to the infused habitus because the latter is
imparted to the soul by God independently of human effort. The infused
habitus is a supernatural habitus which pertains primarily to theologi
cal virtues. See Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 154, n. 8; and
Flannery, Glossary to An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 111.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 154, n. 8.
1

2

The habitus of the performing musician is a virtue of the prac
tical intellect which grows through performance as an added perfection
of native musical capacity.^

The virtue of art, an operative habitus,

is acquired through the art of performance and through a dependence upon
the personal effort of the performing musician.

The virtuoso is a "man

of habitus," that is, a musician who has perfected his virtue to a fine
point of distinction.

At the other end of the continuum are the student

musicians who are developing the habitus of music through the art of per
formance.

Student musicians are the substance of the school performance

program, a facet of music education in which student performers, through
the use of an instrument or the instrumentality of the voice, experience
the art of music by re-creating (performing) musical works.
Recent criticism of the school performance program and the amount
of technical mastery required of student performers has raised questions
about the habitus of the musician and the role of technical training in
the development of this habitus.
Can a performing group move in the direction of a laboratory
for music exploration while retaining a high level of technical
skill? Will time devoted to teaching add to or detract from
the effectiveness of time available for rehearsing? Should the
performance program be allowed to do its special thing, or
should everything possible be done to help performance experi
ence become a powerful influence on the musical understandings
of the participants?^

^"Art is a habitus of the practical intellect. . . . This
habitus is a virtue. . ." (Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue,"
p. 12).
o
For Maritain's discussion of "the man of habitus" see ibid.,
pp. 11-12.
■^See Bennett R.eimer's discussion of the school performance pro
gram in A Philosophy of Education (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1970), chap. 9 passim.
^Reimer, "Patterns for the Future," Music Educators Journal 63
(December 1976), p. 24.
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The "specialism" of performance has been identified as the culprit
responsible for the forcing of goals other than those characteristic of
the art itself.'*'

A paradox of musical performance is that a degree of

technical proficiency is necessary to control an instrument or the voice,
and yet "mastery of technique cannot by itself justify the enormous effort
expended by so many children in learning to play or sing."^
When the major focus of teaching is on technique then the major
effort of the student is expended on skill development, a practice inevit
ably doomed to diminishing returns.

"Novelty turns into routine, excite

ment into boredom, the pleasures of progress diminish as limitations are
realized."J

Can the goals of fine performances, along with the increase

of student musicianship through technical skill, be met without sacrific
ing incentives for students to explore music independently or to expand
their personal musical horizons?^
The specialization of performance brings to light the matter of
extramusical

objectives, that is, the use of musical technique for motives

outside of the art itself.

"Music in the schools has come to be recognized

by the general educator as synonymous with entertainment and is evaluated
and consequently financed as utilitarian bases of entertainment,

iReimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, p. 127; also see
Abraham A. Schwadron, "Aesthetic Values and Music Education," in Per
spectives in Music Education: Source Book III, ed. Bonnie C. Kowall
(Washington, D.C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966), p. 188.
^Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, p. 131.
3Ibid.
^Warren F. Prince, "Music Education’s Split Personality," Music
Educators Journal 61 (November 1974), pp. 30-31.
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'background music' for school affairs, public relations, and school pres
tige."^

When administrators or other school authorities view extra

musical objectives as the prime purpose of music education, the prospect of meeting musical objectives seems dismal indeed.

2

The validity of nonmusical objectives in the school performance
program is also in question.

"Can music be regarded as an academic (or

artistic) study when it is justified extrinsically because of its con
tribution to health, citizenship, morality, and when it is conceived of
as an instrument for the realization of non-musical [sic] values ['A'
ratings and the like]?"^
The entire matter of specialization, and its derivatives, has
created a controversial issue in the performance field.
The music education profession is in a state of confusion appar
ently unprecedented in its history. I doubt that there has ever
been the disagreement, the lack of consistent orientation, the
anxiety, or the willingness to jump onto any bandwagon that is
mirrored in the pages of our recent publications.^
The move for changes in the performance program has caused
much debate, a high level of discomfort for many performance
directors, and a rethinking by the entire profession of its
expectations for the children involved.^

Schwadron, Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education (Washing
ton, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1967), p. 70; also see
Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, p. 135.
n

zHarry S. Broudy, "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum,"
in Perspectives in Music Education, p. 180.
Schwadron, Aesthetics, p. 72; also see Reimer, A Philosophy of
Music Education, p. 29; and Phillip H. Phenix, Realms of Meaning (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 348.
“^Charles H. Ball, "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education," in
Toward an Aesthetic Education, ed. Bennett Reimer and associates (Wash
ington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1971), p. 57.
^Reimer, "Patterns for the Future," p. 24.
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Proposed theories which suggest alternatives to the skill of per
formance have focused upon the intellectualization of performance.

The

object of this focus is to replace technical emphasis with an emphasis
upon musical knowledge, a knowledge refined enough to enable students to
become "critically intelligent" about the art of music.^

The instrument

of this musical understanding is professed to be superior or high quality
literature carefully selected for use by the performance instructor.

o

There is evidence of concern with student musical taste and discrimination in professional publications.

This concern has, however,

paralleled a reduced professional concern with the amount and importance
of enjoyment or personal meaning which students find in the aural experi
ence of music.

For example:

To describe a succession of musical sounds in such terms as
beautiful, . . . ugly, or warm exemplifies a purely sensuous
approach to aesthetic perception and, consequently, calls for
little if any need for formal education. . . . To educate for
pure pleasure or for sheer sensuous enjoyment there is little
need for . . . formal music studies, . . . the business of
merely providing moments of sensuous pleasure is surely not
the erudite task of the music educator.^
The criticism of "sensuous music," however, raises serious ques
tions about the experience of music as music.

How can the aural art of

^"The intellectualization of performance is given theoretical sup
port in Schwadron, Aesthetics, p. 76; and idem, "Aesthetic Values and
Music Education," p. 187. Schwadron's use of the term "critically intel
ligent" is analogous to Reimer's discussion of "musical understanding"
in A Philosophy of Music Education, pp. 132-139.
‘‘The use of performance literature as an instrument of musical
knowledge is given theoretical support in Reimer, A Philosophy of Music
Education, p. 133; Broudy, "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum,"
p. 179; and Ball, "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education," p. 61.
^For examples of such concern see Schwadron, Aesthetics, p. 75;
and idem, "Aesthetic Values and Music Education," p. 192.
^Schwadron, Aesthetics, pp. 81-82; also see Reimer, A Philosophy
of Music Education, pp. 95-97; and Broudy, "Educational Theory and the
Music Curriculum," p. 177.
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music be separated from sensory experience and remain an aural art?

How

can the fine art of music be separated from the pleasing experience of
musical sounds and remain a fine art?
musical sounds fleeting in nature?

Is not all human encounter with

Is it possible, then, that what is

primary to music is being relegated to secondary status in music educa
tion?
The implications of the opening discussion and the above ques
tions infer that the habitus of the musician is more than technique and
a select knowledge of musical concepts; furthermore, the development of
the habitus is evidently more than technical training and a prescription
of selective knowledge.

What remains is the sensory nature of the crea

tive act itself and the ensuing question:

what is the role of the

habitus in the creative art of musical performance, and how is it devel
oped through the act of creation?
The answer to the foregoing philosophical question lies not in
the unknown but in what is already known about creativity in the fine
arts; and that is precisely why this researcher chose the philosophical
writings of Jacques Maritain as a springboard and source for this study.
In his treatises on the fine arts and on education, Maritain has con
fronted the problem of the habitus and, although these writings have
far-reaching implications, this valuable source has rarely been con
sulted by researchers in the field of music education.

Maritain's con

cern with the object of creation and the impact of this object upon the
creative process establishes an approach to the fine arts essential to
an understanding of the habitus.^

^■For an overview of his approach to art and its object see
Maritain, "Making and Doing," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 9; and

7

Statement of the Problem
The research problem is to study the relationship between
Maritain's concept of the habitus and music as a performing art.

Approach to the Problem
The research procedure is a philosophical analysis of Maritain’s
treatises on the fine arts and on education.

Relevant related writings

by Maritain and studies pertaining to Maritain’s philosophy, as prepared
by other researchers, are included as source material as they focus upon
the research problem.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to seek out and identify philosophi
cal truths concerning the role of the habitus in musical performance,
which can form the foundation of a philosophical aim or direction resist
ant to the obsolescence of passing trends, and to apply these truths to
the performance program in music education.

Need for the Study
The need for this study is established through evidence of dis
orientation and misdirection among educators in defining a valid purpose
of the performance program.^

idem, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," in Creative Intuition
in Art and Poetry (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953; also in paperback edi
tion by Meridian Books, 1955), pp. 48-50.
■^See p. 4 above.
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Delimitations
This study will not enter into Jacques Maritain's extensive treat
ment of theology, nor will it enter the Maritain realms of metaphysics,
politics, and the philosophy of history.

Research into the Maritain

sphere of ethics will be confined to the ethics of fine art; similarly,
research into the Maritain sphere of epistemology will be confined to the
poetic knowledge of fine art.

Within Maritain’s philosophy of fine art,

the concepts of poetic knowledge, creative intuition, poetic experience,
poetic sense, and beauty will be considered only in the context of their
relationship to the habitus and will not be pursued as independent areas
of research.
In limiting the study to the fine art of musical performance, the
related subject areas: music analysis (visual and aural), music theory
(composition), and music history (style periods) are delimited from con
sideration in this study.

In limiting the study to the performance pro

gram in music education, the school general music program is delimited
from consideration in this study.

Limitations
Maritain writings in untranslated French text are not included
as source material; consequently, the scope of this study is limited to
the English translations of Maritain's works.
The works of Maritain have a theological bias; accordingly, his
treatises on the fine arts and on education must be considered in light
of what permeates and transcends these discussions: man’s relationship
to God.

9
Maritain's discussions of fine art pertain primarily to the fine
arts in general; consequently, his philosophy of fine art must be trans
lated to the fine art of music and applied to musical performance.

Simi

larly, Maritain's philosophy of education is generalized and must be
translated to the field of music education and applied to the perform
ance program.

Definition of Terms
Art is the realm of "making" or productive action.

It relates to

the good or perfection of a work to be produced and not of the man making
the work.

The action of art is in conformity with rules governing the

good of the work and the end of the work.

In its formal sense, art is

ruled by the intellect of man, a practical intellect whose sole object
is to produce a work."*their object.

2

The fine arts are arts which have beauty for

The productive action of the fine arts tends to the
q

creation of a beautiful work, an end in itself.
Morality is the realm of " d o i n g . T h i s sphere is concerned with
the practical activity of reason as directed toward the good of human life
through the expression of free will.

5

"...

its distinctive object is

■^Maritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order," in
Art and Scholasticism, p. 6; and idem, "Making and Doing," p. 9.
O
Maritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," in An Introduction
to Philosophy, newly des. ed., trans. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1962), p. 196.
%aritain, "Art and Beauty," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 33.
^Maritain, "Making and Doing," p. 8.
^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the
Artist (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 26-27.
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not the perfection of the works produced and fashioned by man but the
good and perfection of the agent himself, or the use he freely makes of
his faculties. . . ."
Intuition is the immediate or direct intellectual perception
which takes place each time the intellect grasps an object which is connatural to it or most like itself.

o

Beauty is that which delights or

pleases the intellect through the senses of sight or hearing and their
intuition.3

The intuitive perception of beauty, then, takes place when

the intellect is delighted or pleased in that which is most like itself.
The creative idea is not an elaborate plan but rather a simple
view or artistic vision of a work-to-be-made.^

The operative or creative

idea is simply formative of things and is not formed by them because the
activity of art is one of creating rather than knowing.
Imitation is the process by which the instrumentality of natural
appearances is first presented to the mind of man and then recast or
transposed by intuition to a productive end.

Imitation uses sensible

signs to intuitively express that which has been presented to the intellect
through the senses.^

"...

the sign is that which makes present for

%aritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 196.
^Maritain, "Intuition and Duration," in Bergsonian Philosophy and
Thomism, trans. Mabelle L. Andison in collaboration with J. Gordon Andison
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 150-152.
^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," pp. 23-24; St. Thomas Aquinas Summa
Theologica, I, 5. 4. ad 1; and ibid., I-II, 27. 1. ad 3.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.
^John W. Hanke, Maritain's Ontology of the Work of Art (The Hague,
Netherlands: Marinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 43.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 55;
idem, "Beauty and Modern Painting," in Creative Intuition, p. 225; and
Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp. 46-47.
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knowledge something which is other than itself."^

A sign takes the place

of that which is signified and is infravalent to it.
Education, in its broadest sense, refers to any process by which
the child of man is shaped and led toward fulfillment.

In a narrower

sense, education refers to the task of formation which adults intention
ally undertake in regard to youth and, in its strictest sense, to the
special task of the school in helping a student attain completeness as
a human person.

9

The essential aim of education is to equip, form, and

liberate the intelligence to prepare for the development of the intellecO
tual virtues or habitus.

The essential aim of music education, then, is

to equip, form, and liberate the creativity of the spirit or creative
intelligence to prepare for the development of the habitus of music.^
Educational ends refers to the possible outcomes of the educa
tional process as reflected from the direction which learning experi
ences are taking.

Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," in Redeeming the Time, trans. Harry
Lorin Binsse (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1943), pp. 191192; also see idem, "Language and the Theory of Sign," in Language: An
Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 86; and Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp.
52-53.
p
Maritain, "The Aims of Education," in Education at the Crossroads
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943; also in paperback ed. by the same
publisher, A Yale Paperbound, 1960), pp. 1-2, 10; and idem, "Thomist
Views on Education," p. 50.
^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 49.
^The term: creativity of the spirit, or the creative intelligence,
pertains to intuition or the intuitive power of the mind, in its opera
tive functions, to seek and find beauty in an object. See Maritain, "Art
as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 54-56; and idem, "The Dynam
ics of Education," in Education at the Crossroads, pp. 42-45.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 2-4.
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Pragmatism is defined as the observable, measurable verification
of truth through the use of experimental methods.

Pragmatism tends to

define human thought as an organ of response to actual stimuli and situa
tions of the environment.3
Sociologism views the student as a potential citizen to be adapted
to the conditions and interactions of social life.
Intellectualism holds supreme two distinct achievements of human
intelligence: dialectical or rhetorical skill and scientific or technical
•5

specialization.
Voluntarism consists of making the intellect of man subserviant
to the will of man.

The will is either disciplined according to a pre

determined pattern as fashioned by the will of others, or left to the
free expansion of nature and the inclinations of self-will.^
The inclusive approach to learning maintains that everything can
be learned through prepared learning experiences.3
Definitions of terms other than those presented in this section
will be made explicit as they appear in the text of the study itself.

1Ibid., p p .
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3Ibid., P.
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CHAPTER II

THE HABITUS OF FINE ART

The Habitus and the Intellect
The Habitus and Natural Gift
The term "virtue" is used in a philosophical sense in this study.
The ancient philosophers referred to this type of virtue as a habitus or
state of possession, an inner strength possessed by man.'*'

The operative

habitus is a stable disposition or inner force which is developed in the
soul and which perfects its operative powers in a certain direction.

2

Being operative in nature, this kind of habitus is acquired through human
O
effort or use.

"Operative habitus, which attests the activity of the

spirit, resides principally in an immaterial faculty, in the intelligence
or will."^

Since reason takes place in the intellect, and since the

intellect resides in the soul, the operative habitus is defined as
intellectual virtue.

5

Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10; and Clare Joseph
Martini, Maritain and Music (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University,
1958; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 58-5769, n.d.),
p. 47.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10; and idem, "Art
and Morality," in The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 38.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 11.
"’Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p p . 48-49. See chapter 1
above for the initial discussion of the operative habitus as intellectual
virtue. Throughout the remainder of this study, the operative habitus
13
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The acquisition of the habitus is, in essence, a development of
an inborn disposition or natural gift of the mind.'*'

The natural gift

or native capacity varies from man to man but in all men it is only a
prelude to the intellectual virtue.

Although indispensable to the

acquired disposition, the inborn disposition must be cultivated and
disciplined in a manner which reflects the spontaneous nature of the
mind.

Since the natural gift possesses a spontaneous nature, it is

best developed through the spontaneous effort or personal activity of
the one in possession of a given capacity.

2

The Habitus and Habit
Maritain makes a distinction between the habitus and habit, a
distinction which further defines the habitus as intellectual virtue.
The habitus, in contrast to habit, is an exercise or use of intellec
tual powers which surpasses simple mechanical routine.

This is the

case because the habitus resides in the intellect of man and is subject to reason, not routine.

Only living intellectual beings can

acquire a habitus because they have the capability or reasoning power

will be referred to as the habitus. The adjective is unnecessary because
this concept will consistently be used in the operative sense.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 41.
2Ibid.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 10-11; and Gerald C.
Hay, Jr., Maritain's Theory of Poetic Knowledge: A Critical Study (Ph.D.
dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1964; Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Xerox University Microfilms, 64-11,084, n.d.), p. 9. Hay refers to the
habitus as operative habits; he refers to instinctual habits as customary
habits. The variance in terminology is the choice of the researcher and
does not change the essential meaning of the concepts as defined by
Maritain.
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to elevate the level of their being through personal activity.■*Habit resides in the nerve centers and is attained through repe
tition or conditioning, which means that habit can be defined in terms of
animal knowledge, that is, thinking without reason.

2

Cogitative reason,

or animal reason, takes place in the memory and is observable through the
O
empirical activity of habit.

The habitus of man, which resides in the

intellect, includes habit but goes beyond habit by retaining a sovereign
power to make or break a habit through the movement of human will.

The

will is an integral part of the intellect, a capacity entirely lacking
in animal intelligence.^

The activity of the habitus, which takes place

in the intellect, goes beyond empiricism because the intellect is
spiritual in nature and because it is moved by the will.

The Habitus and the Practical Order of Art
The Practical Order and the Speculative Order
The habitus, or intellectual virtue, is divided into two cate
gories or orders based upon the ends intended by man's use of his virtue.
Intellectual virtues whose primary end is "knowing" belong to the specula
tive order, the best examples of which are science, knowledge through
demonstration; and wisdom, knowledge through contemplation.^
Intellectual virtues whose primary end is "action" belong to the
practical order which, in turn, has two parts:

"making" and "doing."

%aritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 11.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 12-13.
%aritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 20.
^Ibid., p. 11.

“’ibid., p. 20.

%aritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order,"
p. 5.
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"Doing" is the exercise of man's free will for his personal "good" as a
man, the sphere of morality, the primary virtue of which is prudence.^
"Making" is man's productive action for the "good" of his work-to-bemade, the sphere of art.

2

Art is the determination of works-to-be-

made while prudence is the determination of acts-to-be-done.

3

Art is a habitus, an inner quality or deep-rooted disposition
that raises the natural powers of the artist to a higher degree and
gives him a possession of a certain strength entirely his own.

Since

the habitus resides in the soul, art also resides in the soul; since
art is a virtue of the practical intellect, art and reason are related.
The habitus of art is a virtue which sharpens an object to a point of
perfection or operative efficiency.

Conversely, while the object is

being perfected, the artistic virtue within the intellect is also being
perfected through the activity of art."*

The habitus, then, is both

•^Ibid., p. 6; and idem, "Making and Doing," pp. 7-8. The term
"good" used in this sense refers to that which is desirable to man him
self. See idem, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the
Artist, pp. 26-27.
^Maritain, "Making and Doing," pp. 8—9; also see Samuel John Hazo,
An Analysis of the Aesthetic of Jacques Maritain (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh, 1957; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University
Microfilms, 24,744, n.d.), pp. 10-11. The term "good" used in this sense
refers to that which is desirable for the work-to-be-made. See Maritain,
"Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 23-24.
^Maritain, "Making and Doing," p. 9; and idem, Art and Scholas
ticism, p. 154, n. 5. This study is concerned with the practical order
of virtues and the sphere of art within the practical order. The sphere
of morality is discussed only in the context of its relationship to the
art of performance. See chapter 5 below for this discussion.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p p . 4849; also see Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 47.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 12-13; and idem,
"The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 194.
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acquired from the creativity of art and applied _to the creativity of art
The habitus of art is of the practical order because art is concerned
with the productive activity of the practical intellect.

Generic Art and Fine Art
The realm of art is divided into the useful arts and the fine
arts as determined by the intended end of the work.'*'

The useful arts

are subserviant or servile arts, ordered to the service of man; the
fine arts are free or self-sufficient arts,each product of which is an
O
end in itself.

The phrase "an end in itself" infers that a work of

fine art is allowed to stand by itself with no particular use intended.
This characteristic leads the fine arts to their most important end:
beauty.

Beauty gives the fine arts their aesthetic nature as opposed

to the utilitarian nature of the useful arts.
Art in general tends to make a work. But certain arts tend
to make a beautiful work, and in this they differ essentially
from all the others. The work to which all the other [useful]
arts tend is itself ordered to the service of man. . . . The
work to vrhich the fine arts tend is ordered to beauty; as
beautiful, it is an end, an absolute, it suffices of itself.

A difficulty of fine art is that beauty, while being an end in
itself, cannot be produced as an intended end of a work.

Art in general

as well as the fine arts in particular, intends to produce a good work

■^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; idem, "Art as a Virtue of
the Practical Intellect," p. 61, n. 13; idem, "Poetry and Beauty," in
Creative Intuition, p. 175; and Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, pp. 14-15.
Maritain's use of the phrase "end of the work" refers to the personal
end towards which the artist is striving.

2Ibid.
^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; also see Hanke, Maritain's
Ontology, pp. 33-34.
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rather than a beautiful work.

Beauty is an end beyond the end and

transcends the created object; beauty is not produced but is mirrored
in the work.

2

How, then, can the artist create a beautiful work when his per
sonal intention is to make a good work?

The answer to this question

lies in the relationship between beauty and the intellect.

The intel

lect has a natural desire to produce an object of beauty because of its
spiritual nature.

The intellect finds its delight in beauty and, left

to the freedom of its nature, the intellect will strive for beauty.
This means that when an artist creates an object, beauty will accompany
the creative act because of the natural inclination of the artist’s
intellect.

The creativity of the spirit is at the core of the fine

arts and lies beyond the realm of the useful arts.

Beauty, of itself,

has no use, only the joy of the intellect in finding its delight in
beauty through the making of an object it has willed to make.

3

In the fine arts the general end of art is beauty. But in
their case the work-to-be-made is not a simple matter to be
ordered to this end, like a clock one makes for telling time
or a boat one builds for the purpose of traveling on water.
A paradox of fine art, then, is that the work tends toward beauty
but beauty is not the intended objective.

To achieve the transcendental

end of his work, the artist must love what he is making and refuse to
deviate from this conscious end.

In this light, beauty becomes connat

ural to him and becomes a natural part of the product.

If the artist

^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 173, n. 22
2Ibid., PP. 174-175.
3Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 55.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 46.
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is delighted, personally delighted, with what he is making, the intel
lect is moved by his will and is guided straightly to the making of
the work.'*'
Two crucial points concerning beauty and the fine arts need to
be emphasized.

First, the fine arts, because of their relationship to

beauty— and the intellectual inclination toward beauty,

are free and

must remain free in order to attain their transcendental end: beauty.
Secondly, reason plays an essential but secondary role in the fine arts,
secondary because the intellect inclines toward beauty but cannot produce it.

Any attempt to produce beauty inevitably recedes into aca

demicism because the latter fails to perceive beauty as a transcendental.^
A common error among aestheticians is to attribute the character
istics of the fine arts to the arts in general.

This, in effect, makes

the fine arts sacred and ignores the true relationship between the arts:
making.^

Art is not confined to fine art alone, and the term "aesthetic"

is not appropriate for art in general.

The useful arts depend upon1

1Ibid., p. 47.
o
Maritain also refers to this intellectual inclination as the
"creativity of the spirit." See chapter 1 above, p. 11.
"^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 63.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174. Maritain further asserts
(ibid.) that academicism is a perversion of the fine arts. Chapter 3
below contains a more complete discussion of this concept.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 46. In this study, the noun
"making" is used synonymously with "producing" or "creating"; similarly,
the "making of an object" is equated with "creating a xrork" or "produc
ing a product." The interchange of these terms does not change the
essential meaning of Maritain's philosophy of the arts.
^Maritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 195, n. 1.
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being good for something else, that is, a particular service to man.'*'
A common misconception at the other extreme is to make an overly
rigid distinction between the fine arts and the useful arts.

The divi

sion of the arts into such categories is taken from the ends pursued;
however, the same art

can achieve beauty and utility at the same time

in spite of one end being primary to the work.

2

For example, architec

ture is at the service of man; nevertheless, a degree of structural
beauty is an inevitable part of the final product.

Music stands by

itself as a fine art; however, the beauty of music inevitably attracts
listeners and gives rise to the performance of music in the presence of
a listening audience.

". . . it is not a question of whether in fact a

work of useful art is beautiful or a work of fine art is useful, but
rather of what is intended by the art— to what it is that a given art
essentially tends."

3

The habitus of art applies to the useful arts and the fine arts
in a common fashion.^

Art in general tends to make a good work and the

ways of making this work are instrumental to the work, the instrument of
the habitus, and an integral part of the habitus of art.

5

The habitus

of fine art takes the essential step beyond the arts in general by

^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 175.
2
Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 158, n. 40; idem, "Art as a
Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 61-62; idem, "Poetry and Beauty,"
p. 174; and idem, "Apropos an Article by Montgomery Belgion," in Art and
Scholasticism, app. 4, p. 114.
^Hanke, Maritain*s Ontology, p. 34; also see Hay, Maritain*s
Theory, p. 18.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 38-39.
%aritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 63.
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allowing its product to stand as unique in itself and, consequently, tend
ing toward beauty.

The habitus of fine art cannot produce beauty concep

tually; rather, it captures beauty in an object it has willed to make.
"The object of making is a trap to catch a transcendental."^

The Habitus and the Rules of Art
The Rules of Art and the Rules of Fine Art
Maritain defines the rules of art as ways of making or the tools
or means of art.

2

The rules are fixed rules, but they are not externally

imposed on the artist and his art.

The rules of art, then, are fixed

within the artistic action, which means that the artist uses rules to
suit needs peculiar to the ends of his work.
The rules of art, of which Maritain speaks, are spiritual in
•3

nature because they are a possession of the habitus of art.

This

explains the very personal nature of these rules, something more than
a written list of directives.

The spiritual rules exist only in the

philosophical sense and in the roots of the virtue of art.^1 These
spiritual rules, which form the foundations of intellectual virtue,
exist in the artist's intellect prior to the practical and technical
manifestations of these rules.

5

Since the spiritual rules exist in

^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174, n. 24.
O
Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 176, n. 79.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 38-39.
^Maritain also refers to these rules as "perennial rules" or
"eternal laws" of art in his "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intel
lect," p. 57.
5Ibid.
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the artist's intellect, they are a personal possession of the artist to
be applied to the artistic ends he has envisioned.
Properly speaking, he possesses them and is not possessed by
them; he is not held by them, it is he who holds— through
them— matter and the real; . . . he will act, not against the
rules, but outside of and above them, in conformity with a
higher rule and a more hidden order.^
The higher rule, of which Maritain writes, is the primary rule of
art, that is, a freeing of the creativity of the spirit to satisfy the
need to create a work (a work toward which the will tends).

Left to its

inclination, the will tends to the good of the work, a work brought into
existence by rules discovered by the intellect.

In this way, the will

and the intellect work together in observance of the primary rule.

The

rules discovered in the process of creation become a way or ways of mak
ing a particular object; and as these ways of making are applied, more
discoveries are made and a constant birth and rebirth of xjays or methods
to improve or refine the final product takes place.

2

The rules of fine art are the rules of art transfigured by beauty.
The creativity of the spirit naturally tends toward beauty in the form of
a work-to-be-made.

The primary rule of the fine arts is to free the

creativity of the spirit to pursue a desirable object, one x^hich it
wills to make through natural inclination.
Thus for the apprentice . . . composer the primary rule is
to follow purely the pleasure of his . . . ears in the . . .
sounds he will be responsible for; to respect the pleasure,
and pay total attention to it; at every instant to produce
nothing but what the senses are fully pleased with. For the
creativity of the spirit, in its longing for beauty, passes
through the senses.^*
3

^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 39.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 53-54.
3Ibid., p. 59.
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Reason alone is not enough to create an object which captures beauty.
The will must be left free to its natural inclination; in other words,
the artist must love, or be delighted in, what he is making.

This is

beyond reason but connatural with it.^
Through the inclination toward beauty, a work of fine art is an
end in itself, a unique product; therefore, each work demands a new or
unique way of striving after the intended end.

The rules are fixed or

determined at the time of creation rather than in advance, and they are
subject to perpetual renewal because the ways of capturing beauty are
infinite.

2

In comparison to the useful arts, the rules of the fine arts are
more spiritual in nature because of their deeper relationship to the
realm of the transcendental.

The primary

rule of fine art depends on

the will to guide the reason; the rules are determined at the moment of
creation through discovery, a unique approach to the uniqueness of the
final product.

Because beauty is infinite, the rules of fine art are
O

subject to a renewal more exacting than the rules of useful art.

The Rules of Art and Technique
Maritain insists that the spiritual rules of art exert control
over the material rules or "conventional imperatives" of art,^ a posi
tion which is consistent with his view of the habitus as a controlling
force over habit.

The spiritual rules are the essence of the habitus

and they elevate the meaning of "technique," a term which refers to1
1Ibid., p. 58.

2Ibid., pp. 56-57.

o
Ibid., p. 56.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 38.
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the rules of art.

Maritain's use of this term includes the material

processes and manual skill of art but, above all, refers to the ways of
operation of the intellectual sphere which the artist employs to attain
the object of his art.'1' These intellectual ways of operation, then, are
the spiritual rules of art, the essence of the habitus; the manual skill
of art is equated with habit, a part of technique but subject to a higher
rule, the primary rule of art; the material processes include the tradi
tional rules of art which exist extrinsically and function as a resource
for the primary rule.

o

The habitus of art possesses certain fixed rules of operation;
but they must be discovered along the way or at the moment of creation,
as they are applied to the work, as they perfect it, and as they are
adapted to the final product.

The effort of discovery, or the via

inventionis, requires solitude and is not learned from others.

O

The

1-Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 176, n. 79.
^Maritain does not refer to the spiritual rules and material rules
as the constituents of two separate kinds of habitus; rather, he views
them as txro aspects of the same habitus. His concern is with the predom
ination of the primary rule, which is spiritual, and the subordination of
the material rules, which are external, within the context of the habitus,
the totality of which serves the object of art, the intended work.
" . . . the practical science of the work to be made and (practical)
art are not two distinct habitus [sic] but rather two formal aspects
of the same habitus [sic]. However, one of these aspects may be
more marked than the other in different particular cases; the art
aspect predominates, e.g., in a Moussorgsky, or in some physician
who frequently cures his patients and seems to work by rule of
thumb; the science aspect predominates in a da Vinci, or in a
physician who is more learned but effects fewer cures" ("'Specula
tive' and 'Practical,'" in Distinguish to Unite: or, The Degrees of
Knowledge, trans. under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan [New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959], app. 7, p. 464).
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 42; and Martini, Maritain and
Music, p. 50.
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rules become discernible to the artist alone and are applied or adapted
as he sees them and as the needs of his work spontaneously confront his
intellect.*■
The discovered rules reach fulfillment through discipline, an
intellectual discipline which strives for a personal balance between
the internal effort of discovery and the external presence of tradi
tional rules of art.

The effort of discipline, or the via disciplinae,

involves manual skill and the vast reservoir of material means from
which the artist can draw to refine his product.

These rules, exter

nal to the product, must be adapted to the work as the artist sees it
and applied in a way unique or new to the artist.^

If certain tradi

tional rules do not meet the needs of the work at hand, they are not
applied and remain external to the product.
There is no "proper proportion" between the via inventionis and
the via disciplinae because the balance between the two will vary with
the artist's ability and the requirements of the work pursued.

There is

overlap in the sense that the discovery of traditional rules renders
them new to the artist and new to the product because they are applied
in a unique way.

There is also an important distinction:

The via inventionis is more intimately bound up with the
primary rule. While the via disciplinae concerns itself more
with the secondary rules of making.^

^-Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 43.
^Ibid.; and Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 50.
%aritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 45; and idem, Art and Scholas
ticism, p. 180, n. 91.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 50.
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The via inventionis is necessary for the inclinations of the creative
intellect; the via disciplinae teaches the artist to be the master of
his virtue and reduces the tendency toward artistic anarchy.
The elevated use of the term "technique" applies to all rules
of art but gives priority to the internal, spiritual rules which are
concerned with the primary rule and the end of the work.

The external,

material rules (including manual dexterity) are used to serve the work
and the needs of the primary rule.
Technique, in its lower sense, subordinates the primary rule to
the external rules and inverts the priorities.

A facet of this inver

sion occurs through the temptation for technical display which is, in
essence, a display of the artist’s skills.

Manual skill or dexterity

is external to art in the formal sense; it exists to execute and externalize the spiritual rules of the work as discovered by the intellect.

2

If the primary intent of the artist is execution then the primary rule
is surely neglected because of the inverted priorities; consequently,
the perfection is directed at the artist's skill rather than the workto-be-made.

Conversely, technique, in its higher sense, includes and

requires a certain refinement of skill when the needs of a work demand
that a particular skill be accomplished for the good of the work.
A second facet of technique, in its lower sense, occurs as dis
covered rules, by nature, tend to become recipes or formulas for the

^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 43; and idem, Art and Scholas
ticism, pp. 179-180, n. 88.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14. The term "for
mal sense" refers to the spiritual or intellectual nature of art.
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future

practice of art."*-

Packaged rules are aids to the further prac

tice of art, but they are also obstacles to art, and to fine art in
particular, because the artist's work demands to be good in itself
rather than a copy of the previous work.

The traditional rules of art

are discovered rules which have become recipes or methods of making a
work.

These rules are important to the via disciplinae; however, a

preoccupation with method veers toward academicism or rules for the
sake of rules.

Method, of itself, only provides relief from thinking,

especially for those artists who wish to create but lack the desire to
pursue the laborious demands of creativity.

In this sense, academi

cism inhibits art because academic rules are too limited, restricted,
and narrow in scope to serve the primary rule of art.

Reason is essen

tial to art but mechanistic calculation is extrinsic to the spiritual
nature of the habitus.^

Academicism and the Habitus
Academicism also inhibits the habitus in its development from
the inborn capacity or natural gift of art.^

A reliance upon external

rules to develop the habitus is contrary to the internal nature of the
habitus.

This is because the habitus is a living rule based upon

%aritain, "Art as a Virtue
". . . even in the useful arts, the
taught by professors in schools and
ing discovered by the creative eyes
of invention" (ibid., pp. 53-54).

of the Practical Intellect," p. 54.
rules are not ready-made recipes,
museums, but vital ways of operat
of the intellect in its very labor

^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 40.
^Hay, Maritain's Theory, pp. 19-20.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 41-42.
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living, personal experiences and is formed as such within the mind.
Apart from the habitus, rules are extrinsic to the mind and to the work.
An instructor might fill a student's mind with academic rules of art,
and the student may work hard to apply them; nevertheless, the student
may also never become an artist because a knowledge of rules does not
imply actual possession of such rules internally.

In other words, a

mere knowledge of rules does not insure that an artist is able to apply
them to the internal needs of a work.

Carefully devised formulas for

art remove

the burden of thought, the originality of creation and,

ultimately

the experience of art itself.

The problem is posed for the modern artist in an insane man
ner, as a choice between the senility of academic rules and the
primitiveness of natural gift; with the latter, art does not yet
exist, except in potentiality; with the former, it has ceased to
exist at all. Art exists only in the living intellectuality of
the habitus.
The acquisition of the habitus is a deepening of the mind, an
indirect result of the practice of art or the relationship of the art
ist to his object.

The natural gift of art, which is also intellectual

or spiritual, serves and enhances the development of the habitus,
together giving the artist a unique intellectual power to make works.

Ibid., p. 40. Hay appears to contradict Maritain on this mat
ter, as exemplified in the following quotation: "The rules of art exist
for the purpose of establishing the artistic habitus in the artist"
(Maritain's Theory, p. 21). By itself, the above quotation is ambig
uous. The statement is true if_ the artist discovers the rules in ques
tion through his making of an object. I f , however, the rules exist
prior to the creative attempt, the threat of academicism is present
because of the external nature of academic rules.
2
Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 40.
3Ibid.

of

4Ibid., p. 41.

3 Ib id .
The n a t u r a l g i f t , to w h ich M a r i t a i n r e f e r s ,
t h e m in d , a p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e i n t e l l e c t .
The p h y s ic a l

is

a g ift
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The acquisition of the habitus, then, is synonymous with the development
of the habitus.
In contradistinction to the case of Giotto or Moussorgsky,
the case of Mozart provides us with the classic example of how
fruitful can be the union of natural gift (and what a gift!)
and education— the earliest, most perfect and most intense
rational cultivation of the habitus.
The above quotation reveals something more of Maritain's view of
the habitus and its development.

Giotto and Moussorgsky acquired the

habitus of art through the solitude and personal effort of the via
inventionis.

By contrast, Mozart combined his natural gift with the

via disciplinae of tradition taught him by a master musician.

This sort

of education is the education of apprenticeship which contrasts with the
academy and the type of academic training which teaches certain rules
of— or approaches to— art as a prerequisite to the practice of art.
Mozart, through the via inventionis of his mind, began with works and
not with rules.

In this way, the via disciplinae, in conjunction with

a great gift, immediately served the practice of art, coinciding in the
cultivation of a habitus of great strength and depth.
This is precisely the reason why Maritain concluded that the
artists who expend the most effort to accumulate academic rules of art
are often the least capable of applying them to a work, that is, creat
ing a work of art.^

ability of the artist to competently execute a work pertains to the
material externalization of an internal structure willed by the
habitus. Physical ability, then, serves the intellectual gift; but,
in its own realm, it is of equal importance to art.
^-Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 179, n. 86.
^Ibid.; and idem, "The Rules of Art," pp. 42-43.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 42.
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From this point of view one must deplore the substitition . . .
of the academic teaching of the schools for corporate appren
ticeship. By the very fact that art is a virtue of the prac
tical intellect, the mode of teaching that by nature belongs
to it is apprenticeship-education, the working-novitiate under
a master and in the presence of the real, not lessons distrib
uted by professors; and, to tell the truth, the very notion of
a School of Fine Arts, especially in the sense in which the
modern body politic understands this phrase, conceals as deep
a misunderstanding of things as the notion, for instance, of
an Advanced Course in Virtue.1
Maritain's conception of the academic professor can be defined in terms
of one who teaches certain rules of— or approaches to— art and expects
his students to create works using these rules, thus indirectly dictat
ing the results.

Maritain views the master teacher as one who first

respects the will of his students in their intent to make a certain
work and then assists and supervises the achievement of the desired
result.

The student provides the bulk of the via inventionis— because

it is his work— and the instructor provides the bulk of the via disciplinae, the result being an actual product and not a fabrication.
The instructor teaches a discipline by showing and correcting, through
his personal example of artistic practice; the student learns his dis
cipline by imitating the example and practicing or perfecting it for
application to his work.^

1Ibid.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 177-179, n. 85.

CHAPTER III

THE AIM OF PERFORMANCE

The Fine Arts and Performance
Musical performance is a fine art and the aim of performance is
defined in terms of the fine arts.

Performance, as an art, is primarily

concerned with making an object, a musical work created through the aural
production and perception of music.

Performance, as a fine art, is intent

upon creating a musical work and aiming at an aural end which stands by
itself, "disinterested," to delight the performers who are the makers of
the work.-*The beauty of a musical work, as an end beyond the end, delights
the intellect through the sense of hearing;

2

therefore, the aural nature

of music defines performance as an aural art within the realm of the fine
arts.

Crucial to the aim of performance is the performer's satisfaction

with the sound of the work he is performing.

His work reflects beauty

when he is delighted with it, an experience attributable to the fine
arts in general.

O

%aritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; and Hanke, Maritain's Ontol
ogy, p. 12. A "disinterested" musical work is desired for itself by the
performer and is not a work created to please others or with a concern
for others (in the primary sense).
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 13. The senses of taste, touch,
and scent also provide pleasure to man but do not delight the intellect.
Only the senses of sight and hearing delight the intellect of man and,
consequently, are the windows through which beauty can be experienced.
The former are a kind of good but not a kind of beauty. See St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, 27. 1. ad 3.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 47.
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"*"A good work is one which is pleasing to the performer.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 163; and idem, "Art and
Beauty," pp. 30-31. A metaphysical discussion of beauty is beyond the
scope of this study; however, a brief comparison of transcendental
beauty to aesthetic beauty is necessary to help clarify the relation
ship of beauty to performance.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 163; also see idem, "The Ways
of the Practical Intellect," in Approaches to God, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen,
trans. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), pp. 84-86.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 28.
^ M a r i t a i n , " P o e t r y a n d B e a u t y , " p p . 163-164.
b e a u t y g iv e n i n c h a p t e r 1 i s b a s e d upon t h e i n t u i t i v e
b e a u t y w h ic h i s a n a lo g o u s to a e s t h e t i c b e a u t y .
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Aesthetic beauty is transcendental beauty confronting the intel
lect of man through sense perception; consequently, things are divided
into the beautiful or ugly depending upon whether they please or dis
please the intellect-permeated sense.'*'
ence.

This is the aesthetic experi

The limitation of the aesthetic experience is that man may not

recognize the beauty of an object because his senses may completely miss
the presence of beauty in the object confronting him.

"Not every person

sees beauty in the same object or under different conditions or even at
different t i m e s . A e s t h e t i c beauty is limited to a particular partici
pation in the infinity of transcendental beauty.
The fine arts attempt to absorb transcendental beauty into the
realm of aesthetic beauty, not by creating a concept but by creating an
object.

Since only God can see absolute perfection, the object of fine

art is limited to the imperfection of the artist; consequently, no work
of art can achieve absolute perfection.
The above paragraph is a synthesis of three important points.
First, the spiritual nature of transcendental beauty cannot be produced
as conceptual beauty, an entity in itself.

Beauty, as a concept, is

beyond man's understanding and is revealed to him only through the
aesthetic experience, a minute glimpse of a universe and an experience
which is

nonconceptual in nature.^

^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 164; and Hanke, Maritain*s
Ontology, p. 28.
‘‘Hazo, Mari tain's Aesthetic, p. 27; also see Hay, Maritain's
Theory, pp. 13-14. According to Hazo (Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 29),
the ability to experience beauty is directly proportionate to the
sensitivity of the beholder.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 27.
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Secondly, a work of art cannot be purely or totally disinterested
because the artist cannot work in a void to attain his object.

He must

draw upon the world through sensory experience to practice his art, to
make his object which becomes disinterested to him as it progresses to
a unique end.'*'

An artist cannot create a disinterested object concep

tually because he cannot create beauty conceptually.

The relationship

between the two lies within the realm of the transcendentals; a disinter
ested object reflects beauty.
Thirdly, since aesthetic beauty is never totally perfect, an
object of art always leaves something more to be desired.

An artist

strives for perfection but never quite reaches the absolute summit of
his work.

This lack of perfection functions as an incentive to reach

beyond reason toward disinterestedness and adds a certain mysterious
element to the creative process.

Obviously, absolute perfection would

leave nothing more to be desired and no mystery to be solved.

2

The foregoing discussion makes implicit several important con
siderations for musical performance.

The relationship of beauty to

performance depends upon the aural experience of music because the
aesthetic beauty of music is revealed to the performer through the
aural experience, the sound being the object from which beauty is
mirrored.
The object of performance is not a concept of created beauty but,
rather, a certain sound of music from which beauty is reflected.

A per

formed work can never achieve absolute perfection because it is limited

■^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 73.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 167.
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to the aesthetic inclinations of the performer.

On one hand, it is pos

sible to perform a work without the delight or intellectual joy asso
ciated with aesthetic beauty; and, on the other hand, the performer must
follow his personal delight with the sound of his performed music if the
spontaneous or unpredictable inclination toward uniqueness and disinter
estedness is to be achieved in the work.

Without intellectual joy, the

transcendental beauty of a work will remain muted to the performer’s ear.
In pursuit of the intellectual joy of making, the performer
expects to be delighted in the sound of his performed work-in-progress;
however, sounds may occur which actually offend his aural sense.'*"

For

example, modern or contemporary music may offend the aural sense at
first hearing because of the unusual complexity of such music, espe
cially if the ear is unaccustomed to the sound of such music.

Con

versely, the same music may delight the aural sense of another per
former, a proof of the very personal nature of sensory perception.
Furthermore, that particular sound which may at first shock the aural
sense may become acceptable and pleasing later as the ear-permeated
intellect becomes accustomed to the sound of such music.

The aes

thetic experience, then, is unpredictable from performer to performer
as well as within the intellect of the performer himself.
Each creative act of performance moves toward disinterestedness
but never becomes totally disinterested.

A performer can never be cer

tain of what new heights of aural experience each performance may bring;
each new glimpse of transcendental beauty provides incentive to pursue

^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. A3.
2Ibid., p. A4.
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the next glimpse, which lies somewhere beyond the performer's intuitive
grasp of beauty.^"

Academicism and Beauty
Artistic attempts to make beauty positive rather than intuitive
veer toward academicism, which relies on method or formula to produce
beauty.

o

Academicism in performance strives to remove the elusive nature

of sound as an object of creation and the mysterious relationship of
sound to the beauty if reflects.

Accordingly, this kind of positivism

tries to make positive what is not positive and belies an ignorance of
the nature of transcendental beauty.

If the artist could produce his

own beauty, it would no longer be a transcendental; if beauty is not a
transcendental, it could be reliably produced by artists who "under
stand" the mystery of beauty.
The truth of the matter is derived from a limitation; man is
limited to aesthetic beauty, the beauty of sensory experience.

Sensory

experience is a limitation because man can perceive beauty only as a
reflection of a created object.

Music, then, has a certain sound as

its object and beauty is reflected from the sound heard by the musician.
The academicism of performance focuses upon the printed score as
an object of beauty and attempts to produce beauty through a proficient
reproduction of the score.

Consequently, such preoccupation with a writ

ten score shifts the artistic emphasis from aural experience to visual
experience.

If visual mechanics become the object of performance, a

•^Sense intuition is intellectualized sense perception; it is not
logical and not something to be planned or solved. Hazo, Marltain's
Aesthetic, pp. 35-37.
2
Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174.
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performer may proficiently execute a musical sequence while completely
missing the beauty reflected by the sound of the exercise.

Conversely,

if a certain sound is the object of performance, the score will serve as
the vehicle or instrument of that sound; hence, a visual certainty is
subordinated to an aural uncertainty.
The academicist attempts to define what is beautiful in concep
tual terms while, in effect, denying that the aesthetic experience is
nonconceptual in nature.

Such a practice also denies the personal

nature of the aesthetic by attempting to provide beauty for a performer
as if it could be a simple matter of reproducing the score.

A degree

of transcendental beauty is present in every musical work, but the ques
tion of whether this beauty will reveal itself to the musician can be
answered only through the obscure, personal actuality of the aesthetic
experience.

The true academicist must deny the mystery of transcenden

tal beauty and the unpredictability of aesthetic beauty to preserve his
academic method; the true artist must deny the positivism of conceptual
beauty to preserve the spontaneous, intellectual joy of the aesthetic
experience.
Because the aesthetic experience of music is rooted in aural
perception, the performer's experience of beauty is subjective in nature.
A performer may capture beauty in the sound of a work, but he cannot
simply produce it by mere reproduction of a score, a way of focusing
upon beauty as a conceptual object of music.

The aim of performance

is a created object, the sound of a musical work which reflects beauty
for the performer to perceive aesthetically.

In this respect, beauty

is an end beyond the end, an end captured intuitively or non
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Technique and Performance
Manual Skill and Performance
The technique of performance is inextricably tied to the art of
performance.

This is especially true in the case of technical dexterity

or the execution of the performance product.

The skill of performance

removes a physical obstruction to art and enables the performer to exter
nalize his product or produce the sound of his work, the sound being the
intended object.
The labor through which the zither player acquires nimbleness
of finger does not increase his art as such nor does it engen
der any special art; it simply removes a physical impediment
to the exercise of art: . . . art stands entirely on the side
of the mind.l
The performer’s skill is necessary to carry out the primary rule which
is in the intellect.

The execution of performance, then, is a means

to an end, the end being a particular sound which has evolved from the
primary rule of art and which must be externalized to become the aural
experience of music.
If the aim of performance is execution, the means become the
object and display for the sake of display is inevitable.

The display

of performance skill is a constant temptation to the virtuoso or refined
performance group.

Display tends toward trickery and athleticism to

^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14; also see
Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 52; and Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 10.
2
Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 52.
3Ibid., p. 186.
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capture the admiration of an audience, a practice which betrays a concern
with pleasing others rather than a concern with producing a pleasing
work.^

Musical display can also mask a lack of connaturality with the

beauty of a musical work because the performer's concern is with the
sound of his skill rather than the sound of the work.

2

Consequently,

an impressive display can mask an unimpressive artistic intent.
Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to say that a refined skill is
unnecessary.

A well developed performance skill greatly enhances the

sound of a work, but it must be at the service of the work itself.
point is that a good technician is not necessarily a good artist.

The
A

physical command of an instrument lends itself well to pleasing others;
therefore, it must remain at the service of the primary rule and under
the control of the habitus, which seeks to make a good work rather than
a good performer.

The physical dexterity of the artist is simply an
Q

external and material requirement of art.
How does the skilled instrumentalist or vocalist serve the needs
of a musical work?

First, he must heed the creativity of the spirit in

determining what the work demands and be undeviating with the direction
his performance activity must take to meet these demands.
Secondly, the performing musician must be prepared to subordi
nate himself to the creation of a musical work.

For example, a powerful

soprano must be able to sing softly and without prominence when the work
demands it; a high-register trumpeter may need to develop a complimentary
low register to meet the needs of a xjork; the instrumentalist who dazzles1

1Ibid., pp. 191-192.

2Ibid., p. 186.

^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14; and Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 10.
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his admirers with his fingering facility may find long tones with a
corresponding quality necessary to a certain work.
Thirdly, the performer must recognize the difference between a
work performed to display an instrument or voice and a work performed
for itself, but with an emphasis on an instrument or voice.

In the

latter case, the instrument ie an instrument serving the performed work
while, in the former case, the work serves the instrument and falls into
the emptiness of means.
A skilled performer is highly qualified to carry out his service
to a work of art; however, if this service becomes self-serving, the
creativity of the spirit is confined and reduced by the enhancement of
the ego.

Academic Rules and Performance
The academic rules of performance— the traditional rules of per
formance are included within the academic framework— are a technique
related to the physical skill of performance.

These rules may, in fact,

use skill as a means to its ends, ends which are also a means of art.
The difference is that academic rules are more intellectual, but the
similarity is that they are also material rules, external to the pri
mary rule of art.
Academic rules are packaged rules which confront the performer
with such traditional approaches to art as: the correct way to express
a phrase; the proper interpretation of a style; or the right concept
of tone quality.

The problem associated with academic rules appears

when a possible way to create in a given situation becomes the right
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way to create in all situations.

This is academicism or rules for the

sake of rules.^
Academicism threatens the via inventionis of performance because
the rules tend to be applied in a stringent fashion to all musical works.
The prototypal application of rules is natural to art because the sen
sory experience of art cannot draw upon a void to attain its object.
But when the via inventionis is dominated by the via disciplinae, the
product of performance becomes more of a stereotyped preconception than
a unique object of art.

"To the extent that the rules of the Academy

prevail, the fine arts revert to the generic type of art and to its
2
lower species, the mechanical arts."
R.ules for the sake of rules can be expressed as "art for the
knowledge of rules."

Art for conceptual knowledge is of the specula

tive order and is contrary to

the nonconceptual, practical order of

O
making.

The activity of art is one of creation rather than procure

ment of conceptual knowledge, a knowledge of academic rules.^

Art

utilizes knowledge to create; knowledge is an instrument of art.^

^See chapter 2 above, p. 27.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 48.
^See chapter 2 above, p. 15.
^Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," in The Situation of
Poetry, in collaboration with Raissa Maritain, trans. Marshall Suther
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 49.
^Ibid. This brief consideration of conceptual knowledge is con
cerned with the habitus of art and does not enter the Maritain treatment
of poetic knowledge, a subject beyond the scope of this study. "The
habitus [sic] of art produces its fruit in the practical judgment on
the work to be made; poetic knowledge, in the xrork done" (ibid., p. 64,
n. 14) .
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Conceptual knowledge may be presupposed to art but it is extrin
sic to it.'*'

Art does not intend to form a mind by an object-to-be-known;

instead, the mind intends to form an object.and, through the practice of
art, form itself as well.

n

Rules, or the knowledge of rules, are an

instrument of art and extrinsic to the activity of art.
Performance for the knowledge of performance is a simple accumu
lation of ways to perform.

The conscious concern is with how to apply

conceptual rules to the performance of a work, the obvious lack being
the artistic vision necessary to visualize intellectually the work-tobe-performed.

In other words, vision ensures that the art of perform

ance begins x-riLth an object-to-be-made and not a means-to-be-applied.
The means of performance are fixed at the time work on the musical
selection begins because they become known as the sound of the selec
tion makes itself known to the performer.
Accumulating conceptual rules of art is dissimilar to acquiring
3
the habitus of art.

An artist who knows the most about art may be the

■'"Ibid., p. 50. It is not intended to infer that conceptual
knowledge is a prerequisite to art. A knowledge of a certain aspect
of art is gained through the artistic experience and is available for
further use, as a part of the expanding habitus of art. Nevertheless,
a product of art is made nonconceptually and without dependence upon
conceptual knowledge.
^Ibid.; and idem, "On Human Knowledge," in The Range of Reason
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952; paperback ed., [1961]), p. 17.
•^Following the completion of a performed work, the performer can
extract his material methods of execution from the score for conceptual
use. In other words, after the work is established or "'situated,' the
author can employ without disadvantage the special charm to be found in
the barbarism of technical terms" (Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p.
188, n. 116). The material analysis of a score belongs to the specula
tive order of knowledge and should not be confused with the initial mate
rial application of rules to a work. The rules become an internal part
of the work at the service of the habitus, in its operative intent to
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least able to apply his knowledge to a work being pursued.^

In musical

performance, this occurs because the performer, while able to create
various musical sounds, is reluctant to deviate from his known sound
creations to find that unique sound which applies to the work being
performed.
To become an internal part of the performance product, external
rules must be a discovered necessity of the work at hand, a discovery
made by the performer as he himself performs the work.

What follows is

a new adaptation of certain fundamental or perennial rules to the work
which becomes an internal part of a unique product.

In this way, old

rules learned from past performances become new again.
The material rules of performance serve the spiritual rules, and
the primary (spiritual) rule serves the object of performance, the sound
of the musical work.

This is because the release of the creativity of

the spirit is closely tied to artistic vision, and the artist envisions
the work as a whole, not a set of rules-to-be-followed.^

Technique is

the ensemble of both material and spiritual rules;4 therefore, it cannot
be a primary aim of performance.

Academic Rules and the Conductor
Academic rules present a special problem for the conductor of a
performance group because, besides being the primary maker of the work,
make a work, to practice art. The abstraction of material rules from
the work brings them back to their external position; at this point,
they are rules and nothing more than rules.
^See chapter 2 above, p. 28.
2Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 45.
3
Mantain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 181-182, n. 95.
4Ibid., p. 176, n. 79.
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he is responsible for the artistic experiences of the group members.

It

is the conductor who is responsible, for the via inventionis and the via
disciplinae of the work the group is creating; necessities of the work
are determined and applications of rules are made as he sees them.
is a special situation.

This

JEf the design of the work were to move in the

various directions desired by each group member, artistic anarchy would
result.

The needs of the work itself could be entirely missed in the

conductor's efforts to please his group membership.
The responsibility of the conductor, then, is the same as that
of a performer, but in a higher sense.

He is primarily responsible to

the creation and perfection of a musical work and secondarily respon
sible for the artistic experiences of the performers involved.
The latter responsibility is important because the performers
are artists and not slaves.

The conductor must constantly consider the

performers’ involvement in the making of the product.

Are they able

follow the artistic innovations the conductor is applying to the work?
If the performers can sense that the conductor's artistic innovation
and discipline— through the instrumentality of the group— is perfecting
the work, they become a personal part of the practice of art.
On the other hand, if the conductor's expectations are selfserving, or serve another master (academic rules), the performers become
removed from making and lose the connaturality with beauty so vital to
the fine arts.

In this case, the conductor's personal connaturality

with his product must also be questioned.

Without the primary respon

sibility to the work, the secondary responsibility to the performing
group is obstructed by expectations external to art.
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Since performance is a re-creation as well as a creation of
music, composed works are generally presented to the conductor through
a written score.

A written score requires a visual interpretation,

that is, an assessment through a knowledge of means as a prerequisite
to the aural experience.

The object of performance, however, cannot

be attained apart from the aural experience; therefore, a score is only
a potential work for performance and contains only the potentiality of
beauty for the performer.

It is an instrument of the conductor which

he uses to create the object, the sound of the work.
A knowledge of re-creation lends itself to the oversimplifica
tion of exact reproduction and thwarts the aim of art through the copy
making of an established work.'*'

If the conductor's aim stops at this

point, the performance will fall short of the ends necessary to the
creativity of art.

A conductor's aim to create a good work depends

upon the delight or enjoyment he derives from the sound of the work
as he conducts it.

Beauty cannot delight the artist's intellect unless

he puts something of himself into the work and, as a result, allows
the re-creative activity to become intertwined with creative activity.

2

When the concern of the conductor is the object of performance,
re-creation and creation occur simultaneously; if his primary concern is
(
with the means of score interpretation, re-creation is isolated from
creation and is doomed to the sterility of impersonality, the motions
of performance.

Furthermore, the contemplation of a musical score is

secondary to performance because the aural experience of music exists1
2
1

Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 54-57.
2
Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry in Art and Scholasticism and
the Frontiers of Poetry, p. 126.
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therein as a potentiality and not as an object.

The contemplative activ

ity of the mind belongs to the speculative of knowledge rather than the
practical order of art.^
A problem of academicism is that the artist who possesses rules,
through a knowledge of rules, may be unable to apply them to the indi2
viduality of a work of art.

The artist’s preoccupation with method is

a hindrance to his art because rules are held in a higher esteem than
the composition itself.

A dogmatic loyalty to fixed traditional rules

is unyielding or inflexible in the face of the spontaneous demands of
creation.

The demands of a musical work are unpredictable due to the

aural nature of performance.

The artist’s concern with method consider

ably narrows the scope of the work and attempts to narrow the infinity
of beauty as a result.
The dilemma of the conductor, then, is serving the needs of a
work through the primary rule of art while, at the same time, consider
ing the artistic needs of the performers who are making the x<rork through
the externalization of the conductor's directives.

Communication and Performance
Communication in a work of art occurs when the artist "says some
thing" to a perceiver of the work.
nonconceptual in nature.^

It involves a communication of effect,

The problem of communication is whether the

artist intends such communication or whether communication is inherent

■*ilaritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order, pp. 5-6.
o

See pp. 42-43 above.

^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 44.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 61-62.
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in a work of art.
The Maritain position on communication in art is consistent with
his general position toward foreign elements or external threats to art.

1

. . . the activity of art is not related in itself to a need
of communicating tio others (this need is real and in fact inter
venes inevitably in artistic activity, but it does not define it);
it is related essentially to the need of speaking and manifesting
in a work-to-be-made— by virtue of spiritual superabundance and
even though there were no one to see or hear. . . .2
The quoted passage reinforces what has been said concerning the artist's
first priority in his work, that is, his self-satisfaction with what he
is making.

3

In this sense, a work may present an obscure significance

but resists any claims to a definite internal meaning.^

The externaliza-

tion of the product involves communication but not necessarily a direct
desire to communicate anything beyond the physical substance of the work
itself.

Furthermore, the physical presence of the work brings the art

ist's vision to the consciousness of the artist himself, also obscurely.^
This is because the meaning of the x-rork surpasses the physical product
and presents a certain difficulty for the artist in his attempts to con
ceptualize what he has intended.

It becomes evident that a perceiver is

confronted with a certain obscurity, more or less, which should not be
misrepresented as any sort of definite meaning for perceivers in general.
An artist's concern x<?ith being understood or misunderstood is
beside the point.

He creates first for himself, and his product must be

^See ibid.
, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 49.
■^See chapter 2 above, pp. 18 and 23.
^Hanke, Maritain1s Ontology, p. 92.
5Ibid., p. 99.

6Ibid.
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left to stand by itself as a work of art.'*'

Whether the work is accepted

or rejected by others is an external concern and involves a question of
the use of a product rather than the making of the product.^
The communication of effect involves emotion, either the emo
tional expression of the artist or the emotional perception of the lis
tener.

There are two kinds of emotion in music: the intellectual joy or

delight of perception; and a subjective emotion, a result of the first
kind.^

This means that the expression and apprehension of beauty

involves subjective emotion or personal feelings, a result of the joy
or delight of the intellect in the perception of beauty in a work.^*
2

^Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 49.
2

Martini (Maritain and Music, p. 67) criticizes popular music
for its intent to communicate certain sensual qualities to listeners.
This seems to be a weak criticism of such music because it is based upon
the assumption that (1) all popular music has such intent; and (2) only
popular music depends upon the sensory experience for a connaturality of
sound to the intellect of the listener. In respect to the latter assump
tion, it is true that much popular music is simple in content and repeti
tious by nature; but this, in itself, cannot be equated with the communi
cation of sensuality. The simplicity of music is more connatural to the
average listener, and the repetition of music makes it easier for the
intellect to "find itself" and be delighted by the musical sounds. By
contrast, complex musical sounds are apt to be less connatural to the
average listener, at least until his aural-permeated intellect grows
accustomed to the sound of such music. Obviously, such music tends to
be less popular. In respect to the former assumption, a phase of popular
music does appear to aim at intentional communication: commercial music.
Commercial music is written primarily to please others; that is, the
makers of such music intend to make a work which "sells" rather than a
work which stands by itself as an object of art. Popular music, however,
is not necessarily commercial music because works created for themselves
can become popular without such intent— again, the question of use as
opposed to creative intent applies here. If music created for itself
becomes popular, it matters little that it pleases others in addition to
the artist.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 147.
^Hazo, Maritain’s Aesthetic, p. 50.
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Maritain terms the body of a work as the culmination of all the
technique which produced the externalized product; the soul of a work
is the operative idea, spiritual in nature, the realm of the habitus of
art; the spirit of a work is the internal expression not under the con
scious control of the artist.^- Normally, the body (technique) is the
instrument of the soul (habitus), and the spirit (personal expression)
is a component part of the soul.

o

"Magic" enters a work when the spirit separates from the soul
and controls both the body and the soul of the work.

3

"Magic" in a

work is the superabundance of internal expression, emotion, passion,
or affect in a work which deepens the subjectivity of its content and
provides emotive power to a perceiver.^
It is important to note that magic, in this sense, is not a con
scious component of the artist's intent.

Magic may or may not enter a

work and is variable from work to work and from artist to artist.

The

problem of magic occurs when an artist seeks it in his work and diverts
his attention from the concerns of the habitus of art.

To strive after

magic in music is to strive toward an effect, an effect rooted in affect
5
and external to the created product.

To seek after magic forces a

fabrication of the product of art.^2

^Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," in Art and Poetry, trans. E.
de P. Matthews (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943), p. 99.
2Ibid.

3Ibid., pp. 99-100.

^Maritain, "The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," in
Creative Intuition, pp. 402-403.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 163.
^Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 101.
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If the artist’s first concern is with the good of the work, the
emotive content is not entirely subjective.

In other words, when the

aim is toward making a good work, the intellect works with emotion in
structuring the work and, as a result, the emotional content is neither
entirely objective (depicted) or entirely subjective (expressed).^

The

fine arts purify passion by developing it within the limits of beauty
and in harmony with the intellect.

2

Thus, the magic in a work is

obscurely intertwined with the intellectual soul of the work.
Whatever magic is conjured up the man's imagination, pas
sions and emotions will be subject to the light of the intel
lect. Whatever is vital in magical thought will remain— what
is magical will disappear.^
A work of art, then, can communicate an emotional effect without aiming
at such an effect.1^
It is perfectly true that art has the effect of inducing
in us affective states, but this is not its end or its
object: a fine distinction, if you will, but still an
extremely important one. Everything gets out of hand if
one takes as the end that which is simply a conjoined
effect or a repercussion, and if one makes of the end itself
. . . a simple means. . . .
Communication has a natural part in the creative experience but it is
not the specified object of art, either for one who creates for effect
or one who perceives for effect.^

■^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp. 75-77.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 62.
^Martini, Mari tain and Music, p. 192.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 62.
%aritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 204, n. 138.
6Ibid., p. 205.
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The aural experience of musical performance lends itself well
to the communication of effect.'*'

A performer can bring a tear to the

eye through the beauty of his music; he can shock a listener with dis
sonance; or he can leave an audience awestruck with the power of his
music.

These kinds of experiences can occur without such intent and

as a result of the sound of the work, created for itself.

To avoid

aiming at such effect, the performer must perform as if no one were
listening to his music except he, the artist.

The music will commu

nicate something of the performer, obscurely, and may leave its effect
upon the listener spontaneously and unintentionally.
. . . the magic in performance is quite indispensable since the
nature of music demands its execution in time. Therefore, is
there any performance without some magic, no matter how meager?
Is not the personality of the performing artist or lack of it
thus displayed?"^
The nature of performance is such that the presence of magic
is inevitable and unavoidable, but to aim at such effect is to aim
away from the product of performance.

The communication of perform

ance, then, is a component of, but not an object of, musical perform3
ance.*
3
2

" . . . the possibility of magic exists in music to a higher
degree than in the other arts: since music, taken in its nature, even
before any consideration of magic, has the peculiar privilege . . .
of expressing— beyond any possible meaning of words— the most deeply
subjective, singular and affective stirs of creative subjectivity,
too deep-seated to be possibly expressed by any other art" (Maritain,
"The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," p. 404).
2
Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 186.
3
A product of sound, pleasing to the performer, is the aim or
formal object of performance. The formal object of performance is in
contrast with the material object which simply intends to execute the
written score. The aim of performance, then, transcends material exe
cution and, in fact, submits the material object to the exigencies of
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the formal object. Consequently, the rules of execution are right or
correct because they externalize sounds which please the performer and
guide him in the direction of his formal object. In other words, the
aim of performance is achieved by the submission of the art of perform
ance to a work, the movement being in a direction which aurally satis
fies or delights the performer.
"To say that art must be submissive to the object is therefore to
say that it must be submissive to the object to be made as such
or to the right rules of operation thanks to which this object
will truly be what it ought to be.
(Academicism with its recipes,
pseudo-classicism with its cliches and its mythology, Wagnerism
with its worship of effect, all fail in this submissiveness)"
(Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 225, n. 185).

CHAPTER IV

THE ACTION OF PERFORMANCE

Artistic Judgment and Performance
The performer is a creator of music; moreover, he is a re-creator
of music as well.

The performer is a re-creator when he begins his art

with a work created by another artist, that is, a composition or arrange
ment written by a composer and printed on a score.

The performer becomes

the window— perhaps a stained glass window— through which a composition
shines.^

The intent of the work, and the composer, is commingled with

the self-expression of the performer, another way of saying that the
creation and re-creation of performance are inextricable.
The re-creation of a work for performance begins with a judgment
of what the composer intended when he created the work.

Artistic judg

ment is never absolute because the performer cannot be entirely positive
about a composer's intent, a degree of obscurity being a part of every
created work.

However, to be legitimate, a performer's intentions in

re-creating a work must be faithful to the composer's intentions, so far
as they are known and perceived by the performer.*
4

Obviously, several

interpretations are possible and even the best interpretation is only a
probability.^

\lartini, Maritain and Music, p. 129.
^Ibid.

^Ibid.

4Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 64.
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^Ibid.
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The judgment of a composed work occurs in two dimensions (sepa
rate yet related).

A visual contemplation of the score is the beginning

of a judgment and a reflection upon, or assessment of, symbolic language
through which something of the composer's intent is grasped.'*’ Score
contemplation involves conceptual knowledge and concerns the material
means by which the work was composed.

Such an assessment of means, by

itself, inclines toward academicism because the compositional mechanics
can be accurately identified and readily applied to a conceptual vision
of the work.

If, however, artistic judgment ceases at this point, the

inner, spiritual mystery of the work is muted and less likely to be
revealed to the performer.
The second and primary phase of artistic judgment is the aural
perception of the work by the performer.

In this dimension, the per

former is a perceiver, a listener as well as a maker.

The aural per

ception of a work generally begins when the act of performance, the
making of the work, begins.

p

To judge by perception, the performer

must be open to what the work conveys through sound; that is, judg
ment by perception requires a prior consent to the sound of the work
before the inner work, the composer's intentions, reveals itself to
the performer.^

Judgment by perception is intuitive and less positive*
2

^"Vision, in this sense, refers to score contemplation through
the sense of sight.
2
Judgment by aural perception is possible apart from the action
of performance; however, listening, by itself, cannot approach the depth
of aural perception required by the performing (artistic) experience.
In judging a composed work, perceptive listening goes beyond conceptual
contemplation but falls short of creative perception.
3"We must listen to the interiority of the work . . . [and] be
open to what it conveys. . . . And this requires a sort of previous, ten
tative consent. . . to the work and to the [artist's] intentions. . ."
(Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," in Creative Intuition, p. 308).
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than judgment by conception.

The inner intent, or spiritual mystery, of

the work reveals itself to the performer through the act of performance,
obscurely, spontaneously, and in depth when he has "lived with" the com
position for a time.
Judgment by conception can assess the material intent of a work;
but, if the material judgment is equated with the primary judgment, the
spiritual intent, the sphere of beauty and the fine arts, can be missed
or misinterpreted.

Conceptual or material judgment is a judgment of

preconception because it is made prior to the act of performance.

This

is in contrast to spiritual judgment which occurs at the moment of per
ception and without preconception.

Judgment through aural perception

requires that the intellect be permeated with the sound of the work
before a judgment is completed, a practice which transcends material
observation and involves the aesthetic experience of beauty.'*'

Since

judgment by perception involves the aesthetic experience, it is properly
an aesthetic judgment, a kind of judgment which moves to the deep, spirit
ual roots of a work by means of the material, surface mechanics.
Aesthetic judgment confronts a double mystery: the secret of the
work (the composer's intent) and the personality of the composer.

2

In

this sense, the performer, as a listener, must be obedient to the music
and what it may teach him.

3

Prior consent neutralizes preconception and

allows the work to reveal itself to the performer as he expresses the
work, while, at the same time, uncovering something of the composer3

•*"Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 28.
^Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 61.
3Ibid.
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himself through his compositional idea.
Unless the performer gives consent to the work, as it stands,
the composition will be inhibited in its potential to teach him its
inner secrets.

In other words, if he asks that a composition conform

to his personal view of what a musical work should contain, the work,
already created, is judged by concepts previously formed in the intel
lect.'*'

Under such circumstances, there can be no accurate judgment of

the work as a unique object of fine art.
Giving consent to the work is allowing the double mystery of
the composer's personality and the objective reality of sound he has
captured to be received, perceived, and judged by the performer.

o

The

work teaches through revealment; consequently, whatever the performer
perceives is dependent upon his ability to perceive that which is conO
cealed to the eye.
Through the receptive intuition of aural perception,^ the per
former can judge whether the composer really has something to say,
within the context of his creative idea, and to give of himself*
2

"We shall judge the work of art as an article subject to our
whim, an article the measure of which is our own bent of mind" (Maritain, "On Artistic Judgment," in The Range of Reason, p. 19).
2
Receiving a work is hearing the sound of the work; perceiving
a work is allowing the sound to permeate the intellect through the aural
sense. Reception requires our presence; perception requires our full
attention. The work reveals itself when x?e learn something about the
work apart from the score, an inner secret not evident in print but
obscurely present in the sounds we hear. We judge by intuition while
we experience the aesthetic beauty reflected from the sound of the work.
O
We shall judge the work of art as the living vehicle of a hid
den truth to which both the work and we ourselves are together subject,
and which is the measure at once of the work and of our mind" (ibid.).
^Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," p. 307.
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personally; or whether he is content to offer a purely technical display
of his skills.'*'

Still, it is necessary to respect an artist's effort,

even if the effort falls short of intent or if the intent itself is
found to be meager.

A certain respect for the work, which involves

the prospect of unraveling an inner mystery, is the receptive attitude
necessary for, or prerequisite to, the artistic judgment.

Artistic Judgment and Artistic Criticism
Artistic or aesthetic judgment records or remembers an aesthetic
experience after it has occurred;

3

accordingly, the performer applies

his perceptive judgment of a composed work, as well as the initial score
evaluation, to his re-creation of the work through performance.
The judgment of art, however, is distinct from the judgment of
taste.^

Taste relates to the perceptive powers of the performer rather

than the expressive powers of the work.

The judgment of taste uses the

work to measure these perceptive powers, which is analogous to measur
ing the work through preconceptions.

Taste is more concerned with a

general knowledge of art than with the specific perception of a work;
and it is, consequently, a facet of the speculative order of knowledge
rather than the operative or practical order or art.^

The judgment of

•*-Maritain, "On Artistic Judgment," p. 20.
^Ibid. "The only artist who does not deserve respect is the
one who works to please the public, for commercial success or official
success" (ibid., pp. 20-21).
^Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 28.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 202, n. 137.
^Ibid.
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Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 223. n. 173. The quotation
further clarifies the difference between the judgment of the critic and
the performer. The performer's judgment is operative or creative because
it applies to the making of his work. The critic's judgment is similarly
artistic or aesthetic but dissimilarly external to the creative action;
that is, the criticism occurs following the action of performance rather
than as a part of the action itself.
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taste suppresses the beauty in a work with material concerns validated
by material rules.
The gift of critique is not necessarily synonymous with the gift
of art.-*-

The gift of critique pertains to the contemplative or reflec

tive faculties of the mind while the gift of art pertains to the opera2
tive or practical faculties of the habitus.

Aesthetic criticism,

defined by the gift of critique, combines a knowledge of art with the
skills of critique, thereby encouraging the critic to become a dilet
tante.

A true critic of art defines aesthetic criticism as the judg

ment of art, and not of taste, and uses the skills of critique to com
municate his judgment to the performing musician.
In reference to the critic, Maritain states:

"Before judging

of the work as to its ways of execution, he must discover the creative
intentions from which it proceeds and the more secret things which
O
stirred the soul of its author.'0

Artistic Judgment and the Sign
A created work is an object and a sign; that is, it has a physi
cal presence in matter or notation and a significance, apart from the
object, which is perceivable through a sensory experience of the work.^
The intentional being, or sign aspect of the work, has a significance
which lies deeper than the entitative being or material existent.”**
2

^-Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," pp. 324-325.
2Ibid.

3Ibid., p. 324.

“^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 128.
^Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 114; also see Hanke,
Maritain's Ontology, pp. 55-65.
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The i n t e n t i o n a l s ig n i s a n a lo g o u s to th e c r e a t i v e i n t e n t .
The
a u r a l p r e s e n c e o f sou nd i s th e v e h i c l e b y w h ic h th e e n t i t a t i v e b e in g
( s c o r e ) i s p erm eated and th e i n t e n t i o n a l b e in g ( s ig n ) i s r e v e a le d .

^Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 223; and idem, "Language and
the Theory of Sign," p. 98.
O

JMaritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 128;
idem, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 114; and idem, "The Experience of
the Poet," in The Situation of Poetry, p. 84.
^ M a r i t a i n , " S i g n a n d S y m b o l , " p . 223; i d e m , " T h e E x p e r i e n c e o f
t h e P o e t , " p . 84; a n d i d e m , " C r e a t i v e I n t u i t i o n a n d P o e t i c K n o w l e d g e , "
p . 128.
The r e v e r s e d s ig n i s a l s o term ed : th e in v e r t e d s i g n .
S e e id e m ,
" L a n g u a g e a n d t h e T h e o r y o f S i g n , " p . 98.

^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 129.
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interiority of the scored composition.

As with the artistic judgment

(and its access to a work's interiority), access to the sign quality of
a composition is facilitated by means of aural perception.

In other

words, the secret significance of the printed work is contained within
the sound, or combination of sounds, perceived aurally by the performer.
Artistic judgment, then, perceives and judges the sign quality of a
musical work.

The Creative Idea and Performance
The Creative Idea and the Conceptual Idea
The creative idea is not an elaborate plan; rather, it is a simple
view or artistic vision of the work-to-be-made.^

The creative idea is an

operative or practical idea because it moves the intellect toward the
production of an object, a work of art.

In a work of fine art, the will

intervenes in the artist's vision of his work because the intellect is
naturally inclined to go beyond itself,
of beauty.

toward

the transcendental realm

3

The creative idea is dissimilar to the conceptual idea; that is,
it is not an abstract idea or an intellectual theme or thesis from which
creation takes place.^

Furthermore, the artist does not envision an

ideal model to be copied by his art; rather, he envisions the

■*-Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.
o
^Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 48; and Hanke,
Maritain's Ontology, p. 43.
JMaritain, "Concerning Poetic Knotvdedge," p. 48. The creative
idea is also termed: the artist's vision, or artistic vision.
^Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 81; idem, "Creative Intui
tion and Poetic Knowledge," p. 136; and idem, Art and Scholasticism,
p. 181, n. 95.
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intellectual or spiritual form of an object, in a complex unity, within
which few of the details of the object are consciously known.^

The

work must be externalized before the details of the work are "worked
out," thereby becoming the material structure of the original spirit
ual form.

In contrast to the conceptual idea, the creative idea and

the externalized work reveal themselves simultaneously and both become
known when the work is completed.

The conceptual idea precedes its

object in conscious detail; the creative idea precedes its object in
a detailed unity but with obscure or imperfect knowledge of specific
details.

The operational concept, or conceptual idea, forms and com

pletes an object prior to its externalization as a work of art (object
copies idea).

The creative idea is formed but not completed while in

its spiritual form; therefore, the object-to-be-made is only a potentiality and not yet a reality.

2

The creative idea is revealed through

its object, and the details are fixed or "worked out" at the moment of
externalization.3

A work completed is a creative idea achieved.^

The creative idea is an intuitive flash . . . in x^hich the
whole work is potentially contained and which will unfold

^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knox^ledge," pp.. 135137; and idem, "The Concept," in The Degrees of Knowledge, app. 1, p.
397.
2
Maritain, The Concept," pp. 396-398.
^Hanke, Maritain*
*s Ontology, p. 99.
• • it is only x^hen the symphony is made and finished that,
in the mind of the composer, its creative idea is itself achieved"
(Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 80). The externalized product of
the artist's vision cannot, however, be an exact copy of the original
idea because the externalization of an idea is tempered by human limita
tion, thereby rendering the final achievement an imperfect product of a
more complex original intent. See pp. 64~65 below for a further discus
sion of this point.

64
and explain itself in the work, and which will make of the work
itself an original and a model; incomparably more immaterial
than is believed by academicism. . . .1
The academicist believes that the creative idea is a model of
a work which the artist carries in his head to be copied into the final
product.

The work, already made, is given a presence, an externaliza-

tion by preconception.
Maritain confronts the academicist with the subjective nature of
sensory experience.

When the artist, as any man, attempts to copy an

ideal, the product inevitably leads to an original work, not a copy.^
". . . there is no tracing in the world of God.,,<!t The creative idea is
the artist's subjectivity intertwined with the objectivity of things
from which forms are drawn through sensory perception.

Subsequently,

a completely subjective creative idea is also unattainable by the intel
lect of man.

God's ideas precede things; man draws upon things for his

£
ideas.°

The Creative Idea and the Means of Art
The creative idea is envisioned in a flash of intuition which
contains the essentials of a work in a united whole.

•j

The flash of

intuition, although complete, is obscure and the work must be completed
before the details of the work, or the structure of the idea, become

1Ibid.

^Ibid.

^Ibid., p. 79.

4Ibid.

^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 77.
^Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 120-121.
^Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 55.
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more fully known.

The externalized details of the work reveal to the

artist something of the internal structure of his vision.

As creation

occurs, the artist, through certain additions and adjustments along the
way, probes for details of his initial intuitive flash.

In this way,

details of the work are, consciously and unconsciously, validated by
intuition.^

In other words, the artist knows when the work is "right"

but he may not be able to explain how he knows.
The external work is an imperfect imitation of the creative idea
because the idea discloses detail in the context of a complex unity, all
in an instant and much of which is lost through actual production.^

The

idea is an uncreated form; therefore, the details must be worked out
through creation.

Due to the limitations of memory, the created work

can only approach the original intuitive flash in moving from the uncreated, spiritual form to the created, material form.

3

In addition to

memory block, the creative intent may be further obstructed by faulty
craftsmanship, or poor technique in its lower sense, and external influ
ences which threaten the practice of art.^
The premature calculation of means is an academic plan which
denies the mystery of the artistic vision.

The academicist is skeptical

of the necessity of "working out" such a vision; he is inclined to doubt
that the completed work will teach him anything not contained in his
prepared plan.

•'- Ib id .
9

■^Maritain, "The Concept," p. 398.

3

Ibid.

^Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 56. Foreign elements of art, that is,
external threats to the practice of art, in the pure sense, are manual
dexterity, taste, slavish imitation, emotional effect, and art seeking to
please others. See Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 61-62.
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Maritain, to the contrary, believes that the artistic vision is
obscure by nature and that the means of art exist to serve and probe the
mystery inherent in the creative idea.

The gap between the vision and

the accomplished work is "filled by an interplay of deliberate combina
tions" which serve the work envisioned.''"

This sort of deliberate cal

culation is useful and acceptable at various points of creation because
it is fixed at the moment of making and is an exploratory process.

In

this sense, the manipulation of means is a search for a certain fulfill
ment of the creative idea, spontaneously done and with both the conscious
and unconscious depths of the intellect involved.
The means are the proper domain of the artistic habitus. . . .
But means exist only in relation to an end, and the means
which "are everything" would be nothing themselves without
the conception or the vision which they tend to realize and
on which the whole activity of the artist hinges.2

The Creative Idea and Inspiration
The artist's ability to view a work-to-be-made depends initially
upon imagination, an inborn disposition or natural gift served by the
external senses.^
. . . imagination proceeds or flows from the essence of the
soul through the intellect, and the external senses proceed from
the essence of the soul through imagination. For they exist in
man to serve imagination, and through imagination, intelligence.^

^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 199, n. 131.
“^Ibid., p. 182, n. 95. Conception, in this context, refers to
the creative idea rather than to the conceptual idea.
^Ibid., p. 181; and idem, "The Rules of Art," p. 41.
^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 107.
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A point for amplification is that the imagination serves the
intellect, the creative intellect of art.

The imagination is diffi

cult to distinguish from the creative intellect because it is inti
mately related to it, a part of the intellect itself.'*'

The creative

intellect, however, deepens with each improvement of the mind or as
the development of the intellect, takes place.

The creative idea has

its roots in the creative intellect and grows beyond the reach of
imagination alone.
Similarly, the working out or externalization of an artist's
vision does not occur in the imagination alone because such a view
cannot come out of a void.

3

The use of materials to externalize a

work involves the imagination, but the means of making are validated
by the creative intellect through its connaturality with the intended
object.

The connaturality of the intellect with its object defines

the intuitive procedure by which creation takes place.^

The connat

urality of intuition is a kind of conformity in the manner of action
between the artist and the intended work.”*

"*"Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 41.
^Ibid.
O
JHanlce, Maritain's Ontology, p. 98.
^"A virtuous man may possibly be utterly ignorant in moral
philosophy, and know as well (probably better) everything about vir
tues— through connaturality" (Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic
Knowledge," p. 117). Similarly, a musician may possess little or no
knowledge of music; and yet, he may perform works entirely through his
connaturality with the sound of music.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 12.

68
In

th e

d isp o sitio n :

fin e

arts,

se n sitiv ity ,

b e a u ty .^

S e n sitiv ity

it

th e

serves

th e

in te lle c t

is

c re a tiv e
th rou gh

th e c r e a t iv e

id e a

w h ic h

is

th e

a r t is t 's

a b ility

to

served

by

th e

extern al

sen ses

and,

in te lle c t
th e

an o b j e c t w h ic h r e f l e c t s

sen ses.
b eau ty,

because
S in c e

depends

on a s e c o n d

p e rc e iv e

co n n a tu ra l b eau ty
th e

im a g in a tio n

c re a tiv e

in b o rn

in

tu rn ,

d e lig h ts

id e a

and s e n s i t i v i t y

e n v isio n s
are

in te rre la te d .
The i n t u i t i v e
rie n c e .

The m om en tary,

in sp ira tio n a l
k n o w le d g e
of

fla s h

is

a xro rk in g

id e a .

to

a c re a tiv e

id e a

sudden a p p e a ra n c e o f

e x p e rie n c e .
re le a se d

of

In s p ira tio n
th e

c o n sc io u s

is

is

not a m y stic a l

an a r t i s t i c

v isio n

t h e m om ent t h a t

m in d f o r

is

la te n t

e x p re ssio n ,

in

expe
an

p o e tic

th e

fo rm

•5

^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.
■^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 24. Connatural beauty is aes
thetic beauty which pleases, rather than displeases, the sense-permeated
intellect.
^H azo, M a r i t a i n 's A e s t h e t i c , p p .
I m n r w le d g e M a r i t a i n s t a t e s :

74 a n d 84.

In

d e fin in g

p o e tic

"This is a very different knowledge from what is generally called
knowledge; a knox^ledge which cannot be expressed in notions and
judgments, but which is experience rather than, knowledge, and
creative experience, because it xtfants to be expressed, and it can
only be expressed in a work. This knowledge is not previous or
presupposed to creative activity, but integrated in it, consubstantial with the movement toward the work, and this is precisely
what I call poetic knowledge" ("On Human Knowledge," p. 18).
In a

c o m p a riso n to c o n c e p t u a l k n o w le d g e M a r i t a i n s t a t e s :
". . . i n
s u c h a k n o w l e d g e i t i s t h e o b j e c t c r e a t e d , . . . t h e sy m 
p h o n y , i n i t s own e x i s t e n c e a s a w o r l d o f i t s ox«m, w h i c h p l a y s t h e
p a r t p la y e d i n o r d i n a r y k m w le d g e b y t h e c o n c e p t s and ju d g m e n ts p r o 
d u ce d w i t h i n th e m in d " ( " C r e a t i v e I n t u i t i o n and P o e t i c K n o w le d g e ,"

p. 118).
L a t e n t p o e t i c k n o w le d g e c o n t a in s th e s e e d s o f th e c r e a t i v e id e a .
In s p ir
a t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e i n i t i a l c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e o f t h i s k n o x ^ led ge , and
t h e i n t e l l e c t b e c o m e s m o r e f u l l y c o n s c i o u s o f t h e i d e a t h r o u g h t h e com
p le te d w ork.
H a z o , M a r i t a i n ' s A e s t h e t i c , p p . 48-49.
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The Performer and the Composed Work
The performer's vision of his work occurs as a result of, and
in connection with,his judgment of the composed xrork.

In this respect,

vision and judgment are commingled since a judgment can hardly occur
without some vision of the work's potential in relation to the per
former's ability as a musician.
can spawn the creative idea.

The judgment of a composed work, then,

In other words, as the composer's intent

is judged, the potential sound of the work in performance is envisioned
through the judgment.

As the performer seeks the inner, spiritual

intent of the x^ork, he may also "see" the work as it should be

^Maritain, "Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," in Creative
Intuition, p. 244.
^Maritain, "The Concept," p. 398.
%aritain, "Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," p. 244.
^Ibid.
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The performer's vision of a composed work must be heard in per
formance (externalized) to be fulfilled.

A musician envisions the

potential sound of the work but only upon hearing it can he gain some
certainty of his intended idea.

The performer probes and experiments

with details until he discovers in sound the idea envisioned in the
mind.

The discovery is nonconceptual; the performer intuitively recog

nizes the "right" sound but he is only vaguely aware of how or why a
particular sound is a necessary component of the intended work.

The

necessity of the discovered sound to the work is confirmed at the
moment it is heard.

Following externalization, the performer can bet

ter analyze conceptually the details of the work in retrospect or by
reflection.
When is the performance complete?

A musical work, as time, can

flow without limitation or cessation.’*' The transcendental beauty of
music does not stop; it surpasses its object.

The performed work has

a practical end and is subject to human limitation in its confinement
to certain parameters.

The practical end of a work is a mere pause in

the ceaseless potential of music and the transcendental realm it reflects.
The performance idea, in its original form, is never absolutely
fulfilled; therefore, each performance of a composed work may move pro
gressively deeper into its spiritual intent.

On the other hand, a

repeated work, performed at its human limits, may simply run its course
and no longer be in fulfillment of any creative idea.

In this case,

the work expends itself on repetition rather than intent.

%aritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 82.
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The Creative Idea and the Sign
The performer's judgment or perception of the intentional sign
within a

composed work begins his view of the potential sound of the

work in performance.

Since the performance potential of a work is tem

pered by personal capacity and unique musical abilities, the performer
views the work only as he can perform it.

The performer's intention, or

performance idea, is the new direct sign of the work; it becomes com
mingled with the reversed sign of the performer, his subjective expres
sion which inevitably and unintentionally enters the performed work.
As a result, the intentional sign of the composed work is transformed
into the intentional sign of the performed work.
The conductor, as a performance leader, uses the practical sign
to communicate his creative idea, along with conceptual score notation,
to the musicians of a performing group.’*' Since the conductor's vision
of the work is of primary importance, the practical signs make manifest
his intent in producing the work, the practical sign being an instrument
of his will.^

The conductor's practical signs are gestures of command,

facial expressions and glances, and spoken words.

These signs, both

natural and conventional, express an intention or direction of the practical intellect.

4

The practical signs used by the conductor are also

1-Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 197; and idem, "The Concept,"
p. 395.
^Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 197.

^Ibid.

^Ibid. The natural sign expresses a natural or real relation
ship between the sign and that which is signified. An example of the
natural sign is an expression, gesture, or appearance of quietude.
The conventional sign is an artificial or arbitrary sign which must
be learned as a sign before that which is signified becomes apparent.
Examples of the conventional sign are gesticulative patterns, symbolic
language, and denotative expressions. See ibid., p. 192.
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sensory signs.^
Conceptual ideas, transmitted by musical notation, are infravalent to the creative idea and are of secondary importance to the per
formed work; nevertheless, they are also communicated to a performing
group by practical signs.

What is communicated to performers is, in

essence, the conductor’s definition of the particular notation or his
understanding of these operational concepts inasmuch as they can be
signified.^
The conductor begins x^ith score notation but moves beyond such
means in pursuit of his creative idea of the work, an intent which is
spontaneously signified by practical signs during the act of perform
ance.

The conductor’s responsibility to the intentional sign of a com

posed work, and its transformation to a sign of the performed work, is
similar to that of a performing musician; nevertheless, his responsibil
ity to the performing musician is unique.

The conductor must communi

cate his creative idea to the performer through practical signs, signs
spontaneously expressed as discovered details piece together the puzzle
of his artistic vision.

Imitation and Performance
Artistic imitation is the intuitive manifestation of natural
appearances or sounds.

The instrumentality of natural forms is first

presented to the mind of the artist through the senses and then recast1

1Ibid., pp. 194-195, n. 2.
^Maritain, "The Concept," p. 395.
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or transposed by intuition to a productive end, a work of art."*"

Imita

tion renders,
through certain sensible signs, something other than these
signs spontaneously present to the spirit. Painting imi
tates with colors and plane forms things given outside of
us. Music imitates with sounds and rhythms . . . the
invisible world which stirs within us.^
Imitation, in its formal or higher sense, involves the represenO
tation of a form, an artistic intent.

It uses material elements or

sensible signs to externalize the creative idea and, through imitation,
the work expresses in matter what began in the intellect.^

Sensible

signs are objects in themselves; however, imitation requires these
signs to signify something more than themselves: the creative idea
c
or spiritual intent of a work.
Imitation, in its lower sense, pertains to the duplicative
£
process of servile art and to the strict originality of pure art.
Normally, the essence of imitation is a tension between the need to
create for itself and the dependence upon the existing world for the
forms of art.^

The extremes of precise representation and

Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 46. The artist's intuition,
which pilots artistic imitation, is a creative intuition. Maritain
defines creative intuition in this way:
"His [the artist's] intuition, the creative intuition or emo
tion, is an obscure grasping of himself and things together in
a knowledge [poetic knowledge] by union or connaturality, which
only . . . finds expression in the work, and which, in all its
vital weight, seeks to create and produce" ("On Human Knowledge,"
p. 18).
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 55.
3Ibid., p. 57.

4Ibid., p. 56.

5Ibid., p. 55.

^Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 122-126; also see idem,
"The Experience of the Poet," p. 85.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 45.
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nonrepresentation, however, refuse to recognize that imitation is a
"spiritual marriage" of a given reality to the artist's intellect.'*'
A "human stamp" is present in every representation.

In other words,

the artist puts himself into an art work and, at the same time, he is
affected by that which he has received into his mind through sensory
experience.

3

Imitation, in its lower sense, occurs when the artist mistak
enly looks for freedom from something— freedom from originality through
servile imitation or copy-making, or freedom from the existential world
through making without any sort of representation, the intent being
absolute originality.^

The former freedom relies on technical accuracy

while the latter freedom dissociates art from existing material forms.
Both practices overlook a primary freedom: a freedom _of the creativity
of the spirit to guide the intellect in the creation of that which it
wills to create."*
An artistic surrender or resignation to existence by precise
£
representation is termed as a "sin of materialism."0

This is because

slavish imitation is materially oriented, an artistic means which goes*
2

%aritain, "The Purity of Art,"

p. 60.

2Ibid.
O
Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp. 45-46.
“Hlaritain, "Beauty and Modern Painting," p. 223.
-*Ibid.
%aritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 124-126; and Hanke,
Maritain's Ontology, p. 45. Maritain's use of the term "sin of mate
rialism" is analogous to precise representation, servile or slavish
imitation, strict or exact reproduction, copy-making, and duplication.
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hand in hand with manual dexterity in its preoccupation with means as
ends.

Sensible signs, such as notated sounds and rhythms, are the

"remote matter" of art.'*'

To regard these material elements as ends

in themselves promotes the practice of imitation, in its lower sense.
If there were no element of the creative subject in the work,
it would not be a creation or a work of fine art but would
simply mimic in some way that which already exists indepen
dently of the artist. The human artist is always dependent
upon his surroundings for his materials; but if he is truly
to create, he cannot be wholly dependent with respect to the
form of the work.^
The isolation of art from all things except its own rules of
o
operation, and a concern with uniqueness, is termed "angelist suicide."
Such strict originality sacrifices the representation of imitation to a
void and rejects traditional rules and existing forms in favor of its
pure aesthetic.*
4
The imitative arts aim neither at copying the appearance of
nature, nor at depicting the "ideal," but at making an object
beautiful by manifesting a form with the help of sensible
signs.^
The paradox of imitation, in its lower sense, is that neither
servile art nor pure art can actually reach their proposed extremes.
First, to copy an object may seem simple, but since the object is
presented to the subjectivity of the intellect, the result is a

%aritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 55-56.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 77.
%laritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 122-123; and Hanke,
Maritain's Ontology, p. 44. Maritain's use of the term "angelist
suicide" is analogous to nonrepresentative art, strict or absolute
originality, pure art or aesthetically pure art, and sin of idealism.
4Ibid.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 59.
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commingling that transfigures the objective reality of the object.^
Subjective reality is reality as the artist sees or hears it.
Secondly, to make an object by drawing upon the conscious mind
alone is an attempt to deny the internal presence of latent poetic
knowledge in the spiritual unconscious, and to ignore the spontaneous
frequency of sensory experience which persistently permeates the intellect with objective reality.

2

The attempted severance of the material

world turns the mind in on itself and forces an enclosed intellect into
a void for its materials.

Pure art imitates but it is imitative of what

the conscious mind knows.

This kind of imitation is in contrast to the

formal definition of imitation because only God can draw upon His crea
tive intellect or proceed from His own essence; man is limited to the
perception of things created by God.

3

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the aesthetic joy
of intellectual perception is experienced through an object.

An obscure

object can be more fulfilling than a clear, "perfect" object; neverthe
less, something too obscure loses sensory signification, due to a lack
of connaturality, and is repulsed by the intellect.^*
2

Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 193, n. 127; and Hazo,
Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 18.
2

The spiritual unconscious, or preconscious of the intellect,
is "a deep nonconscious world of activity, for the intellect and the
will, from which the acts and fruits of human consciousness and the
clear perceptions of the mind emerge . . . " (Maritain, "The Precon
scious Life of the Intellect," in Creative Intuition, p. 94). The
spiritual unconscious lies deeper than memory. The memory is con
cerned with what the conscious mind remembers; the preconscious mind
releases perceptions and insights into the conscious mind through
connaturality, and it does this unpredictably and illogically. See
ibid., pp. 90-95.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 59

^Ibid., p. 58.
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The action of imitation in performance begins with a given real
ity, the written score and the various combinations of sounds symbolized
by the score.

The materiality of the object, however, is soon trans

posed, transfigured, or recasted to suit the creative vision of the
artist.*
3
2

The composed work, then, is the entitative reality from which

the performer derives his material to be imitated into the performed
work.
The performer does not merely copy the score but, rather, he
grasps from the score something not notated which is revealed through
the performance experience.

The performer may be unexpectedly delighted

by the beauty of a particular passage as he hears the passage performed.
He then structures a new sound by imitating the notated sound.

The per

formed passage of music, as restructured, is an expression of the
notated sound, transformed by the performer as he puts himself into
the passage.
To imitate, the artist transforms a given reality but is, ordinarily, unaware of his deformation.
personal vision of a work.

2

He is, after all, expressing his

Transformation occurs as a spontaneous

expression of the artist's vision and not as a planned distortion by
deliberate calculation.3

The expression of the vision proceeds from

the work itself;^ accordingly, the performer expresses the composed
work, his vision through the work, and himself through his vision.

%aritain, "Beauty and Modern Painting," p. 225.
2
Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 197, n. 131.
3Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 198, n.
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Imitation, in its higher sense, is the way a performer transforms
the reality of a composed work into his reality of a performed work.

To

him, the performed work becomes more real than the composed work first
presented to his intellect in the form of sounds symbolized by visual
1
notation.

What he performs more closely resembles a spiritual form in

n
his mind than the material appearance of the score.

Imitation, then,

is an imitation of inner form, the sound of the work as the performer
hears it, and not simple score duplication.^
The variance between performing musicians, in their imitative
action, is caused by personal tendencies and not dogma.

An artist may

tend towards the via disciplinae of precise representation, or he may
tend toward the via inventionis of originality; however, neither ten
dency can exist by itself, as a personal dogma, and remain within the
parameters of imitative action, in a higher sense.

4

i
"For each work, he recomposes. . . a world more real than the
real offered to the sense" (Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, p. 127).
^Ibid., pp. 127-128.
%azo, Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 19. " . . . imitation for Mari
tain is essentially the imitation of the spirit of the object as the
artist sees it" (ibid., p. 17).
\laritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 125-126. In the case of
improvisation, the musician begins with sounds previously heard and imi
tates these sound figures into new combinations of sound. Improvisation
is more dependent upon the element of discovery and tends more toward
the via inventiOnis of creativity than does score reading. Consequently,
originality is the dominant component of improvisation while the via
disciplinae of art is more predominant in creation based on the written
score. The latter circumstance is true because of the responsibility of
re-creation confronting the performer. Improvisation is more subjective,
by comparison, and the performer, as an improviser, performs intuitively
while allowing complete freedom to his creativity of the spirit in envi
sioning and externalizing an object or particular sound. The action of
improvisation occurs in a single, sweeping, simultaneous event.

CHAPTER V

THE USE OF PERFORMANCE

M o ra lity

and P e rfo rm a n c e

The aim of art is outside of the sphere of human good.

Art is

concerned with making a product well and not with using the product,
the realm of morality.
Morality is concerned with the practical activity of reason as
directed toward
will.

"...

the good of human life, through the expression of free
its distinctive object is not the perfection of the work

produced and fashioned by man but the good and perfection of the agent
himself, or the use he freely makes of his faculties. . . .
The primary moral virtue is prudence because it commands man’s
actions as a man.

Like art, prudence is a virtue of the practical intel

lect; consequently, art and prudence are related and yet distinct in
respect to their ends.^

The artist, as an artist, relies on the habitus

of art but the artist, as a man, relies on the virtue of prudence.

In

■^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 16. "The artist may
choose not to use his art, or he may use it badly, . . . and yet the
virtue of art in him is not for all that any the less perfect" (ibid.).
o
^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the
Artist, pp. 26-27.
%aritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 196.
^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the
Artist, p. 38.
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reference to its object, art is not subordinate to morality; but, in
reference to the artist, art _is_ subordinate to morality. ^
The above comparisons underline the inevitable conflict between
art and morality (autonomous yet related).
Morality has nothing to say when it comes to the good of the
work, or to Beauty. Art has nothing to say when it comes to
the good of human life. . . . In other words it is true that
Art and Morality are two autonomous worlds, each sovereign in
its own sphere, but they cannot ignore or disregard one
another, for man belongs in these two worlds, both as intel
lectual maker and as moral agent, doer of actions which engage
his own destiny. And because an artist is a man before being
an artist, the autonomous world of morality is simply superior
to . . . the autonomous world of art.^
[Art] . . . depends by its object neither on wisdom nor on
prudence; all its dependence on them is on the side of the
human subject who practises [.sic.] art. . . . It can be mad
and remain art; it is the man who will pay the cost. If in
the end the work must suffer, it is by a repercussion owed
to material causality. . . .^
Art has for its end the object and it despotically dominates matter in
pursuit of this object.

The purity of art, then, is not synonymous

with the purity of man, regulated by prudence.4

Morality and Gratuitous Performance
The habitus of performance is intent upon the work-to-be-performed because fine art has for its end the created work and the

^Ibid., p. 40; and idem, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 15.
o
Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the
Artist, p. 41.
Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," in Art and Faith, in col
laboration with Jean Cocteau, trans. John Coleman (New York: The Phil
osophical Library, 1948), p. 117. According to Maritain (ibid.), art
and wisdom are also autonomous or independent of each other. Science
is subordinated to wisdom because of its object: knowledge; art is not
subordinated to wisdom because of its object: making.
4Ibid., pp. 92-93.

82
beauty it reflects."^

The art of performance, then, is defined by the

element of gratuity, or disinterestedness, which means that the artist,
as an artist, must be true to his habitus, thereby allowing no foreign
element to enter his work.

Maritain concludes that the first respon-

sibility of the artist, as an artist, is to his work.

3

The performer, as a man, however, cannot perform his art to
the exclusion of everything else in life.

The musician, as a man, is

subject to the realm of morality and this, in essence, subordinates
his art to God.

It follows that the first responsibility of the artist,

as a man, is to the proper good of his person.^
Art causes an artist to act in the right way in regard to making
a work but not in respect to the rightness of human will for the good of
his person.

Art, however, exists in the person and, if the person

^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 70.

2Ibid. Maritain defines these foreign elements as empirical
attempts to establish principles of practice (or tear down such prin
ciples) ; shock the public (or avoid shocking the public); and estab
lish a reputation or position as an artist. "An Essay on Art," in Art
and Scholasticism, app. 1, p. 89. These foreign elements relate to,
and expand upon, his previously defined foreign elements listed in
chapter 4 above, p. 65, n. 4. The matter of disinterestedness in
relation to beauty was taken up in chapter 3 above, pp. 31-36.
O
Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the
Artist, p. 40.
4
Ibid.; and idem, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 16. Prudence
perfects the intellect only through the presupposition that the will is
as straight in its own alignment with the proper good of man. It is
possible that the movement of the will, in its desire for good, may cor
rupt the judgment of prudence by displacing spiritual pleasure in favor
of carnal pleasure. The judgment of prudence also depends on the right
intention and not on the event. The observable results of an act may
be properly good but immorally conceived. Idem, "Art an Intellectual
Virtue," pp. 16-18.
■^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 50.
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deteriorates, so must the art.

In other words, the artist is a man

before becoming an artist; if he fails as a man, his art will even
tually decline.^

The fact of an artist being a drug addict may have

no immediate bearing on his artistic virtue; however, in the long run,
if the person suffers ill effects from the drug use, it will eventually be harmful, and perhaps devastating, to his art.

2

Gratuitous performance, misunderstood, aims not only at the
perfection of a composed work but at an absolute independence of the
performer as a man.

This misconception is caused by the belief that

the artist is an artist, and more than a "mere" man.^

"Art for art's

sake" is art abstractly cut off from man, the artist.^
The motto Art for Art's sake simply disregards the world of
morality, and the values and rights of human life. Art for
Art's sake does not mean Art for the work, which is the right
formula. It means an absurdity, that is, a supposed necessity
for the artist to be only an artist, not a man, and for art to
cut itself off from its own supplies, and from all the food,
fuel and energy it receives from human life.^
The severance of art from humanity eliminates, or attempts to
eliminate, human ends in art; the artist must be totally or purely
delighted in his artistic activity to the exclusion of any other
"human" emotion, vrhich is considered a sacrilege against art.
Delight, in this sense, is in contrast to the delight or intellectual

•*-Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 95.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 51.
^Maritain, "An Essay on Art," pp. 89-90.
^Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," in The Responsibility of the
Artist, p. 48.
^Ibid.
^Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 92.
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joy experienced by a performer in his performance of a particular work,
a joy which results in an emotion, not abstract but subjective and very
human indeed.
To dehumanize art is to sterilize art because self-expression
is inhibited.

The substance of the artist is extrinsic to art, but it

influences the artist in his art and cannot simply be cut off from artistic practice without simultaneously repressing self-expression.

1

The expression of the self is distinct from the expression of
the work, which is directed by the habitus of art.

Self-expression is

analogous to the reversed sign of the artist as he puts himself into a
work, his subjectivity being subordinated to his creative intent.

2

The personality of the artist is rooted in his spiritual self,
3
the soul of man.

The inferiority of the spirit requires, by nature,

communication with others or a giving of the self, the definition of
4
self-expression.

In contrast to personality, the individuality of

the artist refers to the narrowness of the ego, which does not give
of itself but rather grasps for itself.-*

"The creative self of the

artist is his person as person, in the act of spiritual communication,

Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 58.
o
See chapter 4 above, pp. 61 and 78.
^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," pp. 141-142.
^Ibid. The spiritual communication of self-expression is a nat
ural part of art but it is not the primary intent of art. In its proper
sense, a certain communication with others occurs unintentionally through
the reversed sign, but this kind of communication contrasts with communi
cation as a conscious intent of the artist, as an artist.
5Ibid.
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not his person as material individual or as self-centered ego."x
Gratuitous performance engages the self but not the ego because
the self reveals itself in the work and sacrifices itself to the work.

2

In contrast to self-sacrifice, the ego is self-centered and thrives on
material individuality.

It seeks, not communication, but glory; the

sacrifice is to the world but not to the work.

3

The above distinction is important because expression of the
C

artist's self sacrifices his ego to the primacy of the work.

This

cannot occur if the ego is dominant because, through his ego, the art
ist unloads his complexes into the work, thereby poisoning it through
the self-centered expression of the ego.

5

The creative self reveals

itself because it is given in disinterestedness; the ego cannot sub
ordinate itself to a work because it is "interested" in self-enhancement.
The normality of art ensures that an artist's personality be at play in
his art, unconsciously and unintentionally, because his inner substance
will enhance the work, rather than warp it, when the concern is with
the work and not the self.^
The purporters of "art for art's sake" fail to make a distinction
between the self and the ego.

While such an approach may be successful

^Ibid., p. 142; also see idem, "Individuality and Personality,"
in The Person and the Common Good, paperback ed., trans. John J. Fitz
gerald (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 31 passim.
^Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," pp. 51-52.
O

JMaritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 145.
4Ibid., pp. 143-144.

^Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 54.
6Ibid., p. 55.
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in suppressing the ego, it simultaneously represses the creative self.
This sort of repression is an extreme reaction to the "anathema" of
human ends in art.

In other words, "art for art's sake" distorts the

meaning of gratuitousness by forgetting that, while art has a primary
end (the good of the work), the artist, as a man, can have as many
ends as he pleases.^

If the artist pursues a human end in his work,

apart from the artistic end— and resulting from it, the danger of ruining the work is present, but not insurmountable.

In this case, the

performer must retain an awareness of the perpetual temptation to
ignore the habitus of performance in favor of self-enhancement, that
is, increased status as a performing musician.
The suppression of human ends in art, then, is not a valid rea
son to purport "art for art's sake."

The artist, dehumanized, develops

personal standards to serve his art; he feeds himself to it and sacri
fices his being to an ideal.^

Art is equated with life itself.

Inevit

ably, the art becomes warped because self- sacrifice to the work, which
engages the habitus, is subordinated to self-sacrifice to an ideal,

Maritain, "An Essay on Art," pp. 93-94. The purporters of "art
for art's sake" view with disdain the commercial musicians who are paid
wages for their art. Maritain, however, insists that there must be a
differentiation between the aim of the artist, as an artist, and the aim
of the artist, as a man.
" . . . the workman should work for his wages, but the work should
be ruled and shaped and brought into being only with regard to its
own good and in nowise with regard to the wages. Then the artist
may work for any and every human intention he likes, but the work
taken in itself must be made and constructed only for its own
beauty" ("Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 73; also
see idem, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 56).
o
Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 96.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp.
51-52.
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xtfhich engages the artist's entire being as a man.^
"Art for art's sake" is often a reaction to the more worldly art:
"art for the people."

"Art for art's sake" disregards the values of

human life and the artist as a man; "art for the people" disregards the
O
virtues of the creative intellect and the artist as an artist.
"Art for the people," sometimes termed "art for the social group,"
ignores the autonomy of art; that is, the social value of a work precludes
the aesthetic value.

3

Through preclusion, the good of a work is subordi

nated to the good of human life and the work is shaped, not with creative
intuition, but with social requirements.^

It matters little whether the

artist is pleased with his work; it matters much whether others are
pleased x^ith it.

Consequently, "art for the people" becomes warped or

bent as it attempts to meet the needs, purposes, or interests of a par
ticular social group or community.^

Performed works are used for ideol

ogical purpose or to capture attention, to entertain, or to provide
background music for a social occasion.

Performance bent in any direc

tion to "sell" monetarily or indoctrinate ideologically is an art xtfhich1

1Ibid.
2
Maritain, "Art for the People," in The Responsibility of the
Artist, p. 69.
■^Ibid. , p. 72.
4Ibid.
-*Ibid., p. 73. Conceivably, this is the reason why Maritain
makes a distinction between church or sacred art, an art of religious
purpose, and Christian art, an art of religious inspiration. See Mari
tain, "Christian Art," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 64 passim; idem,
"Some R.eflections on Religious Art," in Art and Scholasticism, app. 2,
p. 100 passim; and idem, "Reflections on Sacred Art," Liturgical Arts
4 (Third Quarter 1935): 131 passim.
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subordinates aesthetic experience to social values.
If "art for the people" refers to art for future generations, or
mankind as a whole, the meaning of the term is significantly different
from art for the social group or community, the art of immediate social
value.^

Art can be developed for mankind only if the aesthetic values

outweigh the community interest, purpose, or use of art.

The primary

duty of the community is to respect the spiritual dignity of a work of
art and to give it the same prior consent granted by an artistic judge
or critic.^
If the anarchistic nature of "art for art's sake" undermines cer
tain community values, "art for the people" can be a totalitarian reaction
to such a threat, as perceived by the community.^

The duty of the artist,

then, is to separate himself from the anarchistic nature of "art for art's
sake" which disregards human values and the entire issue of morality in
art.

5

The duty of the critic is, primarily, to judge the work for its

aesthetic value; and secondarily, to judge the moral implications of the
work for the sake of the community.^

"''The purporters of "art for the people," ignore or deflate the
formal purpose of art, the spiritual value of art to humanity. Man, by
nature, seeks pleasurable feeling. The spiritual nature of art can be
of utmost pleasure to man; however, deprived of such pleasure, man is
subjected to an increased magnitude of carnal pleasure or material
pleasure because he cannot exist without pleasurable feeling. See
Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 94; idem, "Art and Morality,"
in Art and Scholasticism, pp. 75-76; and St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica, II-II, 35. 4. ad 2.
^Maritain, Art for the People," p. 69.
•^Ibid., pp. 89-90.

^Ibid., p. 74.

^Ibid., p. 69.

^Ibid., p. 84.
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The responsibility of the artist to the community, and the com
munity to the artist, is reciprocal in terms of gratuitousness.
work, and the beauty it reflects is of paramount importance.

The

The

extremes of "art for art's sake" and "art for the people" are equally
threatening to the gratuitousness of art; art left to itself is God's
because all beauty, aesthetically perceived, is part of the transcen
dental realm of beauty.
The artist has great trouble in making use, without hurting
himself, of a creative virtue that is too hard for him as a
man. But art itself goes spontaneously to God.
Art has trouble defending itself against an impure angel
that slaps it in the face, that wants to make use of everything
for self-love, of the very gift the heart makes of itself, of
its weakness; even of God.*
3
2
The performer's use of the habitus, or creative virtue, depends
upon gratuitousness; gratuitous performance is God's because of the
presence of God in the soul of man.^
Since the primary responsibility of the performer is to his
habitus and the performance action it directs, a complete exclusion
of human values (in relation to the self) exposes his habitus to exter
nal forces which may weaken or reduce the primacy so vital to the prac
tice of art.

In fact, the possession of certain moral virtues serve

the habitus by protecting it from nonartistic forces.

These virtues

of the performer, as a man, exist apart from the artistic virtue,
except to protect it.3

The presence of such moral virtue, if the

^Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 97.
2Ibid.

3Ibid., p. 86.

*Ibid., p. 105.

3Maritain, "Poetry and Perfection of Human Life," in The Respon
sibility of the Artist, pp. 99-100. Maritain lists the following moral
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performer pays heed to it, causes the performer to be ascetic and undevi
ating in regard to his habitus and perpetually on guard against the
attraction of easy execution, instant success, or the immediate goals
prompted by external concerns (and the consequent relaxation of crea
tive intent or spiritual effort).'*
*’ The habitus of art diminishes as
the interior effort is relaxed.

2

The highest moral virtue, however, cannot replace a lack of art
istic virtue.3

The morality of art exists to (1) influence or enhance

virtues as being essential to protecting the habitus of art from exter
nal temptation: humility, magnanimity, prudence, integrity, fortitude,
temperance, simplicity, and ingeniousness. "Art and Morality," in Art
and Scholasticism, p. 78; also see idem, "Poetry and Perfection of
Human Life," pp. 99-100; and idem, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 125.
*1

Maritain, "Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 78.
2Ibid.
O
^Maritain, "Art for the People," p. 92. An artistic dilemma
occurs when a work is artistically good but morally bad. Maritain
offers no positive solution because the artist is bound by his primary
responsibility; and yet, his moral responsibility demands that he change
the \<rork. A possible solution is that the artist change himself and
allow his conscience to change the work or to pursue another kind of
xrark of art. A beautiful work is a work that the artist loves; however,
if the work contains an element which distorts truth or causes a deteri
oration of spiritual values, the work may come to displease the artist
in spite of its beauty. A work which repulses or insults others loses
its radiance in the same way. If the artist, as a man, serves a divine
end, through Christianity, he spiritualizes his inner self to an extent
which can rise above the human narrowness which limits art. This is not
a practice of a particular religious style or philosophy, but rather,
art left to itself and the inner influence of Christian inspiration.
I t i s a l s o im p o r ta n t to n o t e t h a t , s i n c e a r t and m o r a l i t y h a v e s e p a r a t e
e n d s , a C h r i s t i a n c o n v e r s i o n m ay a l s o r e d u c e t h e a r t i s t i c v i r t u e b y
c h a n g in g t h e a g e n t , t h e m an.
The s u b j e c t i v i t y o f m an’ s p e r s o n a l i t y
i n f l u e n c e s h i s a r t b u t i n a w a y n o t c o n s c i o u s l y known t o t h e a r t i s t .

Art, by itself, depends on the habitus of art, and the question of
subjective influence upon this habitus is answerable only through the
externalized work itself. See idem, "Art for Art's Sake," pp. 60-64;
idem, "An Essay on Art," pp. 96-97; and idem, "Poetry and Perfection
of Human Life," pp. 97-98.
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the habitus through self-expression, and (2) protect the habitus through
self-discipline.

The extrinsic or indirect role of morality leaves the

habitus free to pursue its object, the making of a work.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Discussion
The habitus of performance, an artistic virtue, is an inner,
intellectual, and spiritual disposition which enables the performing
musician to perform or aurally "make" a musical work.

The very per

sonal nature of the habitus gives it a unique content because it is the
possession of a unique intellect.

The inborn or innate disposition,

from which the habitus proceeds, is a certain musical ability, a gift
of capacity which is also a possession of the intellect.

Since the

acquiring of habitus is synonymous with the development of habitus, the
virtue of art is an intellectual virtue or formation of the mind in a
given direction.
The relationship between the inborn disposition and the acquired
disposition appears to be a complex one.

This is because it is possible

for a musician to rely primarily on the former with little regard for
the latter.

Maritain states that the natural gift is a prerequisite to

the practice of art, the implication being that an artist cannot reach
his full potential (as an artist) without developing his ability (and
extending some personal effort).

It is also apparent that, through the

effort expended in the practice of his art, a performer acquires habitus
without the conscious intent or effort to do so.
ance, then, is acquired or

The habitus of perform

developed through the practice of the art
92
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of performance (the production of a good performed work or one which is
pleasing to the performer).
The acquiring of habitus involves the deepening of the intel
lect rather than expanding the capacity itself.

The natural gifts of

imagination and sensitivity are served by the external senses and, in
turn, they serve the intellect in its operative practice of art.

From

this it can be gathered that native capacity is essential to development,
but it is the mind which acquires the habitus and which uses native
capacity to serve and cultivate this development.
While saying that an inborn disposition must be developed, Maritain also refers to the difficulty in making a clear distinction between
the habitus and its prerequisite.

All musicians, highly gifted and less

gifted alike, will acquire habitus through performance, but the depth of
the habitus does not necessarily reflect the depth of the gift.

A

musician of average ability may perform a work well because his inte
rior effort is intense and because his effort meets or exceeds his poten
tial.

The gifted musician may perform a work well with less effort; how

ever, he may also inhibit his development of the habitus through a
greater concern with the display of his gift than with the production
of his work.

The musical gift is a potentiality but the development of

this potentiality, or the acquiring of a habitus, depends on the crea
tive relationship between the performer and the work being performed.
Since musical ability serves the musical habitus, the two become com
mingled in the practice of performance.

As a result, the distinction

between the habitus and its prerequisite is not easily perceived, nor
is it clearly apparent to the performer himself.

The essential point

is that the habitus is a deepened or changed intellect.
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The contrasting characteristics of habitus and habit are perti
nent to this study because the contrast, by itself, defines the habitus
of performance as an intellectual virtue.
to reason; habit relies on memory.
habit is empirical.

Briefly, the habitus pertains

The habitus is spiritual in nature;

The habitus is spontaneous; habit is repetitive.

The habitus is ruled by the will; habit is subject to routine.
Ultimately, the habitus controls habit because the power of
reason, which proceeds from the spiritual self, transcends memory (which
is subject to the limitation of the conscious mind).

The habitus wills

its end through the exercise of reason and is spontaneously inclined as
a result.

Habit operates instinctively and consistently when reinforced

with repetition or routine.
Maritain's discussion of the rules of art, or the technique of
art, contains the essential characteristics of the habitus-habit rela
tionship.

The spiritual rules of art are equivalent to technique in its

higher or formal sense; the material rules of art are equivalent to tech
nique in its loxtfer sense.

The spiritual rules are a possession of the

habitus while the material rules are concerned with the execution of
habit.

The primary rule of fine art is a spiritual rule which governs

technique, in its higher and lower sense, in the direction of a product;
that is, the primary rule guides the habitus in its intellectual inclina
tions toward

beauty and its desire to create a good work.

In this sense,

the material rules are subordinate to the spiritual rules because the
material rules, by themselves, are concerned with method, physical skill,
or any external means of art (which also make a work but without concern
for the primary rule).

In other words, the means of execution are pri

mary to the material rules of art.
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The technique of performance, in its lower sense, is identified
with its preoccupation with fingering facility, tone production, and
rapid or efficient reading skill (or any good habits of performance
execution which focus upon the performer's physical and mental dex
terity) .
Still another facet of technique, in its lower sense, is the
preoccupation with a knowledge of performance methods or conceptual
ways to perform.

While the performer's skill is physical or manual,

or mental— both closely tied to innate ability, the performer's method
is conceptual and is attained by conscious abstraction of terminology
and broad academic principles.

Skill is concerned with execution while

method is concerned with contemplation.

The method must also be exe

cuted but, in contrast to the habitus, the execution of method serves
the method rather than the work.

Performance for knowledge, then, uses

knowledge to enhance or advance itself and equates the efficient use of
method to be good for the work whether, in its aural reality, it serves
the work or does nothing for it.
The habitus of performance views knoT'/ledge as external to the
work it xtfishes to create and perfect.

If a certain method is required

to create and enhance this work, the particular approach becomes an
internalized part of the product, subordinated to it and abstractive
after the performance has been completed.

The habitus does not inter

nalize a method unless it serves the work in performance.

Since the

necessary means of performance are determined and fixed during the
momentary aural experience of the work, the starting point is an
intuitive, general view of the work as suggested by the symbolic
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notation of the score.

As aural production begins, however, the means

are altered as the envisioned end of the work is more clearly (and
aurally) defined.
The habitus executes its determined method because it has been
discovered to be necessary to the goodness of the work in performance.
Similarly, the performer must refine the necessary skill to execute the
creative intent willed by his intellect.

Obviously, both method and

execution are instruments of the habitus of performance, a habitus
which serves the product of performance by observing the primary rule
of fine art.
Technique, in its lower sense, is impatient with the personal
inclinations and spontaneity of the habitus because the product is
intended to be the result of predetermined rules.

Deviation from the

material rules is regarded as inefficient and impositive either because
the structure of a prepared plan is threatened with revision or because
the display of a particular skill is threatened with refinement.

More

over, the positivistic level of performance disregards, or is skeptical
of, the intellectual power of the habitus (in its operative ability) to
create a good work intuitively.
Whether the performer senses beauty in a work is not important
to the positivist because beauty is (erroneously) believed to be an
automatic result of the "right" conception of rules.

Consequently,

the operation of performance is confined to motions or the objectivity
of execution.

Moreover, little or no effort is made by the performer

to put himself into his work, to follow the primary rule, or to freely
adapt or alter his means in the direction of a good or pleasing product
of sound, the work as he hears it.
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The aural result of a work, limited by material rules, may be
satisfactory conceptually but unsatisfactory aurally and nonconceptually.
In other words, the performer is forced to operate against the inclina
tions of his habitus if the aural product is lifeless or repulsive to
his intellect.

He may, in fact, elect to maintain the objective pres

ence of the sound without probing the work to discuss why it causes
displeasure or tedium.

The habitus of performance guides the intel

lect in its search for the "right" sound or a sound that brings plea
sure through the aural sense.

To repress the will of the habitus is

to limit or confine performance to its lower or material level.
The habitus of performance is also undeviating, but in a differ
ent manner.

The habitus is strictly adherent to the primary rule and

the inclinations of the intellect to produce a good work.

The performer

performs his work with an intuitive idea of what he should do to perfect
it; the habitus, however, cannot provide a precise plan in advance
because the details must be discovered and validated by intuition.

It

is possible that much detail may be known in advance; nevertheless all
detail is subject to change as the sound of the work is reflected upon
the intellect.

In its desire to make a pleasing work, the habitus dis

covers requisite performing habits by altering, recasting, or discarding
old habits and uncovering new ones.

These material means are chosen

along the way, or during the process of performance, as they are heard
to be necessary to the work.

The identification of detail causes the

material structure to evolve spontaneously, a definition of creativity
in contrast with external, material structures which impose themselves
upon a work and dictate the results to be sought.
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After the performance is completed and the working idea exter
nalized, the newly discovered material framework can be abstracted, from
the produced sound it serves, for conceptual use.

Material analysis not

withstanding, the spiritual rules, which framed the material rules,
remain an intangible, nonconceptual part of the aural product.
The guidance of the habitus is anything but a "safe" and unevent
ful routine for the performer.

The habitus demands that the performer

follow his creativity of spirit in judging the role of detail and execu
tion in the end to be sought.

A personal detachment from intent is alien

to the primacy of the habitus in situating the performed work.
Consistent with his view of the external nature of technique, in
its lower sense, Maritain deplores the intent of academicism, or rules
for the sake of rules, to develop the habitus of art.

The academicist,

through the transmission of rules (and their execution), disciplines the
student with a process of making which is equated with the development
of the habitus. Maritain disputes this conception of art by stating
that what the artist actually possesses, through academicism, is knowl
edge and good habits but not necessarily the habitus.

This is because

material rules are external to a work and are useless to the production
of an intended work unless they are discovered to be necessary to the
internal intent.
It is important to emphasize that the habitus begins with an
intended or envisioned work while academicism begins with material rules.
The acquiring of the habitus is a natural result of a direct intent to
make a specific work.

The term "acquiring" refers to a development or

deepening of the intellect pursuant to the relationship of the performer
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to his work-to-be-made.

This is in contrast to the conscious, delib

erate attempts by the academicist to develop the habitus.

The fact that

a student performer's mind be literally filled with methods gives little
or no indication of whether he is able to apply them to a work.

Conse

quently, academicism inhibits, rather than facilitates, the acquiring
of the habitus.
The acquiring of the habitus is a careful, though variable, bal
ance of the via inventionis and the via disciplinae of art.

The via

inventionis reflects the personal relationship of the artist to his
work-to-be-made while the via disciplinae is the application of tradi
tional, material rules to the same work.

By itself, the via inventionis

may tend to artistic anarchy, or total disregard of traditional artistic
practices, and a total reliance upon the discovery of rules.

The via

inventionis is vital to artistic practice but, by itself, is a gift
without guidance.

The via disciplinae provides the via inventionis

with an order upon which to fixate or a discipline with which to unite.
Similarly, the via disciplinae, by itself, disregards the per
sonal nature of art by operating primarily or solely through the exter
nal application of rules, a practice which is synonymous to academicism.
The via inventionis provides the via disciplinae with inventiveness or
the freedom to adapt material rules in a spontaneous manner and in subserviance to the work-in-progress (to perfect the work as the artist
sees it).
The presence of both the via inventionis and the via disciplinae
within the habitus of art is presumably the reason Maritain advocates
apprenticeship education for the student artist.

In this way, the
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student apprentice is confronted with the "real"; that is, he wills or
intends to create works, not rules, and he begins his art with intended
works.

The via inventionis of the student is combined with the via

disciplinae of the master teacher to create and refine an actual pro
duct of art.

The master teacher instructs through correction and

example; the student apprentice imitates through practice and appli
cation.
Above all, the apprentice musician is subject to the primary
rule of fine art: to produce only that with which the aural sense is
fully pleased.

Through the primary rule, the via inventionis is more

intimately involved with the spiritual interiority of the habitus; con
sequently, the via disciplinae is subject to the will of the via inven
tionis in the production of a good work.

This is the reason that the

master teacher must respect the will of the student in the production
of a work connatural to his (the student's) intellect.

Moreover, this

principle of making is consistent with the control of the spiritual
intent of art over the material intent of art, as discussed in terms
of the technique of art.
In Maritain's careful distinction between the practical order of
art and the speculative order of wisdom, the thrust of his argument
becomes evident.

Academicism is

pseudoscientific in its worship of

conceptual art, the rational art of wisdom.

Maritain, however, argues

that the habitus is not fertile in such a seedbed and cannot be sub
jected to an external structure if it is to retain the necessary free
dom to pursue a good work.

The observance of the primary rule, then,

assures that the via inventionis will exercise its inventive nature

101
through operational freedom and exert intuitive control over the via
disciplinae, the material aspect of the same habitus.
The aim of performance is a performed work, a product of sound
created for itself.

The aim of performance depends on the principle of

disinterestedness or gratuitousness because the performance of music is
a fine art.

This principle has two contributing parts: first, a product

of fine art has no necessary use other than its own existence as a good
work; secondly, a good work is created to please its creator.
A pleasing sound conveys beauty to the performer; therefore, a
product of sound is created for itself when the performer produces a
sound which satisfies or delights his intellect through the aural sense.
The sound is the object of performance, an object which reflects beauty
when it is good or pleasing to the performer.

The beauty of a performed

work, then, transcends the object, the sound of the work; nevertheless,
sound and beauty are inseparable when the former is a product of dis
interested performance.
Since the aim of performance is an internal one, the use of per
formance for external aims— such as concerts, entertainment or background
music, or wages— is outside of the internal realm.

If the external use

or aim of performance is the primary object, the principle of disinter
estedness is violated and the internal aim of performance is threatened.
A product of useful art is created primarily for use by man; con
versely, musical performance is a fine art and its product is created
primarily for itself, thus having no necessary use other than its own
existence.

This is because beauty can delight the intellect but has no

use, only an essence.

It reflects from the sound of a work and cannot

be produced directly through specifications (as is the case with a
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product of useful art).

If the product of performance is produced for

use by man, the presence of beauty In the work may be Ignored or
regarded as a "by-product" of the use intended.
The use of a performance product, however, is a probable occur
rence because of the overlap of art in general: the making of a good
xrork.

Because of this overlap, a performance product can be used for

any external purpose desired by the performer; however-, to remain fine
art, a musical work must first delight the intellect of the performer
through his aim to make a good work for itself.

This is the essential

difference between the internal and external aims of performance.

A

good work created to please the performer inclines toward beauty by
nature.

When the internal, spiritual aim is met, the external aims

can be undertaken without harm to the primary aim of performance.
A performer's personal delight in the sound of a work ensures
that the creativity of the spirit, or the creative intellect, is free
to find itself in the work and to do its will in producing a pleasing
work.

If the performer refuses to deviate from pleasing ends— -if he

performs only that which pleases him— he binds himself to the work
through a love of the particular sound being produced.

Beauty is con

natural to him because the will of the creative intellect has guided
him to beauty.

The creativity of the spirit inclines toward beauty by

nature and it wills to make a good work because such a work reflects
beauty back to its maker.

The prerequisite to this inclination is the

freedom to operate through the aural sense by reflecting musical sounds
upon the intellect and allowing the will to pursue sounds which
delight the intellect,

Resultingly, the creative intellect is led by
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the will to a completed work, unique to the intellect and disinterested
in external aims.

Since the primary rule intends to free the intellec

tual inclination toward

beauty, the conjoined spiritual rules of dis

covery, adaptation, and transformation— and material rules of execution—
are bound to the primary rule.
The habitus of performance operates through the intellectual
inclination toward

beauty.

To perceive beauty through the aural sense

involves a simplicity of perception but a complexity of essence in
respect to beauty.

First, transcendental beauty is beauty in all things,

a beauty known to God but not to man— except through the conduit of sen
sory experience.

Secondly, the aural experience of beauty in music is

beauty perceived aurally; and it either pleases or displeases the intel
lect as a result of this perception.

The aural experience of beauty is

defined as the aesthetic experience of music, or the perception of aes
thetic beauty in music.

Thirdly, the beauty which becomes connatural

to the intellect of the performing musician is an aurally pleasing expe
rience of aesthetic beauty.

Connatural beauty, then, is aesthetic beauty

which conveys intellectual joy through the sound of music.

The habitus

pursues the beauty of connaturality as it intuitively seeks itself and
the pleasure of satisfying music.

In its pursuit, the habitus uses the

sound to find itself and apply itself to the object being produced.

The

habitus becomes connatural to its object through the beauty of personal
aural experience.
The academicist, who attempts to produce beauty conceptually and
positively, has little patience with the subjective nature of connatural
ity because the unpredictability of connaturality cannot be ruled by the
positivismof pure objectivity.

To avoid connaturality, the academicist
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must rule sound conceptually, that is, to regard sound as an object from
which nothing transcends.

The academicist exercises little concern over

the pleasurable aspects of sound; he begins and ends with the external
content of the music; he defines sound as an aural copy of the written
score, thus logically filtering out any possibility of an inner mystery
transcending the score.
The academicist's position becomes polarized in respect to con
temporary music because of the external complexity of this music.

A

personal connaturality with such surface complexity is regarded as
improbable, unnecessary, and pointless while personal detachment is
regarded as essential.
Obviously, the academicist lacks confidence in the intuitive per
ception of contemporary music.

As a result, a contemporary work, which

lacks the beauty it purports to represent visually and conceptually,
may be judged as conceptually good while being aesthetically weak.

In

other words, the external quality of the work is equated with the aes
thetic value, the inner sterility notwithstanding.
Maritain argues that all artistic products contain a degree of
transcendence, but apart from sensory perception, aesthetic beauty is
muted.

The aural perception of complex and unusual music may be

repulsive to the intellect at first; nevertheless, if the performer
allows the sound of this music to permeate his intellect, he may grot^
to be connatural to the sounds that were initially repulsive.

The

c omplexity of contemporary music appears to present a challenge but
not an insurmountable task for the performer because all music, tradi
tional as well as contemporary, must reveal its inner content through
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aural perception; otherwise, the beauty reflected from the composer's
intent, however meager, may remain isolated from the intellect.

Fur

thermore, contemporary music having much aesthetic value in its aural
potentiality is also sterilized by artistic striving for pure objectiv
ity.
Because of the intellectual inclination

toward beauty, the

habitus operates through the intellectual will to create a good work.
The habitus, in its spirituality, perfects a work by the intuition of
the will; it intuitively "knows" the proper direction of operation
through connaturality.

The principle of disinterestedness ensures

that a work is performed to delight, initially, the intellect of the
performer and to produce, resultingly, a good sound, one that aurally
enhances the performed work.

In this way, the habitus is prompted to

search, probe, and exhaust itself in pursuit of its object: a pleasing
sound.
To the above end, the virtue of performance draws upon knowledge
and uses or applies this knowledge to enhance the work being performed.
The skill of performance, physical and mental, is used to externalize
the intended work or give it an aural presence.

The habitus relies on

knowledge and skill but only in the context of an undeviating service
to the aural product.

A knowledge of music is speculative; the skill

of execution is empirical.

The habitus of performance is neither as

rational as wisdom nor as observable as externalization.
A purely technical display of skill, or of performing habits,
is a substitute for the formality of performance which begins in the
intellect.

A proficient technician may be observably impressive in his
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motions of performance but his mind may also be intellectually detached
from the aural product.

If the proficiency of performance is primary,

the ego grasps this intent for itself.

The ego makes the work a servant

of the performer's skill, a skill which seeks to enhance itself, thus
making performance a shallow art, an art of proficient reading and
execution.

If society places great value on observable performance

results, a performer's "motions" might be misinterpreted as an art of
depth when it is quite the opposite, that is, a display of good per
forming habits.

The performer himself knows the truth of his intent;

others can judge his intent only through his works.
The habitus adheres to the primacy of a work, an intent not
easily observable; however, such an intent can be judged for its spirit
ual content through the aesthetic experience of music.

The habitus

requires means to externalize its product; therefore, the proficiency
of execution may be equal to that of display for the sake of display.
The essential difference is that the habitus requires execution to
serve the work being produced, a work first envisioned by the intel
lect .
Conceptual methods of performance pertain to the content of a
written score.

The score, and its notation, belong to the speculative

order of knowledge because it is entirely possible to analyze, plan,
and execute performance through the contemplation of notation, the
intent being abstracted from the material content of the score.

In

this sense, the externalization of the product serves the abstracted
material intent.
The problem with conceptual performance lies in the essence of
the habitus; that is, the habitus is illogical and nonconceptual.
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performance.

If the via inventionis predominates, the work is subjected

to the personal whim of the performer, an example of artistic anarchy,
and an emphasis on performer's intent over composer's intent.

Con

versely, the predominance of the via disciplinae encourages conceptual
score analysis which, by itself, neglects the performer's intuitive
aural perception of the work— a point which parallels conceptual aims
in performance.
Re-creation begins with the composed work in its printed or
external form and, in this, the via disciplinae is necessary for score
analysis.

The totality of the judgment, however, cannot dwell at the

material level.

Score contemplation is a beginning of artistic judg

ment but, as re-creation, it is limited to the external work and not
to the work, in the internal sense.

Aural perception is an essential

component of the performer's judgment because the work reveals itself
in sound.

Aesthetic perception requires a prior consent, by the per

former, to the aural reality of the work and what it may teach him.
Prior consent is the full attention given to the sound of the work as
conveyed through performance.

Aesthetic judgment is intuitive because

it requires the performer to judge through his connaturality with the
sound of the work.
The re-creation of a composed work is the initial step toward
the performer's view of the totality of the work in performance.

The

performed work is the potentiality of the composed work in relation to
the performer's intellectual uniqueness and performing ability.

The

totality of the performer's view is the creative idea, a comprehensive
vision containing details in spiritual form, that is, details not worked
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out or externalized.

As externalization or execution begins, the per

former's intuition guides him in pursuit of the envisioned details,
initially obscure, and which become "fixed" as they are discovered,
aurally, to fit the original view of the work.

In this respect, the

performer finds it difficult to calculate his progress in advance
because the fixation of detail occurs at the moment of discovery.

The

sound of a performed work is "right" when he hears the fulfillment of
his idea, that is, when his intellect becomes connatural to the aural
product.
The habitus guides the performer to his preferred particular
sound; the intuition of the habitus probes the composed work for its
beauty and wills the intellect to pursue it and externalize it.
desired sound is validated, then, by connaturality.

The

Apart from his

habitus, the performer could not know in which direction to proceed,
the alternative being an academic plan, conceptually designed, and
derived from the printed score through contemplation.

Such a pre

pared plan is efficient, positive, and, very likely, acceptable; how
ever, it may divert the performer away from the beauty of the work,
thereby limiting the aural product to a level below its initial
potentiality.
Inspiration, or the lack of it, is directly related to the
depth and intensity of the performer's idea.

The flash of inspira

tion is equated with the sudden and unexpected appearance of a crea
tive idea— the composer's intent united with the performer's intent
as the latter suddenly "sees" the potentiality of the work in perform
ance.

Inspiration spurs the performer on to further action, in
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pursuit of detail, and with the hope of externalizing the generality of
the vision before the limitation of memory fades the initial brilliance
of the idea.

For a moment, the performer knew what he wanted; he envi

sioned the full potential of the work in performance within an instan
taneous framework.

It remains for the habitus to guide the intellect

in search of detail and to validate detail by intuition.

The conscious

mind, or the memory, cannot hold the complex unity of the envisioned
work.

The details are revealed through externalization and the exter

nalized details, in turn, provide an aural presence to the envisioned
work, in its totality.

The aural product is an imperfect fulfillment

of inspiration, the material imperfection of the luminous perfection
of the performer's idea.
The sign quality of a musical work supports Maritain's conten
tion that there is an immateriality to the work which transcends the
physical presence of a printed score.

The direct sign is analogous to

the creative idea whether it be the compositional idea of the composer
or the performance idea of the performer.

The latter idea is the com

positional idea transformed by the action of performance.

The reversed

sign is the substance or personality of the performer which enters the
aural product unintentionally through the action of performance.

The

reversed sign of the composer is a nonconceptual part of the composed
work which entered the work through the action of composition.
The habitus of performance operates through the direct or inten
tional sign but because the performer is a man, as well as an artist,
the reversed or unintentional sign is inevitably commingled with crea
tive intent.

The spiritual nature of the direct and reversed signs
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permeates the material or entitative presence of the printed score.
Moreover, the sign of the work is nonconceptual, in contrast to the con
ceptual nature of symbolic notation within the materiality of the work.
The habitus of performance permeates the surface mechanics by aural
action and, in this way, becomes connatural to the inner sign hidden
within the score.

The inner sign of the work is analogous to the crea

tive idea but not to the symbolism of notation, external to the work.
The action of imitation in performance relates to the sign
aspect of a musical work and also defines the Maritain concept of crea
tive intuition.

A musician's imitative action occurs through the simul

taneous reading and execution of the score and the expression of a
creative intent subjectively commingled with the personality of the
performer.

The imitative action of performance is a marriage of the

entitative work to the intentional and unintentional creative.intent
of the performer.

He begins with the score but permeates it with his

creative idea, the latter being affected or influenced by the subjec
tivity of his personality.

This is analogous to the direct-reversed

sign relationship in musical performance and to the relationship of
the entitative work (score) to the intentional work (aural product).
Imitative performance occurs when the performer executes the
score while simultaneously putting himself into the work through aural
perception.

Consequently, the visual work is transformed into an aural

product; a composed work becomes a performed work.

In other words, the

composed work is inadvertently transfigured by the action of perform
ance; the aural product is the composed work as the performer hears it,
a transcendence of musical sounds symbolized materially.
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Technically reproducing the score through the primacy of execu
tion is not imitation, in the formal sense, because strict reproduction
lacks the self-expression and the personal creative intent of the per
former.

Conversely, slighting or ignoring the entitative work in favor

of total performer freedom is not imitative because the entitative work
must be re-created through the action of artistic judgment.
The musical work is a prerequisite to self-expression because
the performer expresses his self through the work; that is, he expresses
the work and not himself, in a direct sense.

Self-expression, or the

reversed sign, is a giving of the self, a self-sacrifice to the work
being made.

The self-expression of the personality is in direct con

trast to the self-centered possessiveness of the ego and its concern
for individuality.

Self-expression is self-sacrifice, a subordination

of the personality to the work being performed.

Self-expression is tied

to the habitus of performance because the performer focuses upon express
ing the work, his creative intent through the work, and himself through
the performance idea.

The expression of the self, then, is analogous

to the unintentional impact of the reversed sign on the action of
performance.
Technical display enhances the ego because it focuses upon the
performer and not the work.

Technique, in its lower sense, enhances

the work when it serves the work, an alien practice to the ego which
grasps and cannot serve.

The habitus seeks to produce a good work and

operates through the self rather than the ego.
A musical work aurally communicates its intentional sign to a
perceiver of the work.

In this way, the interiority of a composition
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is communicated to the performer (and the interiority of a performed work
is communicated to listeners in general).

To perceive the creative

intent of an artist is to perceive something of his self along with
the creative idea.

This kind of communication is nonconceptual and

depends upon aural perception; communication, in this sense, is defined
as a work revealing itself to a perceiver.
The intent to communicate, as an aim of performance, is external
to the formal definition of communication.

The intent to communicate

effect, knowledge, or proficiency of habit

is external to communication,

in its higher sense, because the aim of performance is to produce a good
work.

Communication, in its higher sense, does not focus upon certain

components of a work in a direct and conscious fashion.

A performed

work communicates by revealment, indirectly.
The habitus operates through the soul of a work, or its operative
idea, because this is the inner sphere which intends to make a good work.
The spirit of the work, or subjectivity of the performer, is an uninten
tional component of the soul, transcending the soul but not controlling
it.

This is analogous to the self expressing itself in a work, or the

performer’s self expressing the work.

The aural product communicates or

reveals the soul, in conjunction with the spirit, to the perceiver.

Rela

tive to the composed work, the performer is both perceiver and maker;
relative to the performed work, a listener is a perceiver of both the
composed and performed product.
Intentional communication betrays a concern for the self rather
than the work.

The communication of effect, in particular, is concerned

with the impact of a work on others— another way of saying that the
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performer, in this case, is concerned about how others react to his per
formance product.

The practice of intentional communication also feeds

the social bias of art because performance for communication is a nat
ural instrument of social purpose.

If the performer consciously attempts

to communicate external purpose, he unconsciously inhibits the self which
flows through the aesthetic purpose of a work.

If the performer wishes

to please an audience, he risks displeasing his intellect and inhibiting
self-expression.

This is because self-expression is concerned with the

work, and the intellect must be pleased with the sound of the work before
the habitus operatively guides the intellect in perfecting the product.
What is communicated, then, is the interiority of the work which may
result in an effect, indirectly.
Performance for use, rather than making, subordinates the crea
tive intellect to social requirements and promotes the primacy of exter
nal goals and the incidence of performer satisfaction.

A good work is

one which pleases the performer; a beautiful work is one which the per
former loves without qualification.

Beauty is of no material use; it

exists to delight the intellect of a perceiver.

Performance for use,

then, inhibits the aesthetic experience of beauty.
To encourage aesthetic priorities in a work, the ego must be
sacrificed to the work or, in the absence of such sacrifice, the ego
will demand that the work please others to enhance itself.

The habitus

of performance operates through the aesthetic requirements of art
because it cannot subordinate itself to external forces, only to the
work-to-be-made.

Performance for use can occur following the opera

tion of the habitus in making a good work, for itself; similarly,
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performance for use can be concurrent with the operation of the habitus
so long as the primacy of the primary rule of performance is strictly
observed.

This is consistent with respecting the primacy of the spirit

ual, internal aim of performance in the presence of external aims.
The suppression of all human ends in performance to meet creative
ends presents a similar dilemma at another extreme.

The danger of sup

pressing human ends in art is that self-expression, being human, may be
repressed.

This is equated to severing the reversed sign from the direct

sign for the purpose of purifying artistic intent.

Purified performance

is a sterilized product produced by a dehumanized intent.

The removal

of the performer's personality from his aural product encourages stark
objectivity, the impersonality of which violates Maritain's concept of
imitation.

Art for an ideal is distinct from art for the xrork, the lat

ter drawing upon the habitus for its internal function.
The habitus proceeds from the intellect and the intellect is
rooted in the spiritual self, the person.

The habitus is an inner dis

position of the person which serves a xrork willed by the intellect.
Consequently, the habitus is not a system of art nor does it serve such
an ideal; rather, it serves the interiority of a work-to-be-made.
The habitus is spontaneous because the mind is spontaneous; it
moves freely in various directions to find itself in an object.

The

habitus operates through connaturality because the mind, by nature,
seeks itself in an object.

The intuition of the habitus depends on

connaturality to find its direction; resultingly, the connaturality of
intuition is unpredictable and illogical.
Moral virtue and artistic virtue apply to separate ends.

The

former applies to the human acts of the artist, as a man, x^hile the
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latter applies to the artistic acts of the artist, as an artist.

Despite

these diverse ends, a certain relationship exists between the two virtues
because they both exist in the mind of the man, as a man.

If the artist's

moral virtue, as a man, diminishes, his habitus of art, also a part of
the man, will eventually diminish from the physical and mental repercus
sions of the human acts.

In this way, the free exercise of moral virtue

for the good of the man also protects the habitus of art.
In addition to this, moral virtue can indirectly enhance the art
istic virtue because of the role of self-expression in the practice of
art.

The self or person is directly subject to the operative perfection

of morality; therefore, the enhancement of the self can enhance the
habitus in a positive but undefinable xtfay.
Moral virtue can also guide the performer in his use of the per
formance product in relation to the community and the moral values of the
community.

A performer need not be a "saint" to perform; however, the

possession of moral virtue is an attribute in helping the performer, as
a man, to preserve and enhance his habitus of performance while guiding
his use of the performance product.
The community, on the other hand, must reciprocate by respecting
the free nature of the habitus and its priority of aesthetic value over
social value in the making of a performance product.

If the aim of per

formance is the fulfillment of social requirements, the oppressive nature
of such requirements repress the habitus by ignoring its inclination to
create a good work.

External priorities inhibit the operative nature of

the habitus, restrict its development, and fabricate the performance pro
duct to meet social intent.

The primacy of social aims in performance
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is a rationalization of the place of fine art in society because this
primacy loses sight of the spiritual need for art in human life.

A

society which preserves the dignity of spiritual pleasure (such as fine
art) has less need for the carnal and material pleasures of life.
The conductor, as a performance leader, has a special relation
ship to the work of fine art because of his leadership role in the prac
tice of performance— a role which pertains to the instrumentality of a
performing group.

The conductor's first responsibility is to the aural

product and, in this sense, the habitus of the conductor must flow
through the work in the same manner as the habitus of the aural agents,
or instrumentalists, of the work.

Hence, the performers, or aural

agents, become the instruments of the conductor in his making of the
work.
The conductor's secondary responsibility is to those agents, the
performing musicians, the instruments of his habitus.

If the primary

responsibility is violated by external forces such as conductor self
enhancement or social requirements, or if the performance is dehumanized
by attempts to withdrax/ the self from the work, the secondary responsibil
ity to the performers will also be threatened.

The observance of the

primary responsibility is essential to the fulfillment of the secondary
responsibility because the latter is tied to the former.
The existence of the secondary responsibility is rooted in the
fact that the aural agents of the work are more than mere instruments;
they are human beings and artists in their own right, each possessing
his personal degree of habitus and thereby inevitably establishing a
personal relationship to the performed work.

If the performing
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musicians become the pawns of external forces, or subject to conductor
whim unrelated to the work, the performers may be inhibited in their
inclinations to place themselves into the production of the work.

This

results in the meaningless motions of performance as contrasted with
the fine art of performance, which adheres to the primacy of the work.
If performance becomes the meaningless motions of execution, the con
ductor himself is an external threat to the very art he professes to
lead and exemplify.
The aural perception of a work by its agents soon reveal whether
the conductor's directives are in line with his habitus and are actually
perfecting the work being performed.

The intellectual joy of making a

good work spills over to the agents who are intimately involved with
its execution.

When the performers are aurally aware of their personal

contribution to the general sound of a good work, the habitus of each,
musician is inclined in the same general direction, united in the desire
to achieve a satisfying final product.

The performing group experience

reveals certain similarities in the perception of beauty as well as
unique differences.
The conductor, however, is the principal agent of the performed
work.

If the temptation of material considerations weakens the opera

tion of his habitus, the expression of the work will also be weakened.
The repression of the conductor's habitus will mute the habitus of his
performing group because the primacy of the work is lessened.

To

restore the strength of his habitus, the conductor must subordinate
himself to the aesthetic requirements of the work, as intuitively per
ceived by his habitus, thereby becoming a true instrument of the per
formed work.
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The performance critic also has a special relationship to a per
formed work because he judges the work but does not perform it.

His

aesthetic judgment, in respect to aurally perceiving a work, is similar
to the performer's judgment because both performer and critic are perceivers of the aural product.
The essential difference between the performer and the critic is
that the performer intuitively applies his judgment to his personal pro
duction of the work; the critic uses his skill of critique to communicate
his judgment to a performer x^ho is the maker of the work.

The performer

typically judges a work during his execution of the work and applies his
judgment to a further perfection of the product.

The critic judges from

the execution of the work and applies his critique following the judgment;
however, it is left to the performer to perfect the work, to use the
critique, and to judge the product in an ongoing manner.

Accordingly,

in judging the same work, the ongoing operation of his habitus draws
the performer more deeply into the aural product than the single percep
tive judgment of the critic.

In respect to that particular work, the

judgment of the performer may have more operative depth in spite of the
probability that the critic may possess a superior knowledge of perform
ance.

The judgment, in both cases, is intuitive but in the former case

it is operative while in the latter case it is external.
If the critic judges conceptually, or through preconception, the
work is less likely to teach him its aesthetic intent.

If he judges the

performer directly, and the work indirectly, the inner spirit of the work
is subordinated to the performing skill of the musician.
Criticism is intended to improve the performance product by
intuitively perceiving its inner content.

To do this, the critic must

120
allow the aural product to permeate his intellect through the aural
sense, thus perceiving it for what it is and allowing his habitus to
guide his judgment of the work.

A judgment of the performer, and his

executive ability, can be made through the work because improving the
work requires, by natural necessity, an improvement in execution as
well as intent.
The conductor, in his practice of leadership, and the critic,
in his practice of critique, are both subject to the guidance of the
habitus because the operative nature of this virtue preserves the pri
macy of the work.

This is because the habitus operates through an

aural product of performance.

Summary
I.
intellect.

The habitus of performance is a possession of the performer's
The habitus is a changed or deepened intellect; hence, it

gives the performer an intellectual power to perform musical works through
the inner strength of intuition.

The intuition of the habitus adheres to

the primacy of a work-to-be-performed, a work willed by the intellect.
The habitus perfects its product as the latter aurally pleases the
intellect.
A.

The spontaneous nature of the habitus reflects the spon

taneous nature of the mind from which it proceeds.
flows through the intellectual inclination toward

The habitus
beauty and the

intellectual will to perfect an object which reflects beauty.
B.

The habitus is acquired or developed through its adher

ence to a willed work, the resulting content being a latent energy
or source of strength for intuition (and the intuitive production
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of the next work).

The acquired habitus is served by innate musi

cal ability and is enhanced from each production of an aural
object willed by the intellect.
C.

The habitus rules, by reason, over empirical perform

ing habits and conceptual means of performance.
D.

The personal or subjective nature of the habitus requires

that a performer become connatural to his object.

He facilitates

connaturality by allowing the sound of a work to permeate his intel
lect through his aural sense.

Through the personal effort of con

naturality, the performer's intuition is stimulated to guide the
habitus to its determined end: a pleasing work.
E.

Since the virtue of art serves a willed work, the

habitus of performance cannot serve a system of art or an artis
tic ideal.
II.
for itself.

The primary aim of performance is an aural product created
The primary aim involves the principle of disinterested

ness because the performance of music is a fine art.

The principle of

disinterestedness defines the aural product of performance as a product
having no necessary use other than its own existence as a good work, a
good work being a work created to please its creator.

Through his prac

tice of gratuitous performance, the performer needs no necessary reward
other than the pleasure derived from his aural product.

The aim of

performance, then, is a spiritual aim because it depends upon the per
former's connaturality with his product.

The habitus, and its spiritual

interiority, operates through the spiritual aim of performance because
the latter is also intellectual and internal in nature.
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A.

The aim of performance defines the technique of per

formance as technique, in a higher sense.

The means of perform

ance serve a primary intent, that is, to create a good aural pro
duct.

Technique includes both a spiritual aspect and a material

aspect; but technique, in its higher sense, demands that the mate
rial rules serve the spiritual rules and the conjoined primary
rule (which intends to free the natural inclinations of the
intellect to produce a good work).

Technique, in its lower

sense, is defined as material or external technique, an end in
itself, and a technique which takes means as ends.

The habitus

operates through technique, in its higher sense, because the
rules of performance are a possession of the habitus; therefore,
technique provides the habitus with a content, operative in
nature, which becomes a means to producing a good work.
B.

The aim of performance defines the communication of

performance as indirect, unintended communication, in a higher
sense.

The work reveals itself in sound to a perceiver, the

revealment containing both creative intent and the personality
of the performer.

In this way, a composed work reveals itself

to the performer and the performed work reveals itself to a non
performer.

The external communication of effect, empirical per

forming habits, or musical knowledge may occur as a result of
internal communication; however, external communication as a
direct aim of performance is a violation of the primary aim of
performance.

The habitus operates through the communication of

performance, in a higher sense, because aural perception is
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intellectual in nature (a connaturality of the mind with its
object).
C.

The aim of performance defines the beauty of perform

ance as the intellectual delight or satisfaction derived from the
aural perception of a work, or the aural experience of a good or
pleasing work.

A pleasing sound conveys beauty to a performer

because the intellect is naturally inclined to seek it in an
object of sound.

Since the intellect becomes connatural with a

pleasing work, the beauty reflected from the work is connatural
beauty.

Connatural beauty is the beauty of aesthetic experience,

aesthetic beauty being the beauty of aural perception.

The aes

thetic beauty of music is a momentary glimpse of transcendental
beauty, an infinite beauty known to God but not to man (except
by means of the aesthetic).

Relative to the transcendental realm

of God, the aural perception of beauty is a human limitation, an
experience of beauty more intuitive than abstract and more illog
ical than logical.

The conceptual production of beauty, through

performance, violates the aim of performance because conceptually
planned performance, by itself, depends upon the contemplative
abstraction of a work.

The spiritual mystery of a work belongs

to the transcendental realm and is not an abstractable item.
Moreover, aesthetic beauty cannot be confined to a system of
performance because the transcendental realm, of which the aes
thetic is a part, is infinite.

The habitus of performance oper

ates through connatural beauty because the intellect is naturally
inclined towards beauty.
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III.

The action of performance is defined as the aim of perform

ance activated by the performer as he places his self into the produc
tion and execution of a work.

The performer expresses the work directly

and himself indirectly; thus, the objective reality of the work is com
mingled with the subjectivity of the performer in the action of perform
ance, in a higher sense.

The habitus operates through the action of

performance, in its higher sense, because the personal nature of the
habitus relates to the expression of the self in a work.
A.

The action of performance defines artistic judgment as

the perception and re-creation of the composer's intent.

Artis

tic judgment relates to the communication of the composed work,
in the formal sense; consequently, the intentional sign of a
composed work reveals itself aurally to a performer.

The xvritten

score, or entitative structure, of the xrork is the material repre
sentation of the composer's intent; however, contemplative judg
ment, by itself, remains on the surface or external level.

Artis

tic judgment includes the assessment of the score but the judgment,
in totality, transcends the score by the aesthetic judgment of the
work's sound.

The aesthetic judgment requires a full consent, by

the performer, to the aural reality of the work.

This judgment is

a perceptive judgment which probes the inner mystery of a composed
work as the performer allows the work to communicate itself to him.
The habitus operates through such perceptive judgment because the
judgment is an intuitive action.

It focuses upon the inner work

and requires the performer to put himself into the work to acti
vate his intuition.

Conceptual judgment, by itself, inhibits the
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action of performance because it remains on the surface of the
inner work and does not penetrate the spiritual depth of the
creative intent.
B.

The action of performance defines the creative idea

as the performer's vision of his work-to-be-performed.

The

creative idea is comprehensive but complex, complete but momen
tary, and initially clear but subsequently obscure.

The intui

tive appearance of a creative idea is defined as inspiration.
The habitus operates through artistic vision because the envi
sioned work must be intuitively externalized by the discovery of
details, which become fixed as they fit the envisioned product;
that is, the details must sound right or correct to the per
former as he applies them to the evolving work.

The habitus

guides the externalized details toward the intended product; con
sequently, both detail and product evolve simultaneously.

The

conceptual idea, by itself, inhibits the action of performance
because the preconception of a work must remain on the material
or external level.
C.

The action of performance defines artistic imitation

as an intermingling of the entitative work (written score), the
intentional sign (creative idea), and the unintentional sign (per
former's personality).

The action of imitation begins with the

score but moves beyond the score into the interiority of the work
by means of aural perception and production.

Aurally, the work

is expressed directly and the performer's self is expressed indi
rectly.

The habitus operates through imitation because the work
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is a sign; that is, it contains a spiritual mystery which must
be perceived to be expressed.

The relationship of the direct

and reversed signs to the entitative work defines imitation,
in its higher sense.

The performer must put himself into the

work to initiate the imitative action, a requirement which
parallels both the action of artistic judgment and the action
of artistic vision.

The material reproduction of the score,

by itself, inhibits the action of imitation because the objec
tivity of the entitative work is severed from the subjectivity
of the performer's intuitive perception.
IV.

The moral virtue of the performer, as a man, serves him, as

an artist, in three ways.

First, the free exercise of good moral virtue

protects the habitus; secondly, the presence of good moral virtue
enhances the habitus, nonconsciously but profoundly; thirdly, the
guidance of good moral virtue assists the performer in his use of
the performance product in relation to the social and moral values
of the community.
A.

The morality of performance makes a distinction

between self-expression and self-centered expression.

Self-

expression expresses the work directly and itself indirectly,
a principle in line with the imitative action of performance.
Furthermore, self-expression is a giving of the self (or selfsacrifice) to a work, a principle in contrast with selfsacrifice to the systematic practice of art.

Self-centered

expression expresses the ego directly and the work incidently
by focusing upon the use of the work for self-enhancement.

In
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this way, self-centered expression better serves the systematic
practice of art than the good of a willed aural product.

Self-

expression, which is analogous to the reversed sign, subordi
nates itself to the work, for the good of the intended work.
The ego enhances itself by using the work to display its indi
viduality.

In this sense, the material execution of a work,

by itself, serves the ego but not necessarily the work; accord
ingly, it enhances the performer's individuality but not neces
sarily his personality.

The habitus of performance operates

through self-expression because the latter serves the good of
the aural product.
B.

The morality of performance makes a distinction

between the use of performance and the art of performance
(because the ends

are separate).

The art of performance per

fects the product while the use of the product follows its
production and has external ends not primary to the work.

The

use of a performance product is legitimate if the use strictly
follows the art of performance, or the aim and action of per
formance, in its higher sense.

The primacy of performance for

individuality and performance for social requirements subordi
nates the aesthetic requirements of performance to external
ends; consequently, the art of performance is severed from aes
thetic ends.

The habitus operates through the art of perform

ance but not through the primacy of use.

To preserve his

inclination to perform good works, the performer must give
his intended work precedence over whatever compensation the
use of this work may entail.

To preserve the free nature
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of the habitus in the performance of music, the community must
reciprocate for the performer's personal responsibility in the
use of his product.

The community can reciprocate by granting

him the freedom to perform for the good of his product, in the
primary sense, and for the social value of the product, in the
secondary sense.

Conclusions
1.

The habitus of performance is an intuitive and operative

disposition which empowers a performer to aurally produce music without
a logical, conceptual understanding of his productive action.

The

habitus is unpretentious because its relationship to a work is estab
lished or structured during the momentary perceptions and operative
functions of production, this being in contrast with the pretentious
structure of academicism.

The performer, in possession of the habitus,

knows how to perform his music without conscious certainty of how or
why he knows.
2.

The internal power or content of the habitus is largely in

a preconscious state; that is, the performer is not conscious of its
content until the intellect becomes connatural with an object— a musi
cal work, thereby prompting a movement of the habitus from the precon
scious mind to the conscious mind.

The power of the habitus is freed

through the production of music willed by the intellect (through its
connaturality with musical sound).
3.

The habitus relates to musical performance in the spiritual

or internal sense.

This relationship does not exclude the material or

external aspect of performance; but rather, the material aspect is
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subordinated to the spiritual aspect, the realm of the habitus.

The

material aspect of performance, by itself, requires a mastery of per
formance skills and a knowledge of musical concepts; consequently, a
command of the physical instrument and the printed score is a facilitative means of producing the aural object.
4.

The operation of the habitus flows through the sound of a

work, as the sound pleases or displeases the performer’s intellect.
The primacy of a musical work indicates that the musician desires some
thing from the music being produced, this "something" being the delight
of aesthetic beauty.

He needs no additional reason to perform his music.

If his object offers him nothing, no alternative aim of performance can
legitimately replace the internal aim.
A musical work, in this sense, is defined as any aural object
ranging from short, simple songs— to improvised melodies— to more formal
thematic literature.

The work, then, is more likely an object of inter

nal will than external taste.
5.

The performer's connaturality with the sound of his music

is defined as the placing of the self into the work.

A performer places

his self into a work by becoming totally oblivious to his self, and his
surroundings, and by becoming wholly absorbed in the sound of the music
and the work that evolves.

Within the action of performance, nothing

other than sound exists; the mind, as served by the aural sense, is
fixed upon the work and does not wander away to the external world
without releasing the spell cast over the mind by the work.
6.

The art of performance, as discussed in terms of aim and

action, is not a compartmentalized system of production.

The habitus
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operates through its object comprehensively, thereby causing the compo
nents of performance to be interrelated and overlapped in their contribu
tion to the final product.
7.

The aim, action, and use of performance can occur concur

rently; however, the use must be subordinated to the primacy of the art
to preserve the latter in its higher sense.

The habitus operates through

the art of performance and is undeterred by its use, so long as the use
does not control or dictate the performance product.

Since the use of

a performance product is ruled by morality, the use has human ends while
the art has artistic or aesthetic ends.
8.

It is apparent that the most intense operative practice of

the habitus will occur during the performance rehearsal, while the final
performance is, to a greater extent, the use of the aural product and,
to a lesser extent, a continuation of the aural art (the making of the
work).
9.

The content of the habitus is derived and enhanced from the

performer’s connaturality with his work; therefore, a reciprocal rela
tionship exists between the development and operation of the habitus,
the reciprocality focusing upon the art of performance (operation
enhances development; development enhances operation).

Consequently,

aesthetic delight, perceived as personal enjoyment, facilitates both
the operation and development of the habitus because the intellect is
drawn into its object spiritually.
10.

The relationship of the habitus to musical performance

explains why musicians, possessing a habitus of great depth, are able
to perform musical works without the assistance of a written score and
without dependence upon conceptual terminology.
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General Conclusion
Maritain shows, through the logic of philosophical argument,
the illogical nature of the habitus
tice of fine art.

in respect to beauty and the prac-

Maritain shows, through conceptual consistency, the

nonconceptual nature of the habitus. Maritain shows, without dogmatism,
the unwavering, undeviating thrust of the habitus towards a work-to-bemade, willed by the intellect.

The paradox of this loyalty is that, to

be a servant of the work, the habitus must adhere to the unpredictable
will of the creative intellect.
It is at this point that the spiritual nature of the habitus
becomes evident.

Only the spiritual realm of the intellect could pro

vide such depth to the'virtue of art, thus causing the resulting com
plexity of its operative nature.

The material level of performance can

exist in a factory-like environment, under a thoroughly efficient method
of production— but the habitus finds existence within an oppressive envi
ronment threatening to its operative freedom.

The contrast between the

motions of performance and the art of performance is amplified by the
personal nature of the habitus and the impersonal nature of logical art.

■''The illogical nature of the habitus is distinct from the
irrational nature of habit.

CHAPTER VII

APPLICATIONS TO THE PERFORMANCE PROGRAM IN MUSIC EDUCATION

The Aim of Education and the Aim of Performance
First, it is necessary to restate Maritain's definition of the
aim of education.

The aim of education is to equip, form, and liberate

the intelligence to prepare for the development of the intellectual vir
tues or the h a b i t u s Using this broad definition, the aim of music edu
cation can be defined as the intent to equip, form, and liberate the
creativity of the spirit, or creative intelligence, to prepare for the
»
development of the habitus of music.
Secondly, it is necessary to restate the aim of performance.
The aim of performance is to create a good work through the sound of
music, a good work being pleasing to the performer and the object upon
which the habitus fixates.

o

The essential point in Maritain's definition of the aim of edu
cation is the preparation of the intellect for the development of the
habitus.

Education, in the liberal sense, directs its attention to the

natural intelligence of the student and prepares the mind for the devel
opment of intellectual virtue.

This development occurs through*
2

■*"560 chapter 1 above, p. 11.

2

See chapter 3 above, p. 32.
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experience in a given object and is not educable in the direct sensed
To educate for virtue is a pretense because such education is
invariably external to the development of virtue, a spiritual develop
ment related to the interiority of the will.

This point is consistent

with the acquiring of the habitus through the aural production of works,
indirectly and nonconsciously, the works being objects of the creative
intellect.
Education as formative education is more concerned with the
intellect than the will and recognizes that the school is but a partial
agency in the totality of the educative process (which continues throughout life).

2

Since the nature of man’s mind remains inherently consistent,

the primary aim of education need not be changed or altered to suit
modern needs.

3

Secondary aims may be adjusted or adapted to changing

circumstances and, in fact, periodic reconstruction of the means of
education is an enrichment of the process, so long as the primary aim
is preserved and protected.^
The school performance program should avoid, as implied by
Maritain, direct attempts to make musical "dwarfs" or pseudovirtuosos
out of student performers.

The concept of preparation, as directed

at the natural intelligence, places the habitus of performance beyond

‘'"Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p p . 49-50. Teaching
toward the natural intelligence helps allay instructional tendencies
toward overspecialization. Idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian
Education," in The Education of Man, p. 138. For a further discussion
on specialization see pp. 142-145 below.
^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education, p. 51; and idem, "Edu
cation and the Humanities," in The Education of Man, p. 83.
^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 52.
^Ibid., pp. 52-53.
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the scope of the school performance program or, at least, beyond any
direct aim of instruction.

Since the development of the habitus

depends upon a performer's personal relationship to his music, this
kind of learning is difficult, or conceivably impossible, to reliably
plan or accurately prepare by the performance instructor.

As a con

sequence of such an aim, performance instruction generally veers
toward the mastery of musical mechanics, which improves execution
but, deplorably, encourages the student to express little or nothing
of himself through his music.

He may, in fact, remain aloof from the

intellectual joy of aural production.
The above consequence occurs because the instructor inadver
tently confuses efficient and refined performance habits, or external
technique, with the habitus and confines the habitus of performance to
technique, in its lower sense.

Moreover, the intensity of such surface

development can alienate the student from his art and make his perform
ance one of impersonality or boredom.

This external approach to stu

dent performance can do little to assist gifted students who are intel
lectually inclined to acquire a habitus; and more profoundly, such an
approach to the average student performer, who desires the enjoyment
of music in preference to technical development, reaches the point of
absurdity in its neglect of student will.
The objective of school education, in the liberal sense, is not
to teach for the acquisition of an art, and the virtues involved, in a
direct manner; but rather, this agency of education should assist stu
dents in learning the meaning of an art through the intellect's connaturality with an object, and in comprehending the truth (beauty) which
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the object yields (to the student).^- Liberal education, then, must
"see to it that the young person grasps this truth or beauty through
the natural powers and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive
energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative,
and emotional dynamism."

The meaning of the art of performance is

defined by the beauty conveyed to the performer through the aural
experience of his music.

"So I should say that the youth is to

learn and know music in order to understand the meaning of music
rather than in order to become a composer [or virtuoso]."0
Maritain's definition of the aim of education, and the recon
ciliation of this definition with the aim of performance, can be fur
ther clarified by exploring seven misconceptions of educational aims,
as identified by Maritain.

The Particularization of Means over Ends
To perfect means and disregard ends in education elevates the
importance of means so refined that the end result of their use is
lost in a maze of method.
ate

4

The concern is with immediacy, or immedi

results, rather than the far-reaching implications of educational

methods.

Such particularization encourages over-teaching, a practice
1Ibid., P . 71.

2

Ibid. Maritain uses the term "sensuous" in reference to the
role the senses play in the intellectual perception of beauty. The
gift of imagination, of course, also serves the intellect; and the emo
tional reaction to beauty is a result of the intellectual fulfillment,
which defines the affective role.
^Maritain, "The Humanities and Liberal Education," in Education
at the Crossroads, p. 63; also see idem, "Some Typical Aspects of
Christian Education," pp. 138-139.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," p. 3.
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which gives little consideration to spontaneous, unprepared experi
ences .
The child is so well tested and observed, his needs so well
detailed, his psychology so clearly cut out, the methods for
making it easy for him so perfected, that the end of all these
commendable improvements runs the risk of being forgotten or
disregarded.
If the performance program confuses performing habits with the
habitus, the student performer is viewed as a product of the program,
a measurable product which exits in terms of finality rather than
potentiality.

Quite obviously, the far-reaching implications of per

formance transcend the observable results during the school years and
are not measurable in the material sense.

In terms of ends, the per

formance instructor can monitor current student experiences for their
direction or probable outcomes while fully realizing the limitations
of such assessment.
Maritain implies that envisioning ends, in spite of human fal
libility, is preferable to the glorification of means.

This is the

case whether the student intends to pursue a musical career or, on
the other hand, decides to terminate the performance experience fol
lowing his school years.

Helping the student learn the meaning of

music is in contrast with molding him into a performer of music.

The

student may, in connection with musical meaning, become a proficient
performer, but the depth of such proficiency is generally beyond the
reach of school instruction.

The latter point explains why certain

students become good performers in spite of poor instruction.

The

instructional vision, in looking towards educational ends, determines1

1Ibid.
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probable outcomes of learning rather than obvious and immediate achieve
ment .
The Refinement of Material Ends
The second misconception of aims is closely related to the first
(as discussed above).

The education of matter focuses upon the condi

tioned reflex or sense memorization because it cannot accept the presence
of a spiritual mystery, the mysterious nature of the person.'*'

The posit

ing of material ends expresses the will of the instructor more than stu
dent will and challenges the intellect of the instructor more than stu
dent intellect.
The aim of education, spiritually defined, is more mysterious
and humble than material ends which attempt to define the entire educational experience in terms of achievable goals.

2

Since the spiritual

aim considers the person, as well as the individual, the unpredictable
movement of student will is respected and the latent power of the student intellect is challenged to function for itself.
Material ends in the performance program are designed to "train"
the performer to become musically proficient.

Materially defined, goals

and results are externalities to be measured and evaluated by the
instructor— a way of demonstrating the "effectiveness" of the program
to the community, administration, and the field in general.

There is

no mystery to a technically proficient performance of music, if such
external proof of competency is the desired objective.

Similarly,

good external results are equated xtfith desirable student progress
regardless of the personal relationship of the student to his music.

•'■Ibid., pp. 4, 7-9.

^Ibid., p. 4.

^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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The primacy of material ends, then, inevitably encourages the imperson
ality of sterile motions of performance.
The disorientation in performance program directions, of which
Reimer and Ball write, is a ramification of the material bias in posit
ing educational aims, as well as a historical incidence of means over
ends in achieving short-sighted goals.'*’ The disorientation occurs when
the externally imposed structure of the performance program conflicts
with the internal, spontaneous demands of musical performance, defined
as a fine art.

Music educators are beginning to realize

that pseudo

virtuosity may be empty of genuine content; however, the material bias
in aims is continuing because the field is more concerned with its own
potency than with the inner potentiality of its students.
The performance program, defined by spiritual ends, accepts the
mystery of personality by encouraging the student to place his self into
his music, to react aesthetically for himself, and to personally envision
the potentiality of a work.

He is encouraged to commit himself to the

risk of artistic performance, a spiritual mystery in itself.

Spiritual

ends involve the personal inclinations of the student without excluding
the material objectives of the program, but also including and, at times,
emphasizing personal growth not directly controlled or prepared by the
instructor.
The Pragmatic Approach to Truth
Pragmatic education seeks to verify its objectives with empiri
cal measurements administered by the instructor, while simultaneously

^See chapter 1 above, p. 4.
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neglecting the truth gained from personal insights of the mind.’*' Prag
matic education, in its extreme sense, is a doctrine of doubt, or skep
ticism, because (1) it distrusts in truth not provable by teacher veri
fication, and (2) it doubts the intellectual power of the student mind.2
In this way, pragmatic education is directly related to, and supportive
of, material ends in education because these ends can be verified.
Behavioral objectives are a modern example of the immediacy and
objective specificity of pragmatic truth.

The observed completion of

certain behaviors is equated with personal insight, an admission that
the instructor is thinking for his students and assuming that his
insights into truth are also their insights, to be drawn out and
measured.
Pragmatic aims in the performance program focus upon the per
formance behaviors of the student and away from the works-to-be-made.
Again, the motions of performance are encouraged because each motion
is a measurable objective to be assessed for itself and not for its
contribution to the beauty of a work.

Similarly, the art of perform

ance is subordinated to the motions of performance because the perform
ance action is misconstrued to serve the instructional objectives more
than the good of an envisioned work.
Conversely, the art of performance demands that both instructor
and students alike serve the good of a work and that intended objectives
aim at the perfection of the work rather than the musicianship of the
student.

Furthermore, the aim of education, in the liberal sense,

demands that the student performer's intellect be challenged by the1

1Ibid., p. 13.

2Ibid., pp. 12-14.
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aural production of works.

It is the power of the student's mind which

guides him through the work in search of the good object, the right
sound.

This is a personal commitment to a work which cannot be easily

prepared through performance objectives defined externally, or within
the context of a lesson plan.

The pursuit of aesthetic beauty, within

the mystery of a work, provides the excitement of the performance expe
rience and the incentive to continue the art so long as the object
seems incomplete.
The dangers stemming from the use of behavioral objectives in
music education have been recognized and defined by Bennett Reimer.
It is tragic to have measurement in its narrowest sense exert
great influence on educational processes, yet this tragedy can
be witnessed more and more every day. . . .
Another weakness of behavioral objectives is their deaden
ing effect on educational innovation, which often requires long
periods of freedom before directions become clear. . . .
. . . The central outcomes of learning in the arts are
usually characterized by unpredictability, subjectivity, sensi
tivity, creativity, originality, inwardness. These qualities
do not always lend themselves to prior stipulation in the same
way that predictable behaviors do. In fact, they may be stunted
by the very operations insisted upon by behaviorists as neces
sary for effective learning.^
When the mystery of the student intellect becomes connatural
with the mystery of a work, the meaning of the art and the meaning of
music, as an aural aesthetic, is inescapably conveyed to the student
in the internal sense.

This kind of conveyance was never doubted by

Maritain, but it is doubted by educators who insist on proving what
is not necessary to prove, and trivializing what is profound.

^"Aesthetic Behaviors in Music," in Toward an Aesthetic Education, pp. 71-73.
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Education as Social Conditioning
Education for social adjustment makes a secondary aim of edu
cation primary by emphasizing learning experiences appropriate for
adjustment to life in a modern society, or the current society within
which the school exists.-*-

The emphasis of sociologism inadvertently

encourages educational enslavement to current trends and the perpetual
reconstruction of educational ends, a practice which neglects the
spiritual consistency of the primary aim of education, as defined by
Maritain.

The encouragement of utilitarianism is also a by-product

of sociologism because society, as well as the school itself, finds
it convenient to use the functional skills of the students to serve
its own ends and, simultaneously, to label such use as "educational"
O

or beneficial to the learner.
The controversial aims of performance programs: extramusical
objectives and nonmusical objectives, bear a direct relationship to
Maritain's conception of sociologism.1
^

If the school performance pro

gram's primary function is entertainment, this extramusical aim is
synonymous with Maritain's concept of utilitarianism.

If the success

of the performance program depends upon extrinsic honors, or observ
able social activity, these nonmusical aims are synonymous with the
enslavement of performance to material results, as defined by the
trends or whims of society, or the temporary fads of presentism.

-*-Maritain, "The Aims of Education," p. 15.
2Ibid., p. 17.

3Ibid., p. 16.
2
*

^See chapter 1 above, pp. 3-4.
“’Presentism places its trust in the current, temporary trends
of the present rather than the established principles of the past.
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The impact of extramusical and nonmusical objectives upon the
performance program can have a deadening effect upon aesthetic aims in
performance because the primary aim of performance requires time,
effort, and a personal commitment to a depth of production that sur
passes the requirements of external goals.

The imposed inversion of

priorities for the performance program has had the most obvious reper
cussions at the public school level and has contributed to the disorien
tation in the field, as discussed above.

This is because sociologism

views musical performance as a servile art rather than a fine art, and
the student performer as an artisan rather than an artist.

Education for Specialization
Maritain's conception of intellectualism is defined as education
for dialectical skill, or the possession of concepts, and the narrowness
of specialization, or overspecialization.^

The focus of intellectualism

is upon single areas of emphasis; it is disinclined to view the universal
ity of a field or its broad potentialities for the learner.

The nature

of intellectualism serves a materialistic philosophy of life through the
education of matter toward such primary aims as vocational education or
preparation for college.

To achieve its intent, intellectualism may

ignore, circumvent, or suppress the student's will in implementing the
narrow scope of its content.
Intellectualism in the performance program has taken two forms,
one in reaction to the other.

Intellectualism as overspecialization

occurs when the art of performance is equated with technique, in its

-^Ibid., pp. 18-19.

^Ibid., p. 19.
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lower sense.

Since technical proficiency is the primary aim, the perform

ance program focuses upon the performance skills of the student; moreover
the proficient execution of performance skills is equated with the making
of a good aural product.

Performance, in this sense, is limited to execu

tion, which in turn is dependent upon technical training, or the refine
ment of performance skills.

Overspecialization occurs when (1) the per

formance of music is focused upon the performer rather than the musical
product; and (2) the performance program intends to mold its students
into performers of music.
Maritain is

less critical of specialization which serves an

intellectual object; however, specialization ttfhich confines an art to
narrow ends is defined as overspecialization.^

It is overspecializa

tion which narrows the aim of the performance program; consequently,
an overspecialized performance program may intend, primarily, to teach
students to play and/or master an instrument of music, thus accepting
O

the motions of performance as a vehicle of mastery learning.

•^According to Maritain, the amount of educational specialization
may increase progressively through the school years, but this progres
sion must be carefully monitored for tendencies toward overspecializa
tion. "The Humanities and Liberal Education," p. 64. Teacher consider
ation of student performing interests is, of course, vital for connaturality; however, the exploration of musical works which are less
desirable, or in which the student is less interested, is a counter
action to overspecialization. Similarly, the teacher must, at times,
monitor his personal standards, or relinquish some of his preferences,
in consideration of student interests and in the interest of lessening
instructional specialization.
See chapter 1, above, pp. 2-3. Reimer's questions (p. 2) can
be answered in light of Maritain's conception of technique. A group
performance experience can be a laboratory for musical exploration if
technical skill serves the exploration. Rehearsal time is a minimal
factor if rehearsing and teaching are synonymous activities. If the
performing group intends, as its primary object, to aurally produce
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Music education reaction to overspecialization has resulted
in intellectualism, in its second form: the emphasis of conceptual
musical understandings intending to teach students about the art of
music.^

Performance action, in this sense, is viewed as an instrument

of knowledge rather than an artistic endeavor.

Envisioning performance

ideas and applying them to a nonconceptual aural product, a risky and
challenging adventure, is subordinated to studying the conceptual con
tent of the scored material.

Intellectualism, in its second form,

regards the scored work as a conceptual finality, from which no spirit
ual mystery transcends.

Conceptually framed, the action of performance

is limited to a method: a series of planned lessons which logically and
objectively structure the learner’s experience of music.

The adventur

ous spirit associated with the nonconceptual, spontaneous action of per
formance is neutralized by a fabrication of the product's content.
R.esultingly, the unpretentious nature of the fine arts is stifled by
academic pretense.
The elevation of conceptual performance over proficient perform
ance succeeds only in transforming the quasi virtuoso into a student
dilettante.

The aesthetic beauty of music, which is conveyed aurally,

is ignored; the pleasurable experience of aesthetic perception is
derided for its "sensuous" or shallow nature.

Obviously, intellec

tualism, in its second form, misunderstands the aesthetic experience
because the academic study of music is erroneously termed a fine art.

works for their own sake, the use of the product for public performances
is an insignificant threat to the musical understandings and aesthetic
experiences of the participants.
^See chapter 1 above, p. 5.
^See chapter 1 above, p. 5.
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The art of performance, through the connaturality of mind with
sound, encourages the student's intellect to probe the depths of music
aurally and helps define the meaning of music to one who is making his
first hesitant commitments of his self to the perfection of a work.
The intellectual delight the learner receives from the sound of his
object is the perception of aesthetic beauty, which defines the mean
ing of music.

Paradoxically, the student performer can learn the mean

ing of music, as well as becoming a proficient and knowledgeable per
former; however, the meaning of music cannot be discovered apart from
the aesthetic experience of beauty.

Consequently, intellectualism,

in either form, makes what is primary to music secondary to music educa
tion and, more specifically, the performance program.'*'

The Education of Will
The education of will, or voluntarism, subordinates the educa
tion of the intellect to either an imposed discipline or the free expansion of the will.

Voluntarism, taken as external discipline, neglects

self-discipline and self-will while voluntarism, taken as free will,
neglects teacher discipline or institutional authority.

Both extremes

of voluntarism isolate the will from the intellect as if each could
operate in isolation from the other.

To the contrary, the personality

■'■"Methods, programs, organization, educational technique are,
without doubt, important; but they are, after all, merely secondary.
First must come the truth to which the teacher should bear witness"
(Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," in The Education of Man, p. 40).
In musical performance, the truth of a work is the beauty it conveys to
the performer. The teacher must also pursue, without pretense, the
truth of a work through his self-involvement in the aural production.
There is no easy or logical access to beauty, either for the instruc
tor or the student.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 20-22.
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is a commingling of both intellect and will because the will seeks to
adhere to an object, an object to be judged and shaped by the intel
lect.'*'

In this way, the will rules the intellect but is shaped through

the operation of the intellect and along with the development of the
intellect.

While the aim of education focuses directly on the natural

intelligence, the will is shaped along with it, indirectly.^
Voluntarism in musical performance is often present in conjunc
tion with other misconceptions of education.

For example, sociologism

may be imposed by the will of the administration, community, or parents;
and, at the other extreme, the art of performance may be allowed to
degenerate into social activity because the teacher has failed to chal
lenge his students with aesthetic pursuits.

Similarly, intellectualism

is often imposed on the performance program by the instructor or the
professional leadership in music education.
In respect to the latter, educational leaders and agencies have
exercised varying degrees of imposition into, and concern with, the per
formance program and music education in general.

The result has been a

confusing and dictatorial influx of programs, objectives, and guidelines
descending upon the schools from "above."

In this respect, the will of

the profession has proven to be rather contemptuous of the will of the
instructor, much less the will of the students.
According to Maritain, modern education is very concerned about
its field, not because of significant new discovery, but because it has
lost its own direction.^

^Ibid.

This explains the current preoccupation with

^Ibid., pp. 27-28.

■^Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," p. 41.
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trend, the "bandwagon" mentality.
A second facet of professional over-concern is the unprecedented
high expectations modern education has placed upon itself.

Obviously,

it has forgotten that the school is only a partial agency, however vital
it may be to the education of youth.

This oversight has encouraged the

profession to arbitrarily mold minds to get its will done, while fearing
that a less than total effort might be fatal to its designs.
To the contrary, Haritain insists that for the school to assist
living, spiritual beings in self-development, more mysteries must be
left unsolved than solved.

The general direction of learning experi

ences can be assessed but the final result is unassessable, in the
immediate sense.

Inclusive Education
This educational aim assumes that everything (or anything) neces
sary to a field of study can be taught through classroom experiences,
that is, through the preparation of lessons within a specified framework
of time.^

Again, as discussed above, inclusive education has forgotten

that the school is but a partial agency in a lifelong educational experience.

Furthermore, the frantic preparation required to "cover the mate

rial" offers the learner little opportunity for personal meaning or
experiential depth.

It is the meaning of an art which provides direc

tion and not, necessarily, mandatory exposure to multifarious experiences.*
2

'*'Ibid. , p. 43.
2
Haritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 22-24.
^Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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The inclusive approach to education has induced educators to
plan supplementary musical experiences for student performers, activ
ities which, in effect, force the performance program to veer away from
the primacy of aural creation.

Planned experiences in conducting, com

posing, and score analysis are designed to ensure that students exiting
the performance program will be complete musicians rather than mere
performers.
The false premise, from which this aim is derived, is reinforced
by its relationship to material ends in education, pragmatic approaches
to education, and intellectualism (in its second form).

Moreover, the

definition of school music, in terms of a partial or directional agency
in music education, is discounted or disputed by inclusive education.
Curiously, the supplementary experiences, as outlined above, parallel
a college music curriculum in scope; therefore, depending on how they
are applied, any one or all of these experiences may easily take pre
cedence over the art of performance.

If school music programs are

encouraged to feed the complexities of fine art directly to the school
musician, then, it must be concluded that music education desires to
supplant the college music program and its focus upon artistic virtue.
The results of this study imply that the art of performance,
defined spiritually, requires a self-commitment to aural production by
instructors and students alike.

If this art, by itself, can teach the

meaning of music to those learners willing to take the risk of such an
adventure, the imposition of additional experiences is clearly burden
some and unnecessary for the students involved.

It is an unnecessary
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duplication of artistic experience as well as the fragmentation of an
art into shallow or spurious components.
At the school level, aural creation stimulates the natural
inclinations of the student's intellect to produce pleasing sounds and
does so with a minimum of specialization.

If supplementary experiences

are brought into the program, they must be genuinely contributory to
aural production.

In other words, they must be employed as spontaneous

applications to unforseen needs, all of which serve the productive
process.

Such applications serve aural production by making the work

more delightful and fulfilling aurally, an improved product sensed by
the ears of the producer.

This sort of subordination to an object of

creation is alien to inclusive education.

The Reconciliation of Aims
To fulfill the aim of education, the teacher must respect the
dignity of the learner's mind and its power to think for i t s e l f . T o
fulfill the aim of performance, the teacher must respect the dignity
of a work and its power to reveal its inner truth (beauty) to the per
former.

The aims are reconciled by guiding or assisting the student

in the challenge of aural production and by freeing his intellect to
become connatural xtfith musical sound, thereby facilitating the percep
tion of aesthetic beauty in the music through self-fulfillment.

This

reconciliation is inherently fragile or insecure and difficult to
oversee.
Based on the reconciliation of general aims, the aim of the
performance program is to assist students in finding meaning in their1

1Ibid., p. 26.
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"musical making" or aural production, while recognizing that meaningful
experiences cannot be reliably prepared. -Through the instrumentality of
musical meaning, the performance program can help form the creative
intelligence for the development of the habitus, while recognizing that
the habitus itself cannot be directly taught.

Since personal meaning

motivates the learner to self-commitment, it is concluded that a degree
of the habitus is acquired by student performers who have achieved connaturality with their music.

The development of the habitus, however

meager or however profound, is a natural result of an internal relation
ship between the performer and his object.
The aim of education, as defined by Maritain, has three implica
tions for the performance program:
1.

The performance program must direct its attention toward

the natural intelligence of the student; therefore, its aim should be
to teach the meaning of music to the student performer, the art of
performance being the vehicle for the learning intended.
2.

To fulfill its primary aim, the performance program must

avoid teaching toward

artistic virtue, that is, to teach for the

habitus of performance.
3.

The teaching of performance skills and musical concepts,

primary to any of the misconceptions of education, should not define
the performance program.

These material aims are contributory aims of

the performance program, necessary but secondary because they serve the
classroom art and its focus upon the learner's connaturality with his
object.
The aim of performance, as defined in this study, has three
implications for the performance program:
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1.

Since the meaning of music, or the perception of aesthetic

beauty, prepares the intellect for the development of the habitus, an
immeasurable degree of the habitus is developed as a natural result of
the student performer's connaturality with his aural object.
2.

The habitus, because of its internal depth, is the least

accessible result of the performance program but one which has farreaching implications for the student in possession of such virtue.
Consequently, the impact of the habitus upon a student performer's
musicianship can be profound without being educable, and conspicuous
without being measurable.
3.

The material means of performance, because of their exter

nal nature, are the most accessible results of the performance program,
but these are measurable only in the immediate sense.

For students,

the material means, by themselves, lack the inner depth of the habitus
and, for the instructor, they restrict the farsighted vision required
of directional oversight.

The Habitus and the Release of Learner Intuition
Maritain's respect for the intellectual power of the learner is
evident in his view of the "agents" in education.

The student is the

principal agent of education while the teacher is the ministerial agent,
or one who assists or guides the learner with authority but without
mindless coercion.^

The ministerial role is a position of moral author-

ity because the teacher must adapt himself to the student.

2

Moral

^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 31; idem, "Thomist
Views on Education," p. 58; and idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian
Education," p. 131.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 32-33; and idem,
"Thomist Views on Education," p. 58.
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authority, however, is not to be mistaken for permissiveness because
the teacher must exercise the responsibility of classroom leadership.
Education begins when the student adapts himself to the teacher, thus
completing the reciprocality of the process."*"
Maritain's view of the agents in education is in contrast with
despotic education, in which the teacher is the principal agent, and
O

progressive education, in which the teacher is no agent at all.

The

two latter extremes of education relate to the extremes of voluntarism,
which is concerned with the will and not the intellect.
According to Maritain, the will and the intellect are inter
twined.-^

This is in contrast with the view of the academicist, who

ignores free will because of the belief that intellectual development
precedes and defines it; and the empiricist, who denies the existence
of free will because of the belief that unconscious motivations con
trol behavior.^

The academic and empirical views relate to the two

forms of intellectualism, which tends to ignore or suppress the will
in its intellectual pursuits, materially defined.
cially critical of empirical dynamics.

Maritain is espe

"The fact . . . that there are

unconscious motivations which the subject obeys without knowing them
furnishes in no manner . . .

an argument against free will, for free

will begins with intellectual judgment and consciousness.

■*"Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," p. 40.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 32-35.
O

The will depends on intellectual judgment but it also controls
intellectual movement. See Maritain, "The Conquest of Freedom," in
The Education of Man, pp. 162-163.
4Ibid., pp. 160-161.

5Ibid., p. 161.
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The unconscious motivations, of which Maritain writes, emanate
from the Freudian unconscious mind, the source of irrational impulse or
instinct.’*' The spiritual preconscious mind, as defined by Maritain,
proceeds from the soul of man and is the domain of the intellect and
the xvd.ll, the rational mind.

In other words, reason and will exist,

not only at the conscious level (the logic of reason and the delibera
tion of will) but also in the illogical, spontaneous realm of the
O
spiritual preconsciousness, an area which no technique can reach.
The Freudian unconscious mind might influence the preconscious mind
but it does not control or define the spiritual movement.

The will

emanates from the illogical mind, but this should not be confused
with irrational motivations.
The liberation of the mind, then, refers to the uninhibited
movement of the preconscious mind to the conscious mind, an internal
act which involves both the intellect and the will.

Educational

awareness of the preconscious mind and its movement changes teacher
emphasis ax<ray from external pressure toward
of the spirit.

5

the internal aspirations

The free movement of the preconscious mind is defined

as the release of intuition or intuitive power.

Intuition is defined

as intellectual insight into truth, a power for x^hich no training
exists.®

■''Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 40.
^Ibid., pp. 40-41.

^Ibid., p. 41.

^Ibid., p. 42.

^Ibid.; and idem, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 61.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 43; and idem, "Thomist
Views on Education," p. 61.
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Maritain defines truth as the conformity of.the mind with real
ity.'*'

Intuitive insight into truth is confirmed by personal verifica-

tion; thus, the intellect finds joy or fulfillment in finding truth.
Liberal education, as defined by Maritain, seeks to liberate student
intuitive power to seek truth for itself, thereby preparing the mind
to exercise its own power to reason.

3

The release of intuition can be inhibited by the substitution
of mechanical drill for insight and the substitution of pre-made for
mulas for insight because insight must engage the student's self to be
released.^

These inhibitions relate to the two forms of intellectual-

ism in education.
Education for intuitive insight can be totally betrayed by
society if the secondary agent, the teacher, is denied the time or
the freedom to educate in such a manner.

"It is preposterous to ask

people [teachers] who lead an enslaved life to perform a task of libertr

ation, which the educational task is by essence."'3
teachers to society's

The enslavement of

whims relates to the aim of sociologism in edu

cation.
How, then, can the teacher help free the intuitive power of the
learner's mind?
lect

The answer appears to encompass the nature of the intel

in two related areas: (1) the intellectual adherence to an object;

and (2) the intellectual inclination toward

fulfillment.

"''Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 47.
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 60.

^Ibid., p. 48.

^Ibid., pp. 57-58.
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The Intellect and Its Object
The instructor must allow the student's mind to adhere to an
object, one to be studied or made.^

In the case of performance, the

object specified is a work-to-be-performed.

The teacher must choose

and pursue works which reflect beauty to him and which, in his judgment,
have the potentiality for reflecting beauty to his students.^

The

teacher, with moral authority, must lead the way in the judgment of
potential works; however, a consistent consideration of student choices
and reactions is necessary to assure the free adherence of the learner's
mind to the chosen objects.

To ignore the second stage of the process

is to risk student apathy or alienation in respect to the works-inprogress .
Maritain admonishes students to create nothing which does not
reflect beauty to its creator.

3

This philosophical principle relates

directly to the primary rule of performance.

The performer should per

form nothing which does not please the aural sense.^
In respect to the teacher, he must make certain that the student
grasps each step of the learning experience no matter how slow the grasp
ing, this being particularly important in respect to teacher demonstration
5
or explanation.

,
The practice of this philosophical principle encourages1

1

Ibid., p. 61; and idem, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 44.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 44-45.
■^Ibid., p. 44.

^See chapter 2 above, pp. 22-23.

-*Ibid.; idem, "The Aims of Education," p. 10; idem, "Some Typical
Aspects of Christian Education," p. 137; and idem, "The Dynamics of Edu
cation," pp. 44 and 50.
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the student to place his self into the productive action; for if the stu
dent is confused or apathetic, the self will remain external to the work,
internally defined.

To avoid the motions of performance, the student

must perceive the aural reality of his object; to teach for this grasp
is to appeal to the intuitive power of the student performer.^
The teacher may contribute to student confusion or apathy if he
presents works in the context of pure objectivity and without a sense of
personal conviction that beauty is present within the sounds to be pro
duced.

"The first duty of a Teacher is to develop within himself, for

the sake of truth [beauty], deep-rooted convictions, and frankly to mani
fest them, while taking pleasure, of course, in having the student develop,
possibly against them, his own personal convictions."

2

Maritain also suggests that genuine involvement in a single object
is preferable to a superficial involvement in several objects.^

In this

case, freeing the mind refers to student mastery of reason over a single
object, this being in contrast to burdening his mind with an unreasonable
quantity of material objectives.^

The music instructor should avoid

overly high standards in performance by positing too many material objec
tives for the performance experience; and by attempting to cover an
excessive amount of material in proportion to the reality of time, stu
dent ability, and student interest.

Such a practice weakens the adher

ence of the mind to its object because it fragments the performance*
2

^"Maritain, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," p. 137.
2Ibid., p. 138.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 44-45.
^Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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experience into artistic superficiality.

This point bears a direct rela

tionship to the aim of inclusive education and the fragmentation it
encourages.

The Intellect and Its Aspirations
The release of intuitive power is facilitated if education adapts
itself to the spontaneous curiosity of the student.'*'

Since this is

directed at the natural intelligence, the primary aim of education is
aptly served and encouraged.

2

The facilitation of student curiosity

reproportions the classroom experiences to include more intellectual
enjoyment and less factual information, objectively conceived.

O

More

emphasis is given to illumination by personal perception, a subjective
experience in contrast with the mere dissemination of facts.
In the above context, informal and unsystematic learning is as
important as, and perhaps preferable to, formal and systematic educa
tion.^

The instrumentality of "play" is important in learning matters

of great worth, and great depth, for there is no better way to capture
student interest and convey the meaning of a field.*
3

Informal learning

does not diminish the importance of a field but, to the contrary, it
uses curiosity to a great advantage: to seek truth in an object and
to risk creative experiences.3

^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 72; and idem, "The
Dynamics of Education," p. 43.
■^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 49-50, 72.
3Ibid., p. 72.
^Maritain, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," pp.
152-153.
5Ibid.

6Ibid.
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The playing of an instrument is, in the above context, given a
literal definition.

Through connaturality, the student’s curiosity can

be aroused by the potential sound of a work.

The intellectual fulfill

ment and enjoyment occurs when the sound of his object is perceived as
"good," an internal, informal discovery.

The Habitus and Intuition
Uninhibited intuitive power is fertile ground for finding the
meaning of music.

Similarly, the development of the habitus is facil

itated because (1) intellectual adhesion to an object relates to con
naturality; and (2) the freeing of learner intuition encourages the stu
dent to place his self into his aural object.

The complexity of the

habitus denies a predictable outcome from such classroom involvement;
however, the nature of the habitus allows at least the probability that
its development will be facilitated through the instrumentality of stu
dent intuitive pox?er.
An important point for emphasis is that the enjoyment of music
through performance is given a renewed priority in the performance pro
gram.

Maritain believes that, without personal delight, neither the

meaning of music nor the habitus can make a significant impact upon the
student during his formative years.

It has been established that the

performance program should not educate for the habitus; however, the
spontaneous development of this virtue is a profound and commendable
achievement, not to be disdained or ignored by music education.

The

pathways to meaning, and to the habitus beyond, are cleared through
enj oyment.
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Unless we delight in and are moved by a work of art, we may
thoroughly discuss and analyze it but we shall never understand
it. . . . the delight transmitted by beauty thrills not only
the senses but also, and first of all, the intuitiveness of
intelligence and spirit. Neither the "historical" approach,
freeing us from the consideration of the works themselves, nor
any irrational and merely sensuous "communication of ecstasy"
is an appropriate method. The good method requires first the
intuitive delight, both emotional and intellectual, in the
work's beauty, second, the rational disquisition of the very
causes of this delight and of the intellectual regulations by
which the work has been internally and vitally ruled and
structured. It is necessary to make clear for the understand
ing of the pupil the inner logic of a Mozart sonata, read and
discussed from the score. But it is first necessary for the
pupil to hear the sonata and be delighted in it, and love it
with his ears and with his heart. Man's senses are not fan]
. . . impure element [to be distrusted], . . . They are not
unworthy of reason, they naturally serve reason and convey
its food to it.

%aritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 52, n.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this study do not support a total regeneration of
the performance program, to be initiated by the profession itself.

In

other words, Maritain's philosophy of the arts, and of education, does
not lend itself to extremist tendencies, externally conceived and
imposed; therefore, the implementation of a "Maritain method" designed
to turn performance programs upside down would be as arrogant and irre
sponsible as any methods targeted for replacement.
The findings of this study do support an inversion of priorities
in the performance program, but the process of inversion would be inter
nally conceived and developed.

Each program, through its teachers, would

be encouraged to (1) exercise self-examination or introspection for the
identification and evaluation of present priorities and to (2) implement
whatever changes might be necessary to correct misconceptions or mis
directions .
For most performance programs, new priorities would be defined
by a shift of emphasis away from the external influence of institutional,
social, or instructional designs to the personal aesthetic inclinations
of the primary agent: the student.

Similarly, the general content of

the performance experience would remain the same; hox^ever, no single
area of study or performance activity, which threatens the primary focus,
would be allowed to dominate or dictate the performance experience.
160
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A minority of performance programs may find that conscientious
introspection is a stimulus for a radical change in priorities, inter
nally conceived.
sary.

Another minority may find little or no change neces

Change for the sake of change is as potentially harmful as the

self-serving resistance to any change at all.
Educational agencies and institutions would, by necessity, be
required to invert their priorities in the same direction as the per
formance programs, not for purposes of imposition, but to provide leader
ship, encouragement, and assistance to school performance programs in
general.

To accomplish this, the profession must abandon its preoccu

pation with precocious recipes as educational ends.

It is recommended,

therefore, that educators focus their energies upon (1) a renewed recog
nition of the student as the primary agent in the classroom; (2) a redis
covery of the nature of fine art; and (3) an unwavering defense of these
priorities within the context of the performance program.

The Art of Performance and the Classroom Art
Classroom Aims
Classroom performance, which is typically a group experience,
should focus its attention upon works rather than students.

In other

words, classroom performance should pursue the making of good works
more than the making of good musicians.
On the surface, this recommendation may appear to contradict
the preceding discussion; however, the pursuit of good works is directed
at the natural intelligence of the student, this being in line with the
primary aim of education.

Furthermore, aural production which is pleas

ing to the students, as well as the instructor, is in line with the
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primary aim of performance.

The pursuit of beauty in performed works

is, in the internal sense, the top priority of classroom performance.
Classroom musical production which arouses student curiosity and encom
passes student intellectual inclinations is defined as a student-centered
experience.
Student mastery of the instrumental or vocal mechanism is,
within the framework of the group experience, accomplished through the
production of works or in service to a musical object.

Classroom expe

riences in skill refinement should be undertaken to help perfect an
aural object, to improve its musical sound to the satisfaction of the
students and the instructor, rather than to train for the sake of the
skill by itself.
The teaching of musical concepts, through score analysis, should
be prompted by the necessity of producing a work rather than merely know
ing about the components of works.

Terminology and the sign language of

score notation are a means of production and students must be shown that
conceptual means serve an aural end, an actual end and not a prepared
lesson.

In the presence of real works, students can come to understand

why a personal command of score notation is important and how musical
concepts facilitate the experience of making.

The use of selected works

for the teaching of certain concepts is hot aural production and,
although the occasional isolation and emphasis of material is desirable,
the general practice of performance for knowledge is missing the artis
tic element and cannot be defined as classroom art.
The proponents of "comprehensive musicianship" have posited
objectives and activities which are intended to make, of the student,
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a complete musician.

First, it is true that the student performer should

be viewed, by his teacher, as something more than a skilled technician.
Secondly, it is also true that instructional consideration of musical
knowledge and alternative musical activities are often ignored by the
performance program in favor of commitments to public appearances.
Nevertheless, the most serious and obvious problem with the pro
posed method or approach is that it focuses upon the student performer
rather than the art of performance.

Despite different priorities, the

focus of "comprehensive musicianship" moves in the same direction as
"technical training," the very specialization it intends to displace in
importance.

Both aims fall into the framework of intellectualism in

education.
The scope of works authorized by the above method is not to be
confused with the spontaneous selection or discovery of works by the
instructor and his students.

In respect to the former, the repertoire

consists of a carefully selected, analyzed, and prepared sequence of
works.

Through suggested implementation, objectives and activities are

carefully organized, a feature which fails to confront the spiritual
mystery of art and seems to tolerate a mode of sameness which encour
ages the sterilization of classroom performance.

The implication is

that the student product is to be a copy of an ideal rather than a per
former and perceiver in his own right, a learner with personal abilities,
inclinations, and goals to pursue.

A method which tightly controls the

experience of performance also denies teacher-student freedom to operate
within an infinity of artistic possibilities for fulfillment.
Again, professional agencies and institutions must accept that,
inevitably, the teacher knows his students, and their intellectual

164
traits, better than any external educational agent.

It is the teacher

who must choose methods and materials which he judges to be connatural,
or to contain the potentiality of connaturality, with the students in
his classroom.
Professional advocates of singular approaches to comprehensive
musicianship have misunderstood the depth of this concept.

Through the

formal action of performance, the student is carried to a personal
spiritual depth that surpasses the scope of singular approaches.

The

depth of artistic performance is reached nonconceptually and through
the intellect's connaturality with sound.

Each genuine experience of

art, then, will unquestionably, and immeasurably, enhance a student's
comprehensive musicianship without direct preparation for this achieve
ment .
When works-in-progress demand the accomplishment of certain
material objectives, a prepared lesson plan or published method should
be spontaneously applied for remedial work.

The artistic needs will

reveal themselves spontaneously, and the instructor's chosen methods
must be applied experimentally with a constant monitoring of results.
Conceivably, ineffective methods will be discarded while others proven
to be effective will be employed.

The difficulty of this procedure

reflects the difficulty of the art of performance.
Classroom performance for effect is, in actuality, a concern
with the group's sound and a corresponding lesser concern with the
sound of its object.

Performance for effect is concerned with audi

ence approval, parental approval, or administrative approval, all of
which are desirable but not as determining factors in the execution of
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the classroom product.

The desire to please or impress others threatens

the primary aim of performance because nonmusical and extramusical con
cerns can easily dominate the artistic practice.
To neutralize temptation for approval-seeking, each work should
be produced and performed as if no one, except the producers, were to be
present to hear the performance.

The aim to please should be personally

defined; that is, the performers should first seek personal pleasure in
their art and then they can safely aspire to external fulfillment and
hope that their personal fulfillment will be conveyed to others as well.
This kind of external approval follows, but does not define, the experi
ence, and it preserves the primary rule of fine art.
Often, classroom performance for effect is an ego-enhancing
device which disguises a lack of artistic action.

Conversely, perform

ance for the object engages the self but not the ego; therefore, the art
of performance teaches the student something of self-commitment to aural
products.
It is recommended, therefore, that elementary and secondary level
group performance be directed at the creation of works.

The growth of

external musicianship will occur simultaneously and spontaneously with
the depth of production.

Furthermore, the internal realm of the habitus

will develop apart from institutional or instructional control, undetect
able in its growth but profound in its presence.

Classroom Action
The role of artistic judgment in classroom performance begins
with the choice of literature, the repertoire of works-to-be-performed.
Judgment, as defined in this study, is an ongoing process which would
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make the selection of works an ongoing process, an intuitive assessment
of a work's potentiality as it is perceived in sound.
The moral authority of the classroom conductor requires that he
accept and implement his leadership role in the judgment of works and
the consequent selection of the performance repertoire.

Obviously, by

visual score assessment alone, he cannot reliably know in advance which
works will facilitate his group's connaturality with sound.

Initially,

the visual choices are made with the students in mind, in consideration
of ability and interest, and with a perspective of the appropriateness
of the literature for future performance commitments.

Sight-reading the

selected works through performance action is a primary determining fac
tor because, through sound, the visual assessment is affirmed or negated.
Both the conductor and his students will perceive and react to the initial
hearing of the work, in terms of pleasure or displeasure, and the group's
ability will be directly tested by the work's level of difficulty.

Most

works will reveal themselves to be worthy or unworthy of further aural
action.

Some works will require time and effort before a decision can

be made on the desirability of pursuing a final point of completion,
thereby providing living proof of the ongoing nature of artistic judgment.
In the case of contemporary music, the classroom conductor must
accept the probability of his students' initial displeasure with the
complexity of this music.

As the aural sense begins to grow connatural

with complex music, the instructor can better judge the potentiality of
contemporary works, while exercising patience and tact with his students.
Works that remain incomprehensible to the students should be discontinued,
at least temporarily, and perhaps permanently.
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Externally imposed taste cannot legitimately supersede the
mind's connaturality with sound, no matter how simple or trite this
sensory relationship may appear to the teacher.

The matter of style

is secondary to the selection of literature because often a teacher
purported style of music is, in fact, an imposition of taste upon his
students.

It is preferable that stylistic considerations be a natural

part of choices made in the light of artistic judgment.

Works that

challenge, as well as please, are not confined to a particular style
because beauty is present in all works, to a degree.

Exploring the

unfamiliar is desirable because works that unexpectedly arouse curi
osity or excitement must be discovered.

Choices should not be exter

nally determined by style; they should be a natural result of a con
naturality with a style, internally perceived.

It is probable that the

practicality of a particular style may be a determining factor in its
initial choice; however, the essential internal test (its connatural
ity with the student performers) is the primary factor, one which
naturally operates within the framework of practicality (so long as
external taste does not impose itself upon the selective process).
The reality of the work, or its inner mystery, must be assessed
aurally as it is perceived in sound.
sense.

The instructor must teach

This is re-creation in its fullest

toward, and demonstrate the presence

of, the inner work which lies beyond the score, the outer work.
The action of classroom performance requires creation, as well
as re-creation, because (1) the performing group brings its uniqueness
into the experience, and (2) the composed work, already complete, is
incomplete as an object of performance.

Artistic judgment helps the
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performer envision the potential product, a creative idea to be pursued
intuitively.

The instructor must teach his students that the perform

ance idea is more than scored material and more than a single, obvious
phenomenon to be fulfilled.

Artistic vision is more likely to encom

pass a series of ideas occurring along the way to a completed product.
The ideas unfold and are to be pursued in detail, the details being
tested by their application to the evolving work.

The teacher must

take great care in demonstrating how the spontaneous creative ideas
are tested against, and reflected upon, the evolving product; that is,
the spawning ideas are more closely tied to the realism of the evolving
work than the idealism of a lesson plan.
Inspiration is not a teachable concept, in the direct sense; it
is experienced through discovery.

The instructor can provide the set

ting for inspiration but he cannot prepare it or provide it within a
lesson plan.

He must allow and encourage a free flow of ideas from

his students, in addition to the spawning of his own ideas, all of
which are applied to, and tested by, the aural results.

The proper

setting for inspiration is a free and continuous testing of perform
ance ideas in pursuit of the spontaneous discoveries which promote
intellectual movement toward

its object.

Artistic imitation, as defined in this study, regards the action
of performance as something more than simple execution or reproduction
of the score.

The classroom conductor who defines performance as the

execution or externalization of score mechanics is duplicating but not
imitating.

To imitate, the classroom group and its conductor must

become part of their object through self-commitment.

As the work
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evolves in sound, the aural reality becomes the objective work trans
figured by subjective perception; in other words, the score is trans
formed into the inner work.
The instructor teaches the imitative action of performance by
assisting his students in expressing the work through a self
involvement in the aural reality perceived.

This requires the stu

dents to "lose themselves" in their object.

The Classroom Conductor as Instructor
The classroom conductor is first responsible for the production
of good aural products, and through this responsibility, he inherits the
leadership role in classroom art.

As the classroom leader, he is also

responsible to the artists, in terms of guiding the experiences of the
student performers.

In respect to works, his instructional directives

should relate to experimentation, application, and perception.

In

respect to his students, his instructional directives should apply to
guidance, assistance, clarification, demonstration, and evaluation.
Despotic imposition is not a proper part of either instructional mode.
In respect to despotic aims, the classroom conductor must avoid
defining the performance experience as the dissemination of academic
rules; the execution of martial drill; art for use; and art for self
enhancement .
The school conductor must seek beauty in his aural product by
directing the classroom art in that direction, aurally.

He must see

to it that his students perceive and understand his directives in rela
tionship to the work-in-progress.

In this way, the students can become

personally involved in the process of innovation and they can personally
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perceive the aural results.

In a sense, the student performers, as pro

ducers or instruments of sound, are closer to the action of performance
than the conductor.

With this in mind, the instructor must ensure that

the classroom art will not deteriorate into impersonal motions of per
formance within which external aims or uses predominate.

The classroom

art is truly a "team effort" in service to an object.
The classroom conductor must recognize the spiritual mystery
inherent in each work of art.

In other words, he should avoid dictat

ing results in advance or defining his classroom art in terms of pre
conception.

It is preferable that the classroom conductor free his

personal habitus to guide him intuitively to the "good" ends.

In this

way, he will determine means at the moment of production, during the
momentary action of conducting.

Simultaneously, the means are commu

nicated to the student performers by the practical sign and the aural
end evolves of itself.

Exposure to such creative depth is an irreplace

able experience for classroom performers because the instructor is a
personal example of an artist who has freed his creative intellect in
observance of the primary rule of fine art.

Studio Lessons and Apprenticeship Education
The matter of studio lessons relates to Maritain’s conception of
apprenticeship education.

The apprentice performer aspires to become a

performer and seeks the guidance of a master teacher in his development.
Because such education looks toward the habitus, studio lessons are
beyond the scope of Maritain's conception of classroom education, which
pertains to the natural intelligence.
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In reality, however, each performance program includes and pro
vides for studio-like lessons, in which the teacher plays the role of
the master teacher.

Because of this reality, and in resolution of the

above conflict, it is concluded that studio lessons, private or individ
ualized, are an exception to the conclusions of this study because the
focus is upon the student performer; furthermore, the instruction is
directed toward

the artistic virtue or habitus.

Because the student performer is a novice, unrealistic teacher
expectations are as inappropriate in the studio as in the classroom.

A

minimum of external pressure must be combined with a maximum of positive
encouragement.

The factor of student aspiration also requires an

increased emphasis upon specialization and an increased student respon
sibility for personal achievement.
The master teacher must challenge, guide, and encourage his stu
dent's inner aspirations.

As much as possible, the performance material

should be objects chosen, or at least agreeable to, the student, with
the master teacher assisting and supervising the works' production.
The teacher, in the studio, demonstrates and corrects through personal
example; the student apprentice imitates the example through practice
and application.

In other words, the student does the actual making

while the teacher observes and oversees, but does not dictate, the
final product.
The refinement of performance skill is a necessary part of the
studio experience but it does not define its purpose.

The acquiring of
r

the habitus is dependent upon the self-commitment of the student to his
object; and the master teacher must look towards it, recognize its
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presence, give it direction for growth, and provide the setting for
facilitating this growth.

The Use of Performance and the Performance Program
The Concert
In respect to the primary aim of performance, the concert expe
rience is the best forum for the performance program to present its
works to others, a forum similar to the display of visual works in an
art gallery.

The use or display follows the production and does not

legitimately define it.

Some productive action occurs during the con

cert experience; however, the works are normally and largely produced
and externalized during the classroom rehearsal, prior to the public
presentation.
Since the works presented in concert are products of classroom
action, these works first provided pleasure to the performers during
the daily classroom activity.

In this case, classroom action and

classroom rehearsing are synonymous experiences.

The public concert,

then, is a natural culmination of the action, the fruits of production
made available for enjoyment by others.
Concerts presented to satisfy the school calendar, raise funds,
or enhance public relations supersede artistic priorities unless these
extramusical elements are relegated to secondary status, a fringe bene
fit of the art itself.
Because of the perceptive depth involved, the concert experience
is very likely more aesthetically rewarding to the performers (and con
ductor) themselves than to an audience, which must perceive with less .
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depth because of external limitations.

The responsibility of the audi

ence is to receive the works and perceive as much as can be perceived
from an external position.

The Contest
The pursuit of contest ratings can force the performance pro
gram into a dependence upon nonmusical objectives for demonstrating its
success or effectiveness.

Using contest ratings as a barometer of suc

cess is outside of the aesthetic realm because the presence of aesthetic
beauty cannot be confined or limited to external measurement.

The ques

tion of whether the fine arts lend themselves to the competitive arena
can be answered in terms of disinterestedness.

A product of fine art

must first be created for itself before any use, such as competition,
can legitimately be undertaken.

Consequently, the music contest,

defined in terms of nonmusical objectives, is in violation of the pri
mary aim of performance.
Because aspiring for high contest ratings encourages overspe
cialization, voluntarism (in either extreme), and sociologism, the pur
suit of ratings may also violate the primary aim of education.

In

respect to sociologism, the performance program may inadvertently encour
age the community, the school, or parents to use high ratings to advance
themselves in the eyes of others.

As a result, students may gain a

false impression of themselves, of the intent of the performance pro
gram, and of the meaning of fine art.

Contest ratings, then, can be

defined as the "false idols" of fine art, the pursuit of which enhances
observable success to the neglect of internal, aesthetic fulfillment.
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Apart from ratings, the contest experience is desirable if (1)
the disinterestedness of the product is enhanced through further learn
ing; and (2) the virtuosity of the student performer is supplemented
and enhanced by the adjudicator's suggestions.

To accomplish this,

the instructor and his students must retain aesthetical objectives in
the face of nonaesthetical temptation.

They must aspire for conceptual

and nonconceptual improvement in their aural product, and they should
seek technical assistance in performance execution, by inquiry if
necessary.

Artistic Criticism and the Adjudicator
The role of the contest adjudicator can be defined as aesthetic
criticism, a form of aesthetic judgment of performed works. While the
performer's aesthetic judgment is an ongoing judgment, the adjudicator's
criticism is typically a single judgment, external to the productive
process.

In other words, ongoing aesthetic judgment carries the per

former into his object more deeply over a period of time.

The adjudi

cator's criticism is applicable to the product in its present form.

The

criticism is made in terms of providing direction but it cannot legiti
mately control the production action in terms of finality.

The performer

judges through the action; the adjudicator judges from the action.
Often, adjudication is a judgment of taste rather than of works.
This is criticism tainted by preconception because the work is judged
from views or requirements previously determined by the adjudicator.
The judgment of taste is a negative criticism because the adjudicator
listens for his preconceptions and judges the work by the presence or
lack of such taste.

To avoid the bias of taste, the adjudicator must

175
allow the work to teach him its content by receiving it as a unique
aural object and perceiving the object in sound, nonconceptually.

The

true adjudicator asks the work to reveal itself to him and then judges
what it has to say, a way of detecting the inner presence of beauty.
Occasionally, the adjudicator will focus his criticism upon
the performer rather than the work, a judgment of the performer's
technique and ability.

This kind of judgment confuses the judgment

of skill with aesthetic criticism while slighting the very object
from which aesthetic beauty emanates.
The contest adjudicator must exercise aesthetic criticism by
judging the work without preconception.

While focusing upon the work,

he can judge the performer's technique through his object.

The criti

cism of taste should be avoided in reference to either the performer
or his work.

The Marching Band
The marching band experience encompasses two art forms: a martial
art and a fine art.

Because these art forms, by nature, are in conflict

with one another, the marching band presents unique problems to the per
formance program, as aesthetic education.
Critics of the marching band often deny that this experience has
aesthetic properties; however, they also ignore the presence of two dis
tinct art forms within its parameters.

The marching band is a fine art

when it performs musical works for the good of the work.

The marching

band is a martial art when it executes physical movements and patterns
with military-like discipline, the content of which is learned through
physical drill or repetition.
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Because the inarching band consists of performing musicians, the
aesthetic intent should predominate over the martial intent in its oper
ation.

This is in contrast to the drum and bugle corps which equalizes

martial maneuvers and musical production.

Often, the marching band is

erroneously equated with the drum and bugle corps; resultingly, it is
viewed as an instrument of martial patterns, and colorful display,
rather than as an aural instrument enhanced by the visual effects.
Open air acoustics requires a unique approach to aural produc
tion, thus giving the marching band its unique aesthetic properties.
The sound of the group is affected by the strength of the brass and
percussion sections and the choice of block-band formation.

The

dynamics of sound are generally louder and are executed with less
contrast than the concert hall acoustics would require.
Despite the disadvantages of open air acoustics, the aural plea
sure of performance exists at the marching band level as well as the
concert band level.

The difference is a matter of timbre, complexity

of sound, and depth.

Nevertheless, to regard the marching band as a

martial art, and nothing else, is a slighting of the aesthetic poten
tiality of this experience.
The marching band presents problems to the performance program
when it is given precedence over all other components of the program.
For example, show band marching can require complex martial maneuvers,
thereby over-commiting classroom time to martial drill and saturating
the performing band experience with nonaesthetic considerations.
The marching band experience should not define the performance
program.

If this single component of the program threatens to dominate
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the classroom activity, it is the responsibility of the instructor to
adjust, reduce, or eliminate the threat in preservation of the class
room art, aurally and aesthetically defined.

The Sports Band
The sports band experience is a controversial, and often abused,
component of the performance program.

The influence of sociologism has

forced many performance programs to emphasize this experience over all
of the other components of the program.

Consequently, preparation for

sports band commitments can saturate the classroom activity and force
the classroom art away from its aesthetic priorities.
A common criticism of sports bands, as expounded in educational
circles, is that the musical styles typically performed by them lack
aesthetical content.

This study has provided evidence to the contrary.

The aesthetic beauty of music is not confined to a particular style or
specified type of production.

Furthermore, the artistic production of

works should not be confused x^ith its use.

Obviously, the sports band

object has less depth and complexity than the concert band object; never
theless, a performer’s connaturality with the sound of his object is as
important to the sports band experience as any other performance experi
ence .
The instructor, x<?ith a personal bias in musical taste, may slight
the sports band object, thereby encouraging the impersonal motions of
performance.

Motions of performance, alloxjed at any musical level, is

inexcusable.

The preparation of the sports band object must be directed

at the aural good of the work, regardless of the use intended.
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The sports band presents problems to the performance program
when it is given precedence over all other components of the program.
Faced with overcommitment, the instructor should adjust, reduce, or
discontinue any sports band activity which threatens the primacy of
classroom art.

If the primary rule of fine art is observed, the

sports band product can then be used for its commitments without
harm to the art itself or the student performers involved.

APPENDIX
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The Research Design

Chapter II
The Habitus of Fine Art
Research Questions
1.

What is the relationship of the habitus to the intellect?

2.

What is the relationship of the habitus to the practical order of
art?

3.

What is the relationship of the habitus to the rules of art?

Chapter III
The Aim of Performance
Research Questions
1.

What is the

relationship of beauty to performance?

2.

What is the

relationship of technique to performance?

3.

What is the relationship of communication to performance?

Chapter IV
The Action of Performance
Research Questions
1.

What is the

relationship of artistic judgment to performance?

2.

What is the

relationship of imitation to performance?

3.

What is the

relationship of the creative idea to performance?

Chapter V
The Use of Performance
Research Question
1.

What is the relationship of morality to performance?
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Chapter VI
Summary and Conclusions
Summation Question*
1
1.

What is the relationship of the habitus to musical performance?

Chapter VII
Applications to the Performance
Program in Music Education
Applicative Questions
1.

How can Maritain's definition of the aim of education be reconciled
with the aim of musical performance, as defined by the habitus?

2.

How can the habitus of music be developed through the release of
intuitive power in the mind of the student performer?
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